As the only outlier, the Qatari ruling family’s future is a little rosier than that of the other Gulf monarchies: the state can actually sustain high spending and wealth distribution to its national population. As one recent study put it, ‘It seems at first glance Qatar has bought itself out of the possible ill effects of modernity’.[1000] Furthermore, it lacks a poor hinterland, is relatively calm, and has fewer issues of sectarianism or discrimination, and it is generally perceived as having played a positive role in the Arab Spring. The ruler also seems to be more sympathetic than his regional counterparts towards his citizenry’s cultural and religious practices, and it’s possible he may follow a route towards constitutional monarchy in the next few years. Nonetheless there are a number of areas of concern, and if mismanaged these could still derail the ruler’s liberal autocratic ambitions. In particular, if a more organised opposition does emerge, the authorities might still be tempted to resort to heavy handedness, which could delegitimise the ruler and expose his limitations to his own people and the rest of the Arab world. Various websites and Facebook groups have already been set up, including a ‘Revolution in Qatar’ forum which features cartoons of the ruler dressed as an Orthodox Jew or depicted naked, with a US flag draped around his body and horns protruding from his head. It also features photographs of the ruler meeting with Israeli officials. Although these groups are not yet very active — at least compared to similar groups focusing on other Gulf monarchies — and although they still seem to focus mostly on Qatar’s foreign policy, they could be used to discuss future arrests or crackdowns against activists in the emirate itself, or could facilitate discussions about the ruling family, corruption, or other red line issues. Already, for example, the groups contain much criticism of the ruler’s wife’s dress code which is deemed ‘too open and public for the wife of a ruler’,[1001] along with calls for genuine democracy. Indeed, as reported by the New Statesman, the audience of a recent Doha Debates forum voted overwhelmingly in favour of democratisation over economic liberalisation which — although perhaps not yet representative of the nation — indicated that the increasingly well-educated Qatari youth are likely to push soon for a new environment where legitimate democratic discussion can take place.[1002]
POSTSCRIPT
The original, British edition of this book went to press in summer 2012. At that time there was little, if any, mainstream discussion outside the region of the prospect of serious political unrest or regime failure in the Gulf monarchies. Academia and the policy community, at least among the monarchies’ Western allies, had for the most part ‘ring-fenced’ these states as exceptional and somehow aloof from the Arab Spring movements sweeping the broader Middle East. With extensive trade and military ties to the West, coupled with the described accumulation of ‘soft power’ influence, this position was both predictable and understandable. With a mixture of carrots and sticks the poorer Gulf monarchies had, after all, managed to contain most of the protests that had spilled onto their streets in the immediate aftermath of the revolutions in North Africa. Meanwhile, the wealthier monarchies seemingly remained in command of largely apolitical, well-heeled societies with little, if anything, in common with those dwelling in the angry tenements of Tunis, Cairo, or Tripoli.
Since then, however, much has changed. By the winter of 2012 most leading Western broadsheets were carrying articles and predictions of either monarchical collapse or at least some serious impending turbulence. Veteran foreign affairs correspondents filing reports on protests, trials, growing poverty, and cyberspace activism in the Gulf states became commonplace, with even leading US think tanks publishing on the prospects of ‘Revolution in Riyadh.’ With a growing awareness of the rising discontent among increasingly large swathes of Gulf nationals, and being better plugged into regional grassroots campaigns and emerging opposition groups, the international commentariat seemed to have finally woken up to the struggle that had already begun to take place between the people of the region and their increasingly authoritarian and reactionary elites.
This current, unprecedented international interest in Gulf politics and the possibility of a ‘Gulf Spring’ is in many ways due to the hundreds of headline-grabbing incidents regarding political activism, human rights, and corruption that have taken place in the region over the past six months. Almost without exception, these have provided further, compelling evidence in support of the central thesis of this book. Namely that traditional monarchy as a legitimate regime type in the region is soon going to reach the end of its lifespan, especially as most of the Gulf states are now caught in a pincer movement of pressures between unsustainable wealth distribution mechanisms and increasingly powerful ‘super modernising forces’ that can no longer be controlled or co-opted by political elites. The former continue to manifest themselves in widening wealth gaps and increasing real unemployment, despite ramped-up public spending programmes and urgent public sector job creation schemes. These counter-revolutionary ‘rentier outlays’ are likely to keep spiralling, with the International Monetary Fund and other bodies having already predicted that even the wealthiest of the monarchies will be in budget deficit within a few years. Meanwhile, in the poorer states, where this strategy is now increasingly inapplicable, street protests keep growing and regimes have had little option but to openly crack down on dissidents, with ever larger numbers of political prisoners being taken.
As for ‘super modernisation,’ and especially improved communications in the form of social media, in recent months a veritable battle in cyberspace has now begun. New legislation has been introduced, or is about to be introduced, in all six monarchies, with the aim of tightly policing online dissent and meting out heavy punishments to all would-be critics. As unsustainable as the spiralling public spending, the strategy also seems likely to fail, with several of these states now having the highest social media usage rates in the world, and with massive, often well-organised, online political discussions having made Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube the region’s de facto new parliament. Detailed, substantiated criticism of governments has thus become commonplace, with exposés of ruling family corruption and public insults directed at hitherto unchallengeable elites being broadcasted and digested by millions each day. As with the clamping down on street protests, this new form of repression is already damaging — probably irreparably — the described social contracts and legitimacy resources of these monarchies. Certainly, such disparagement of rulers was almost unimaginable prior to 2011, but now it is almost fashionable for young Gulf nationals to question their autocrats.