The U-2's time in England was brief. At the same time the unit was being set up, a British frogman died while investigating the hull of a Soviet cruiser in an English harbor. The resulting press furor caused Prime Minister Anthony Eden to withdraw permission for the U-2 to operate from Lakenheath. Bissell and General Cabell then went to see West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. He said, "This is a wonderful idea. It's just what ought to be done." He gave permission to use an old Luftwaffe base fifty miles east of Wiesbaden. The four U-2s and the seven pilots moved to the new base. The unit was called "Detachment A."[74]
The first public word of the U-2's existence came with a May 7, 1956, press release from the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). It announced: "Start of a new research program [using a] new airplane, the Lockheed U-2… expected to reach 10-mile-high altitudes as a matter of routine… The availability of a new type of airplane… helps to obtain the needed data… about gust-meteorological conditions to be found at high altitude… in an economical and expeditious manner." Specific areas of research included clear air turbulence, convective clouds, wind sheer, the jet stream, ozone, and water vapor. "The first data, covering conditions in the Rocky Mountain area," the press release said, "are being obtained from flights from Watertown Strip, Nevada."
On July 9, NACA issued a second press release titled, "High Altitude Research Program Proves Valuable." It stated:
Initial data about gust-meteorological conditions to be found at 10-mile altitudes which have been obtained to date by the relatively few flights of the Lockheed U-2 airplane have already proven the value of the aircraft for this purpose…
"Within recent weeks, preliminary data-gathering flights have been made from an Air Force base at Lakenheath, England… As the program continues, flights will be made in other parts of the world."[75]
Indeed, the U-2 had been making flights that provided highly valuable data. But the data was not about the weather.
In the early summer, the CIA sought Eisenhower's agreement to begin overflights. At this point, the project was seen as a short-term, high-risk operation.[76] The U-2s were also considered too delicate to have a long-operating lifetime. The desperate need for intelligence outweighed the risks.[77]
Eisenhower initially authorized two test overflights of Eastern Europe.[78]
The first was made on June 20, 1956. Carl Overstreet was selected to be the first pilot to take the U-2 into "denied" airspace. The route went to Warsaw, Poland, then over Berlin and Potsdam, East Germany. Following the two overflights, Eisenhower was shown a number of photo briefing boards from the missions. At the same time, the Soviets put on another mass flyby of bombers.
On July 2, Bissell sent a request to begin Soviet overflights to Eisenhower's personal assistant Gen. Andrew Goodpaster. The following day, Goodpaster sent word that Eisenhower had authorized overflights of the USSR for a ten-day period. Bissell asked if this meant ten days of good weather. Goodpaster replied, "It means ten days from when you start."[79]
At 6:00 A. M. on July 4, 1956, Hervey Stockman took off in U-2 Article 347. The plane carried the A camera and was in a bare-metal finish with no national markings. Stockman headed over East Berlin and northern Poland via Poznan, then crossed the Soviet border. The overflight covered a number of bomber bases in the western USSR, as far east as Minsk. The Soviets made more than twenty intercept attempts. The camera photographed MiG fighters trying to reach the U-2's altitude, only to have their engines flame out. Stockman then turned north, toward Leningrad. Once he reached the city, he turned west and flew along the Baltic coast. The U-2 landed back at Wiesbaden after an eight-hour-forty-five-minute flight.
The next overflight would go directly to Moscow. When asked to justify such a dangerous target, the mission planners told Bissell, "Let's go for the big one straight away. We're safer the first time than we'll ever be again."
Article 347 took off at 5:00 A.M. on July 5. The pilot was Carmen Vito.
The flight path was farther south than the first mission — over Kracow, Poland, then due east to Kiev, then north to Minsk. There was heavy cloud cover, which started to clear as Vito turned toward Moscow. Again, MiGs tried to reach the U-2. Several crashed when they were unable to recover after flaming out. Over Moscow, a new danger loomed — the SA-1 Guild surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites that ringed the capital. Vito could see several "herring bone" shaped sites, but no missiles were fired. Vito flew back along the Baltic coast to Wiesbaden.[80]
In all, five overflights were made during the first series — one on July 4, and two each on July 5 and 9. Their photos were highly illuminating. The bomber airfields in the western USSR had been equipped with nuclear weapons loading pits, but no Mya-4 bombers were spotted. Within weeks, the bomber gap controversy was over. The U-2 photos had proven the Soviets did not have a large bomber force. The photos brought a revolution in intelligence. It was now possible to know, not to estimate, not guess, but to know the military capabilities of an enemy. That was the most important accomplishment of the Angel of Paradise Ranch.
On July 10, the Soviets protested the overflights, and Eisenhower decided to halt the missions for the time being. He was very impressed, however, with the photos of bomber bases and the shipyards around Leningrad.[81]
In September 1956, the second group of U-2 pilots completed training at the Ranch. The seven pilots of Detachment B were based at Incirlik, Turkey.
From there, the southern Soviet Union, as well as targets throughout the Mideast, could be covered. It was not until November that the first overflights were made from Turkey, a pair of short overflights to examine Soviet air defenses. The first was flown by Powers.
The third group, Detachment C, was established in early 1957 at Atsugi, Japan. The unit made overflights of targets in the eastern USSR, such as Vladivostok and Sakhalin Island, as well as flying missions over China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Indonesia.[82]
The year 1957 saw a step-up in overflight activities. This represented a change in attitude toward the operation. Eisenhower had come to rely on the U-2 photos, comparing other intelligence data to them. Soon they were providing 90 percent of the intelligence on the Soviet Union. Instead of a short-term project, it had become an open-ended one. Fears about the U-2's fragile structure had eased and early problems with the B camera had also been overcome. Detachment A in Germany was closed down and combined with the Turkish-based Detachment B.
The risks were also clearer; a year after the first overflight, Bissell asked for a special estimate of the U-2's vulnerability. The Soviets had begun deployment of a new SAM, the SA-2 Guideline, in late 1956. The study concluded the SA-2 could reach the U-2's altitude, but they had been designed to hit much lower-flying B-47s and B-52s. Above 60,000 feet, the SAM's accuracy was so poor only a lucky hit could be made. The risk was not a serious one.[83]
A primary target of the overflights was Soviet ballistic missile activities.
Since World War II, the Soviets had undertaken an aggressive development program. The SS-3 and SS-4 medium range ballistic missiles, then in the final stages of testing, could threaten U.S. bases throughout Western Europe, North Africa, and Asia. It was the U-2 that provided the first good photos of the Kapustin Yar test site on the Volga River.
77
Powers and Gentry,
80
Pocock,
83
Steven J. Zaloga,