All went well with the taxi test until the A-12 lifted off. As it did, the plane wallowed into the air, the wings rocking from side to side, and the nose high.[136] Schalk recalled later, "I really didn't think I was going to be able to put the aircraft back on the ground safely." Finally, he was able to regain control and cut the throttles. By this point, the A-12 had flown past the end of the runway. As it touched down on the lake bed, the wheels kicked up a huge cloud of dust, hiding the aircraft. The Groom Lake tower asked what was happening. Schalk radioed an answer, but the antenna was on the plane's underside and he could not be heard. Once the A-12 slowed, Schalk turned and the aircraft emerged from the dust cloud. Everyone breathed a sigh of relief. There was no damage from the near mishap. Schalk judged the A-12 was ready for flight, but added that the SAS should be turned on.[137]
The first A-12 flight was made on April 26. The plane remained aloft for some forty minutes, with the landing gear left down to avoid any retraction problems. Schalk switched off each of the SAS dampers, one by one. The plane remained stable, and he turned them back on and landed.
The official first flight was made four days later, on April 30. As the plane's landing gear retracted and it accelerated, several fuselage and wing fillet panels began falling off. There were no handling problems, and the plane reached 30,000 feet, a speed of 340 knots, and remained aloft for 59 minutes. The loss of the skin panels was solved by filling the cavities with steel wool. The repairs were completed and, on May 4, the A-12 reached Mach 1.1.[138]
After nearly a year's delay, the A-12 had embarked on its flight into the unknown. The new CIA director, John McCone, sent a telegram of con-gratulations to Johnson.[139] With the first flights completed, the test program now began expanding. Schalk made the first thirteen flights. In late 1962, three more Lockheed test pilots joined the program — William C. Park, Robert Gilliland, and James D. Eastham. The early flights tested aircraft systems, the inertial navigation system, and midair refueling. This was done using KC-135Q tankers of the 903d Air Refuelling Squadron. A maximum altitude of 60,000 feet was also reached by the end of 1962.
Because the J58 engines were not yet installed, little could be done in the way of high-speed flight testing. The CIA pressed Lockheed to make a Mach 2 flight, arguing that if the J75-powered F-106 could reach Mach 2, the A-12 should be able to do the same. Finally, Park put an A-12 into a dive and reached Mach 2.16. The flight proved little. Since the inlet-nacelle design was mismatched with the J75 engines, a "duct shutter" resulted— a vibration caused by airflow within the inlet as the plane neared Mach 2.[140]
As flight testing continued, more A-12s were being delivered to Groom Lake. By August 1962, Article 122 and Article 123 had arrived. Article 124, the A-12T two-seat trainer was moved to Groom Lake in November, and Article 125 arrived on December 17, 1962.
The Oxcart program received a boost during the summer of 1962 when CIA U-2s discovered the deployment of SA-2 SAMs in Cuba. CIA Director McCone asked if the A-12 could take over the Cuban overflights. The A-12 was still at too early a point in the flight-test program to consider such a mission. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, bringing the A-12 to operational status became one of the highest national priorities.
Despite the added A-12s now available, the test program was still handi-capped by the delay of the J58 engines. CIA Director McCone decided this was unacceptable. He wrote to the president of United Aircraft on December 3, 1962: "I have been advised that J58 engine deliveries have been delayed again due to engine control production problems… By the end of the year it appears we will have barely enough J58 engines to support the flight test program adequately… Furthermore, due to various engine difficulties we have not yet reached design speed and altitude. Engine thrust and fuel consumption deficiencies at present prevent sustained flight at design conditions which is so necessary to complete developments."[141]
The first J58 finally was delivered to Groom Lake and installed in Article 121. The first problem was getting it started. The small-scale, wind-tunnel model did not adequately predict the internal airflow. As an interim measure, an inlet access panel was removed during ground tests. Holes were later drilled in the nacelles to cure the problem. Article 121 made its initial flights with one J58 and one J75. On January 15, 1963, the first A-12 flight with two J58s was made. By the end of January, ten J58 engines had been delivered and were being installed in the A-12s.
Recruitment of the CIA pilots had begun even before the first A-12 flight.
The Oxcart pilots would need remarkable skill, due both to the performance characteristics of the A-12 and the demands of flying secret intelligence missions. Air Force Brig. Gen. Don Flickinger was picked to establish the requirements. He received advice from both Johnson and CIA Headquarters.
The initial criteria included experience in high-performance aircraft, emotional stability, and good self-motivation. The pilots also had to be between twenty-five and forty years of age. The small size of the A-12's cockpit meant that the pilots had to be under six feet tall and weigh less than 175 pounds.
Air force files were screened for possible candidates. The initial list was further reduced by psychological assessments, medical exams, and refine-ment of the criteria. The final evaluation resulted in sixteen potential pilots, who were then subjected to intensive security and medical checks by the CIA. Those still remaining were approached to work "on a highly classified project involving a very advanced aircraft."[142] In November 1961, five pilots agreed: William L. Skliar, Kenneth S. Collins, Walter L. Ray, Dennis B. Sullivan, and Alonzo J. Walter. They were a mixed group — Skliar was an Air Force Test Pilot School graduate (Class 56D) and was assigned to the Armament Development Center at Eglin Air Force Base.[143] The others had operational backgrounds. Like the CIA U-2 pilots, they were sheep dipped, leaving the air force to become civilians. Their time with the CIA would be counted toward their rank and retirement. The pay and insurance arrangements were similar to those of CIA U-2 pilots.[144]
The CIAA-12 pilots arrived at Groom Lake in February 1963. Like their U-2 counterparts in the 1950s, the men found Area 51 "desert, windy and hot, windy and cold, isolated, basic." They made several flights in the A-12T trainer (also called the "Titanium Goose"), then began making training and test flights in the single-seat A-12s. Each pilot had a personal call sign — "Dutch" followed by a two-digit number. The unit was designated the 1129th Special Activities Squadron, nicknamed "the Roadrunners."[145]
With the deliveries of the J58 engines, and the arrival of the CIA pilots, the program began a three-shift schedule. This required a large number of engineers, who were also recruited in a clandestine manner. One Lockheed engineer was asked if he wanted to work on a "special job." He would be flown to a site, work there all week, then be flown back to Burbank on Friday. In some cases, the engineers were not told what they would be doing until they actually saw the A-12 for the first time.
The A-12 was a large, loud, and distinctive-looking aircraft. Keeping it a secret would be a problem. During the early test flights, the CIA tried to limit the number of people who saw the aircraft. All those at Groom Lake not connected with the Oxcart program were herded into the mess hall before the plane took off. This was soon dropped as it disrupted activities and was impractical with the large number of flights.
137
Paul F. Crickmore,
139
McIninch, "The Oxcart Story," 33. The two men who had done so much to bring both the U-2 and A-12 into existence, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell, had both resigned following the Bay of Pigs disaster a year before.
143
Lt. Col. Steve Stowe,