Читать онлайн "After the Sheikhs : The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies" - Davidson Christopher Michael - RuLit

As with Fahd, Abdullah has also tried to address the succession issue and strengthen the Al-Saud as a dynastic monarchy. In 2006 an Allegiance Commission or Hayat al-Bayah was set up, ostensibly to allow for some degree of consensus within the family over appointing new rulers and also to facilitate the dismissal of kings by the rest of the family in the event of illness or other problems.[115] Although limiting the powers of Saudi Arabia’s religious police in recent years and — in 2007—separating the Supreme Court from the Al-Sheikh-controlled Ministry for Justice,[116] Abdullah has otherwise followed Fahd’s strategy of reinforcing the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance. In particular, he has ensured that only the state-appointed, Riyadh-based Council of Senior Religious Scholars has the ability to issue a fatwa or Islamic legal pronouncement in Saudi Arabia, thus reducing the influence of religious figures elsewhere in the country.[117]

In 1961 Kuwait joined Saudi Arabia as an independent state, after Britain formally withdrew its control over the increasingly prosperous and autonomous sheikhdom. Abdullah Al-Salim Al-Sabah duly proclaimed himself ‘emir’ and the United Nations granted recognition to the emirate of Kuwait, while the US had already established a consulate before Britain left, and had even begun to process Kuwaiti visas.[118] Almost immediately, however, British troops had to be re-deployed following Iraqi claims on Kuwait. But by 1963 a new government in Iraq relinquished these claims[119] and over the next two decades the Al-Sabah dynasty consolidated its position. The family has since ruled unopposed, with Jabar Al-Ahmad Al-Jabar Al-Sabah suffering only a brief exile in 1990 following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, and being quickly reinstated in 1991 following the US-led multinational Operation Desert Storm which ousted Iraq’s forces. Jabar was succeeded in 2006 by his crown prince, Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah, who represented a different branch of the family. But due to Saad’s poor health he was peacefully deposed and replaced by another member of Jabar’s line, Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jabar Al-Sabah, who continues to be Kuwait’s emir.

Following independence, Abdullah was quick to draw up a new constitution for Kuwait and to establish a new parliament, the National Assembly. As discussed later in this book, Kuwait’s merchant population had long been involved in various consultative institutions, given their relative wealth and political influence, so democratic or rather consultative traditions were much more ingrained in Kuwait than in Saudi Arabia. The first parliamentary elections were staged in 1963, with all literate male Kuwaitis being eligible to stand for the fifty seats.[120] Significantly, and much like the Al-Saud rulers, Abdullah also sought to strengthen the Al-Sabah as a dynastic monarchy by confirming in the constitution that the Al-Sabah were the inviolable rulers of Kuwait, and that future rulers must always be descendants of the long-serving former ruler of Kuwait, Mubarak Al-Sabah. The constitution also required the prime minister to be a member of the ruling family, and allowed the emir to appoint fifteen of the sixteen cabinet positions. Moreover, political parties were banned, and the emir was able to dissolve parliament as he saw fit and to pass emergency laws when parliament was not sitting.[121]

But despite these restrictions, the parliament proved more vibrant than anticipated, with various outspoken blocs forming — including Arab nationalists and Islamists — and with some tribes even holding ‘primary elections’ to select their preferred parliamentary candidates.[122] Endless debates and controversies — few of which could be resolved given the inherent tension from having elected members of parliament alongside appointed cabinet members — led to unapproved budgets and the stalling of various development projects. While the government tried to boost support for their preferred parliamentary blocs, often by naturalising further tribes in exchange for loyalty, the emir eventually chose to step in and dissolved parliament in 1976.[123] Only after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran did the emir re-open parliament, expecting greater government support due to uncertainties over Iran’s intentions. Even then, he was prudent to offer loyal parliamentary candidates further advantages: the number of electoral districts was increased from ten to twenty-five, and more naturalisations took place, mostly in the new constituencies. Moreover, in an effort to placate the Islamist blocs and gain their loyalty, the emir called for greater restrictions on alcohol and on the celebrating of Christmas and other non-Islamic events.[124]

By the mid-1980s Kuwait’s parliament was again under threat, with the Iran-Iraq War continuing to destabilise the region and with a series of car-bombings and an assassination attempt on the emir. In 1986 Jabar duly dissolved parliament, and it remained closed until after the trauma of invasion and liberation.[125] During this period the only space for political discussion was in the more traditional setting of Kuwait’s meetinghouses or diwaniyas. Since its reopening in 1991 the parliament has remained a source of controversy, having been closed down on several more occasions by the current emir. Such closures have usually been in order to prevent uncomfortable questioning of the prime minister — up until recently Nasser bin Muhammad Al-Sabah. Thus its powers are still very limited, with the ruling family and its ‘sovereign’ appointees continuing to dominate the emirate’s executive, in something of a neo-patriarchal model. Nonetheless, despite weariness, declining voter turnouts,[126] and general disillusionment with the system, elections have continued, having last been staged in early 2012. And on some occasions parliamentary opposition has managed to push through key reforms, notably the 2006 ‘Orange Movement’ decision to reduce the number of electoral districts down to just five — an effort to tackle the corruption and voterigging which was alleged to be taking place in many of the smaller electoral districts.[127]

Much like the Al-Saud and the Al-Sabah, the ruling families of the former Trucial States have also ruled unopposed since their independence. In Bahrain’s case, Isa bin Salman Al-Khalifa ruled from 1961 until his death in 1999 when he was peacefully succeeded by his eldest son, Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, who continues to rule. Succession in Qatar has, by contrast, been much more complicated, with Ahmad bin Ali Al-Thani being deposed in 1972, one year after Qatar’s independence, by his cousin Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani. Then, in 1995 Khalifa was dramatically deposed by his second wife’s eldest son, Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani. Nevertheless, the overall authority of the Al-Thani dynasty has never come under serious question, with the family remaining in tight control of Qatar. In Abu Dhabi, after succeeding his unpopular older brother with some degree of British assistance in 1966,[128] Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan enjoyed a long and relatively untroubled reign. His death in 2004 was closely followed by the succession of his eldest son and long-serving crown prince, Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. But following a secret family agreement reached in 1999 which saw Khalifa’s ambitious younger half-brother, Muhammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, being appointed as deputy crown prince,[129] Muhammad was then immediately upgraded to crown prince following their father’s death — despite Khalifa having two adult sons. Since then, Muhammad has risen to become one of the most powerful members of the Al-Nahyan family, controlling most key policy areas in the emirate. In neighbouring Dubai, the Al-Maktoum family had a similarly long-serving patriarch, with Rashid bin Said Al-Maktoum ruling from 1958 until his death in 1990. Survived by four sons, his eldest — Maktoum bin Rashid Al-Maktoum — duly succeeded. However, and as something of a precursor to the Al-Nahyan succession arrangements, he appointed one of his younger brothers — Muhammad bin Rashid Al-Maktoum — as crown prince in 1995, rather than one of his own sons. Between then and 2006, when Maktoum died, Muhammad was Dubai’s de facto ruler, and thus his eventual succession in 2006 was little more than a formality.