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In 2007 Qatar then played a key role in brokering the extradition of six Bulgarian nurses from Libya. Having been accused of deliberately infecting over 400 children with HIV in 1998, they had been sentenced to death before having their sentences commuted to life imprisonment. Although France captured most of the headlines in facilitating their release, Nicolas Sarkozy conceded that ‘…some humanitarian mediation by the friendly government of Qatar was decisive in helping with the release of the medics’.[352] Perhaps most controversially, Qatar was heavily involved in brokering the 2010 ceasefire in the Sudan between the Khartoum government and the Darfur rebels. Having invited the Sudanese president — Omar Al-Bashar — to Doha, despite an International Criminal Court arrest warrant having been issued for his alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Qatari ruler also invited the presidents of Chad and Eritrea.[353] A permanent truce was eventually signed in summer 2011, with Qatar’s role again being fêted by both regional players and the international community. Significantly, the signing session took place in a Doha hotel, presided over by the ruler and in the presence of several African heads of state in addition to UN and African Union representatives. Emphasising Qatar’s efforts, Hamad stated that ‘…the State of Qatar is keen to coordinate with its regional and international partners to see the people of Darfur and Sudan enjoy security and stability, as they are the two conditions for development and stability’.[354] Also in East Africa, Qatar’s attempts to resolve the long-running border disputes between Eritrea and Djibouti have also received international attention, although success has not yet been forthcoming. In 2010 a high-ranking Qatari delegation arrived in Djibouti after previously visiting Eritrea. But without support from Ethiopia — which broke off relations with Qatar in 2008 on the grounds that ‘Qatar’s support for Eritrea had made it a major source of instability in the Horn of Africa’—an agreement was not reached.[355]

As a more established regional peace-broker, the UAE has also had a number of successful interventions, albeit more low profile than Qatar’s efforts. The first example of such UAE mediation was in 1974 when Abu Dhabi’s ruler solved a territorial dispute between Egypt and Libya.[356] More notably, in 1991 he then attempted to save Iraq from full scale invasion by meeting with the Saudi king and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak in an effort to forge an agreement between Saddam Hussein and the displaced ruler of Kuwait, Jabar Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah.[357] In early 2003 Abu Dhabi was again an active intermediary, proposing an emergency summit with the aim of diverting the US from attacking Iraq. A meeting was held in Sharm el-Sheikh and presided over by the Arab League Secretary-General.[358] Saddam Hussein and his family were reportedly offered sanctuary in Abu Dhabi if they complied with American demands to leave Iraq.[359] Since Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan’s succession as ruler of Abu Dhabi in 2004, the UAE’s has to some extent continued with these policies. In early 2007 the minister for foreign affairs flew to Iran to meet government representatives,[360] and later that year (and within the space of just one week) Khalifa separately hosted both Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the US vice president Dick Cheney, seemingly in an effort to defuse the Iran-US nuclear standoff.[361] In 2008 the UAE was again active, inviting the US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, who was en-route to East Asia, to Abu Dhabi to debrief US envoy William Burns on his Iran negotiations and also to meet with the UAE minister for foreign affairs. Crucially, just one week before, Abu Dhabi’s crown prince had received Ali Rida Sheikh Attar — an envoy of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and undersecretary to the Iranian minister for foreign affairs.[362] Combined, these diplomatic actions earned the UAE praise during UN Security Council meetings in August 2008.[363]

Soft power in the West: strategic investments and development assistance

For many years the Gulf monarchies’ soft power strategy in the West was primarily an offshoot of their sovereign wealth funds. In addition to these funds’ investments in multinationals, blue-chip companies, and mature real estate; additional investments and associated sponsorships have been made in higher profile, headline-grabbing, ventures that may not necessarily turn a profit. The aim, it seems, has been to boost awareness of the Gulf monarchy in question with certain Western powers, at every level from government officials to members of the public. In almost all cases these brand-focused investments have been made in countries that either have a history of providing Gulf monarchies with protection or security guarantees, or can realistically be expected to provide assistance in a future emergency.

For the same reasons that it has emerged as the most energetic regional peace-broker, Qatar is unsurprisingly the most active proponent of the strategy. The ruling family-owned Qatar Holdings, for example, bought London’s prestigious Harrods department store in 2010, after an earlier failed attempt to buy the British national grocery chain Sainsbury’s. Having paid $2.3 billion for Harrods — believed to be an overly generous offer — Qatar Holdings’ chairman (who is also Qatar’s prime minister and a key member of the ruling family) announced that the purchase would not only ‘add much value to its portfolio of investments’ but that Harrods was also ‘…a historical place. I know it’s important, not only for the British people, but it is important for tourism’. Similarly, the Qatar Holdings’ vice-chairman described the purchase as a ‘landmark transaction’ for Qatar.[364] Meanwhile Qatar has been acquiring other iconic properties in London including the old Chelsea Barracks and the American Embassy building on Grosvenor Square. The building of Europe’s tallest skyscraper — the London Shard — was also financed mostly by Qatar, namely the Central Bank of Qatar, which holds an 80 per cent share. The $3 billion, 310 metre tower houses two duplex apartments specifically for use by the Qatari ruling family, and its official opening ceremony in July 2012 was hosted by the Qatar Holdings’ chairman.[365] When asked for comment, the Central Bank governor was clear about the rationale behind the investment, explaining that he was confident ‘…the Shard would become a symbol of the close ties between Qatar and the UK’. Likewise, the Qatari ambassador to the UK stated that ‘…the UK is a dear country to us… our investment is a long term investment, we don’t need the cash now… we think the UK is the right place to put our investment. The UK is a strategic partner with our country’.[366]

Elsewhere in Europe Qatar has also been active, with the Qatar Foundation — chaired by the ruler’s wife — signing a record $230 million sponsorship deal in 2011 with Spain’s Barcelona Football Club,[367] one of the biggest brands in international soccer. Having previously shied away from shirt sponsorship and preferring to display the UNICEF children’s charity logo, in 2010 an audit revealed that the club was nearly $500 million in debt. Although marketing experts were reported to have been working on finding a way of displaying both logos on the new shirts, it was admitted that if that proved impossible then the Qatar Foundation logo would take precedence.[368] This now appears to be the case, with the UNICEF logo having been relegated to the back. In France, it has been the turn of Qatar’s largest sovereign wealth fund — the Qatar Investment Authority — which has also bought into soccer via a new, sports-focused investment vehicle, Qatar Sports Investments. In 2011 QSI took a controlling, 70 per cent stake in Paris St. Germain[369] and promptly appointed a Qatari national as the club’s new president — the first non-French president in the club’s history.

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44. Broadcast on Al-Jazeera, 6 August 2007.

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45. BBC News, 4 March 2009; CNN, 23 February 2010.

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46. Capital Eritrea, 14 July 2011.

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47. Somaliland Press, 7 June 2010.

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48. Anthony, John Duke, Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics, Petroleum (Washington DC: Middle East Institute, 1975), p. 152.

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49. Heard-Bey (1996), pp. 388–391.

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50. Amr Moussa.

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51. The National, 28 July 2008; Mutawwa (2005), p. 99.

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52. Oxford Business Group, ‘Abu Dhabi: The Report 2007’, p. 25.

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53. Reuters, 11 May 2007; BBC News, 13 May 2007.

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54. Gulf News, 18 July 2008.

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55. The National, 8 August 2008.

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56. BBC News, 8 May 2010.

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365

57. Daily Mail, 4 July 2012.

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366

58. The Guardian, 30 December 2011.

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59. Associated Press, 25 September 2011.

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60. BBC Sport, 10 December 2010.

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61. ESPN, 31 May 2011.