To add to these concerns, Sithole was not acting in unison with Government and James Chikerema withdrew his support from Muzorewa’s ruling party. It was not as if we did not expect to see infighting and incompetence in the new government order because all along we knew that relinquishing control too early would not work; but circumstances had made this the only option to attracting Western approval and circumvention of the Marxist alternative.
By now the title appended to the increasing exodus of whites seeking safer pastures changed from ‘chicken run’ to ‘owl run’ because many considered it the wise thing to do. Yet, for most white Rhodesians, the desire to remain in God’s own country remained strong. Like everyone else in COMOPS I had one aim in mind. This was to support the government in power, weak though it was, and work flat-out to destroy the enemies that sought to remove it.
The saying that every dark cloud has a silver lining was applicable to these times. South Africa was embroiled in what became known as ‘The Information Scandal’. I do not remember the details but know that it forced a change in national leadership. Vorster was out of the driving seat and P.W. Botha took the wheel. With this change came a marked improvement in political attitudes towards Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and the inflow of goods returned to normal.
Operation Uric
FOR THE MOMENT ZIPRA WAS hobbled but ZANLA, with ever-mounting assistance from FRELIMO, was increasingly active in the south. Terrorist numbers in the Op Repulse area had grown to the point where over 50% of ZANLA’s deployed force, estimated at 11,000, was in that area in early August 1979. In a show of support to the Muzorewa Government, South Africa committed a Fireforce comprising Puma helicopters, Dakotas and troops to the south of the country. Fielding as many fighting troops as all of our Fireforces put together, there were great hopes that this force would make great inroads against ZANLA and FRELIMO, but it was not to be. As we had come to know only too well, the flat lands of the region rendered intelligence of the type needed to bring Fireforces into contact almost impossible.
At the same time an impending multi-party conference in London was making world headlines; but President Machel of Mozambique saw some danger to ZANU’s position if the talks took place. He turned his full attention therefore to assisting ZANLA push for an early outright military victory. To achieve this meant cutting Rhodesia’s road and rail links to South Africa and countering ZIPRA’s limited encroachment into southern Matabeleland.
More radio-equipped FRELIMO forces were added to those that had been operating inside Rhodesia for some time and some elements had even penetrated into ZIPRA areas. Externally, FRELIMO forces deployed along the well—established communication lines through Gaza Province from the coast to the Rhodesian border were now given instructions to strengthen their bases and give maximum support to ZANLA. By mid-August ZANLA was receiving overt assistance to the extent that they had become fully integrated with FRELIMO in their bases, defences, and transport systems. With over 15,000 trained CTs poised to move through Gaza, the dangers to Rhodesia were escalating rapidly.
This situation meant that any actions we took in Gaza would involve deliberate confrontation with FRELIMO, which until now had been avoided wherever possible. Now, however, the FRELIMO Government’s undiluted involvement with Mugabe’s ZANU party brought about a substantial change in political thinking. Major economic targets, which had hitherto been safeguarded by ‘political considerations’, no longer enjoyed such protection. This was all possible because of new thinking by the black government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and changed attitudes within the SA Government.
In COMOPS there was little to ponder on how to stem the impending flood. Norman Walsh’s operational plans, shelved for ‘political reasons’ in 1977, had to be put into urgent effect. They involved in-depth destruction of road and rail communications, specifically bridges, and first priority was given to Gaza Province.
Whereas the railway had already been put out of commission by the Scouts and SAS in numerous short-duration operations, FRELIMO had not been neutralised—quite the opposite. They had in fact acquired considerable combat experience and determination in countering RSF forays against their ZANLA brothers. They had also put together sufficient road transport to fully compensate for the loss of rail transport.
In particular, FRELIMO had been given so much breathing space between operations that they had been able, with considerable assistance from Russian advisors, to build up a formidable military base at Mapai incorporating heavy ground and counter-air defence networks. In addition they had installed defensive positions around all strategic and economic key-points. All in all this made a job that might have been a cakewalk two years earlier complicated and extremely dangerous.
The first phase in this operation was to cut the transport line running from the Aldeia da Barragem road-rail bridge that formed part of the Limpopo River irrigation system all the way northwestward to our border. It involved cutting the huge Barragem bridge plus four lesser ones, mining main and secondary roads and destroying all transport north of the Limpopo. Equal in importance to destroying ground communications was the destruction of Mapai itself. This was considered essential to drive FRELIMO out of Gaza and force ZANLA into adopting the safer northern routes through Mozambique that would channel them through hilly terrain best suited to Selous Scouts and Fireforce operations.
There was some division in COMOPS thinking concerning operational priorities and actions to be taken in Operation Uric. Together with Brigadier Peter Rich and Brian Robinson, I saw Mapai as the key target around which to focus all other operations. Air Commodore Walsh supported this line of thinking, though he had no direct say in the ground planning.
The SAS, RLI and Army Engineers were earmarked for the destruction of bridges and mining of roads, so we recommended that a strong Selous Scouts vehicle-borne force with Air Force jet support should move on Mapai at least three days ahead of these actions. The object was not to attack Mapai directly but to subject it to siege and harassment to soften up and hem in the garrison force. We knew this force relied heavily on daily supplies of road-transported water, a commodity that was very scarce in that arid area. So denial of water would be the Scouts’ prime objective.
The planning sessions became somewhat heated and were incomplete when Op Uric was launched prematurely. This became necessary when an agreed date for the commencement of an all-parties conference at Lancaster House in London was suddenly thrust upon us. It was less than two weeks away.
Because of the political time factor, General Walls hurriedly ruled out Mapai, as he believed destruction of communications had to take first priority and, if successful, this would effectively force Mapai’s collapse. He also wanted to ensure that all air support would be available to the SAS, RLI and Engineers operations.
On D-Day minus one, 1 September 1979, fuel, explosives, ammunition and most participating troops were parachuted into the forward Admin Base located in remote ground 200 kilometres inside Gaza. Then, on D-Day, a heavy guti (low cloud with heavy drizzle) came down, forcing a postponement. Luckily the miserable weather only lasted one day instead of the usual three days.