Apart from a single vehicle track leading to the area, the JSPIS photo-interpreters could find little of interest on or near the prominent ridge the pilots reported as being the source of enemy fire. So one of the pilots was called in to view the photographs to clarify what he had seen coming from where.
Bill Buckle was considering re-tasking a Canberra recce for 10:00 the next day to overcome the glare problem by bringing shadows into play. Whilst he pondered this with others, Norah Seear was taking another close look at the southern end of the ridge where the pilot said at least two of the guns were positioned. Vaguely, very vaguely, Norah saw lines that might be trenches—but she could not be sure.
In COMOPS we knew that the pilot reports were accurate and that ZIPRA had certainly been where the anti-aircraft fire had come from. It was decided therefore to send in the SAS to investigate rather than run another photographic sortie, which might cause ZIPRA to move away.
Captain Bob MacKenzie moved to Kariba and, on 18 October, launched two SAS patrols by helicopter. One patrol landed well to the north of the ridge to ambush the track and the second team was put down well to the south of the ridge. Once they were down, Hunters and Canberras put in strikes. As the jets cleared, a high-flying Dakota ran parallel legs each side of the ridge, dropping incendiaries in a failed attempt to burn vegetation and deny the enemy bush cover. Orbiting high over the ridge in a Lynx piloted by Air Lieutenant Trevor Jew, Bob MacKenzie took a good look at his area of operations.
Apart from the main north/south ridge-line, a lesser ridge ran parallel to it two kilometres to the west with a bone-dry water pan surrounded by thick bush occupying much of the space between them. The vehicle track from the north passed the pan on its eastern side. Bob came to the conclusion that the main base, if occupied, was on the low ground around the dry pan with primary defences high on the ridges.
Bob and all the pilots saw trenches but no sign of people or anti-aircraft fire. The SAS patrols agreed that not a shot had been fired at any aircraft. So, all in all, it looked as if ZIPRA had vacated the position. Nevertheless, Bob MacKenzie instructed his teams to continue as briefed. This was to move closer to the base then listen and observe from ambush positions—a classic SAS task.
The southern SAS patrol had only just established its ambush after sunset when a ZIPRA patrol came their way moving through thick bush in extended formation. One ZIPRA man was killed before the main group scampered into deep cover. Blood spoor showed that others had been wounded and dragged to safety.
Because of this action, Bob ordered both patrols to break ambush and commence a move towards the main ridge. They were to link up on the high ground at first light before descending into the suspect base area. Faced with thick jesse bush conditions on a dark night, the southern patrol opted to move along the vehicle track. In doing so it ran into a ZIPRA ambush in which one of the SAS men, Lance-Corporal McLaurin, was fatally wounded. In consequence, and because another soldier was down with severe heat fatigue, the patrol moved to safety and held position until a helicopter casevac was made at first light.
Because both patrols were still well short of the ridge, helicopters moved the troops closer to their objective. At the time, the commanders of both groups were sure that ZIPRA must have pulled out of the area following afternoon and night encounters. They were seriously mistaken!
Unbeknown to the Rhodesians, a large conventionally trained and highly disciplined ZIPRA force, dug in on the ridges and pan area, awaited them. All command posts were linked by landline telephones that allowed the progress of the two SAS patrols to be relayed by those who could see them to others who could not. Not a sound could be heard by the SAS as they climbed the steep-sided ends of the ridge.
As they were nearing the top, the southern group came under unexpected intense and accurate fire from a host of weapon types. The group was pinned down and could not move in any direction without attracting angry attention. Jet support was called for.
Trevor Jew and Bob MacKenzie immediately got airborne from Kariba in a Lynx. They aimed to establish the position of the pinned-down group as well as the ZIPRA elements containing them. They arrived ahead of the jets and picked up the flash and dust of a ZIPRA recoilless-rifle firing at the trapped soldiers. In an attempt to relieve the hard-pressed soldiers, Trevor turned in with the intention of neutralising the enemy position with Frantans. Showing great discipline, the enemy had patiently withheld their fire against aircraft the previous day; but now they opened up with a vengeance the moment Trevor commenced his attack dive.
The weight of fire was too great to continue the attack and, as the Lynx pulled up and turned, it took critical strikes which forced Trevor to turn for home. On the way his damaged front engine quit and at Kariba he was forced to make a relatively high-speed belly landing because severed hydraulic lines had disabled undercarriage and flaps functions.
In the meanwhile Hunters drew all enemy attention to themselves when they put in attacks on the pan area. This allowed the southern patrol sufficient breathing space to make a hurried withdrawal. Both patrols were then recovered to Kariba, but not before the northern group had a short contact near their helicopter pick-up point. Three ZIPRA were killed and one was captured. Miraculously, as had happened before, the captured man turned out to be a key figure. He was the logistics officer for the base.
From this important man a number of issues came to the fore. The base contained part of a battalion of ZIPRA’s 1st Brigade from Mulungushi comprising over 200 conventionally trained men with another 100 men expected to arrive soon. This particular base had been established recently as the forward element for an intended invasion of Rhodesia across the Kariba dam wall. The logistics officer said the present force would definitely not abandon its position even knowing an attack was coming. Whilst plans were being made for this, the commander of the southern SAS patrol was redeployed with a smaller callsign to keep an eye on ZIPRA developments from an OP on a prominent hill feature.
Operation Tepid
WE HAD STUMBLED UPON THIS forward base at a time when disturbing intelligence was reaching COMOPS. It concerned the movement of large numbers of ZIPRA’s conventional forces from Luso Boma in Angola and from Mulungushi in Zambia. Most appeared destined for CGT 2 base, which was obviously another forward launch-point for the impending invasion. In addition, large quantities of arms and equipment, including MiG 21 fighters, were reported to be arriving in Zambia.
Joshua Nkomo was obviously pulling out all the stops to get his large invasion force into Rhodesia before the Lancaster House talks progressed to a point where this might no longer be possible. Those forces he had in the country were small and ineffectual whilst the forces of his rival, Robert Mugabe, already dominated all of the Shona tribal areas and large sections of his own Matabeleland. Considering the imminent possibility of a ceasefire agreement to be followed by all-party elections, this was not a happy situation.
There was also the probability that, following a ceasefire, Kenneth Kaunda would prevent Nkomo from expatriating his weapons and equipment—particularly after having been caught out for hiding the war materials that the SAS destroyed in July.