Twelve hours before the planned takeoff time (H minus twelve), a second review of the weather was made. The forecast continued favorable, and the two pilots were given a detailed route briefing during the early evening. On the morning of May 31, the pilots received a final preflight briefing — the condition of the two aircraft was covered, last-minute weather and intelligence reviewed, and any changes in the flight plan gone over. At H minus two hours, a final "go-no-go" review of weather was made by headquarters.
This covered not only North Vietnam, but the refueling areas and the take-off and landing sites. The only problem was at Kadena — it was raining heavily. Ironically, after all its testing, the A-12 had never flown in the rain.
The target area weather was clear, however, and the decision was made to carry out the flight. A "go" message was sent to Kadena.
With the final authorization, Vojvodich underwent a medical examination, got into his pressure suit, and was taken out to the primary aircraft, Article 131. If any problem appeared in the preflight checkout, the backup plane could be ready to make the overflight one hour later. Finally, with rain still falling, the A-12 taxied out, ignited its afterburner, and took off into the threatening skies.
The first Black Shield mission made two passes. The first went over Haiphong and Hanoi and left North Vietnam's airspace near Dien Bien Phu.
Vojvodich refueled over Thailand, then made a second pass over the Demilitarized Zone. The route covered 70 of the 190 known SAM sites, as well as 9 other primary targets. The photos were judged "satisfactory." The runs had been made at a speed of Mach 3.1 and an altitude of 80,000 feet.
No radar signals were detected; the mission had gone unnoticed by the North Vietnamese and Chinese. The total flight time was three hours and forty minutes. Vojvodich needed three instrument approaches amid driving rain before landing back at Kadena.
Between May 31 and July 15, a total of fifteen Black Shield missions were alerted. Of these, seven were flown. Four of the overflights detected radar-tracking signals, but none of the A-12s were fired on. By mid-July it was clear there were no surface-to-surface missiles in North Vietnam. The early overflights showed how good the A-12 was, and the hesitation to use it ended.
Between August 16 and the end of the year, twenty-six missions were alerted and fifteen were flown. A typical Black Shield mission would involve an aerial refueling south of Okinawa soon after takeoff, one or two photo passes, and a second refueling over Thailand before the return to Kadena. Due to the plane's huge turning radius, some mission profiles required the A-12 to enter Chinese airspace. On a single-pass mission, the A-12 would spend only twelve and a half minutes over North Vietnam. If two passes were made, the A-12 would spend twenty-one and a half minutes in hostile airspace. Once back at Kadena, the exposed film would be unloaded and placed aboard a special plane for shipment to the processing facility. For the first overflights, this was the Eastman Kodak plant in Rochester, New York. By late summer, an air force processing center had been set up in Japan. The data would be in the hands of U.S. commanders within twenty-four hours of an overflight.
Despite the speed and altitude of the A-12, the risks of overflights were clear. On September 17, a SAM site tracked an A-12 with its acquisition radar. The Fan Song guidance radar was unable to gain a lock on the plane, however. On October 28, a North Vietnamese SAM site fired a single SA-2 at an A-12 flown by Sullivan. The plane's camera photographed the smoke from the site, then the missile's contrail. The ECM equipment worked well and the SAM missed.[192]
Sullivan's next overflight, on October 30, 1967, resulted in a "hit." On his first pass, Sullivan noted the plane was being tracked, with two SAM sites preparing to fire. On the second pass, as he flew toward Hanoi from the east, the North Vietnamese were ready — at least six SA-2s were fired at the A-12. This was the first of many concerted efforts to bring down an A-12/SR-71. Sullivan saw contrails and the detonation of three missiles.[193]
The bursts appeared, then seemed to collapse instantly as the A-12 sped away.[194] Unlike a tactical fighter, the A-12 could not evade a missile by maneuvering. The pilot had to continue on his course and trust the ECM equipment would protect him.[195]
When Sullivan landed back at Kadena, a postflight inspection discovered a piece of metal had hit the lower right-wing fillet area and become lodged against the wing tank support structure. The fragment was not a warhead pellet, but a very small piece of the brass fuze from one of the missiles.
This was the only hit scored on an A-12 or SR-71 in over one thousand overflights. Sullivan kept the fragment as a souvenir of the mission.
The new year brought new crises, and the A-12 was in the midst of them.
On January 23, 1968, the U.S.S. Pueblo was captured by the North Koreans.
There were fears that this was the prelude to full-scale military action, and an A-12 overflight of North Korea was authorized. On January 25, the first attempt was made by Weeks, but a problem caused an abort shortly after takeoff. The next day, January 26, Murray took off. The mission was to locate the ship and then determine if an invasion of South Korea was about to occur. Murray made his first pass down the east coast of Korea: "As I approached Wonsan I could see the Pueblo through my view sight. The harbor was all iced up except at the very entrance and there she was, sitting off to the right of the main entrance."
Murray made a total of four passes over North Korea, from the DMZ to the Yalu River, covering the entire country. The A-12 was tracked by the Chinese, but no missiles were fired. When the photos were analyzed, they showed no evidence that a ground attack was imminent.[196]
A second overflight of North Korea was requested, but the State Department was reluctant, fearing political problems should the A-12 be shot down. Secretary of State Dean Rusk was briefed on the mission: the plane would spend only seven minutes over North Korea, and even if a problem occurred, it was highly unlikely the A-12 would land inside China or North Korea. Even so, Rusk suggested changes in the flight path before giving his approval. Rusk thus became the A-12's highest-ranking flight planner. (This was not unique; President Eisenhower had made changes in U-2 overflights.) The mission was flown by Layton on May 8, 1968.
Between January 1 and March 31, 1968, four North Vietnamese overflights and one North Korean overflight were made (out of fifteen alerted).
Between April 1 and June 9, 1968, two North Korean overflights were alerted; only the May 8 mission was flown. May 8 also was the last A-12 overflight. In all, the A-12 made twenty-six overflights of North Vietnam and two of North Korea. No overflights of China were made (although several flights did enter Chinese airspace during turns). No Skylark missions over Cuba were flown, as the U-2 proved adequate. Now, the A-12 Oxcart was to pass from the scene.[197]
Starting in November 1965, even as the A-12 was declared operational, doubts were expressed about the cost of operating the two separate groups of A-12s and SR-71s. After a year or more of debate, it was decided on January 10, 1967, to phase out the A-12 program. The first four A-12s were to be put in storage in July 1967, another two by December, and the final two by the end of January 1968. At the same time, the SR-71s would be phased into operation. This, it should be noted, was before the A-12 had undertaken a single overflight.
192
Crickmore,
Sullivan's A-12 was the only U.S. aircraft over Hanoi at the time. Thus, the SA-2 batteries had their best opportunity.