This was confirmed by the flight-test program, which was conducted between September 16 and October 12, 1960, at Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico. The tests showed the radar return of a drone at 50,000 feet could be reduced without causing aerodynamic problems. A cover story was also created should one of the modified drones come down outside the Holloman test range: the drone was a "Q-2D," a "ground-controlled target" used to test SAM missiles at altitudes of 60,000 feet. This would conceal its true reconnaissance role.
The test data was to be used for Ryan's proposed Model 136 reconnaissance drone. It used long, straight wings, a horizontal stabilizer with inward-tilted rudders at their tips, and a jet engine mounted on top of the airframe to reduce the radar and infrared signatures. Both the test flights and the Model 136 were code-named "Red Wagon." (A Boeing design was called "Blue Scooter.")
As with Bell and Lockheed, Ryan set up its own Black production facility for the reconnaissance drone program, in a warehouse on Frontier Street in San Diego, California. The people needed for the effort were recruited without being told what they would be doing. Only after arriving at the warehouse did they learn the project dealt with drone reconnaissance.
Behind the scenes, there was considerable debate over the future of reconnaissance programs. The end of Red Wagon came on election day 1960.
President John F. Kennedy and the Democrats would have their own ideas about reconnaissance, so any new projects were put on hold.
Despite this, interest remained in drone reconnaissance. Ryan Aeronautical proposed a new system called "Lucy Lee" (also "L Squared"). It was to undertake photo and ELINT missions outside Soviet airspace. Lucy Lee would use a modified Firebee rear fuselage, long straight wings, and a new forward fuselage with an intake above the nose. It would fly at altitudes between 65,000 and 72,000 feet, and the radar return of Lucy Lee would be reduced. Ryan Aeronautical also proposed that $500,000 be used to modify a standard Firebee drone to a reconnaissance configuration.
By mid-summer 1961, it seemed Lucy Lee would succeed. Then, despite support at nearly every level, the project was canceled in January 1962.
Work at the warehouse ground to a halt; it was down to "one light bulb, one engineer, one secretary, and a guard." Finally, Ryan Aeronautical management issued orders to close down the warehouse.[202]
A half hour later, the air force called.
147A FIRE FLY
The air force had accepted the Ryan Aeronautical proposal for a modified Firebee reconnaissance drone. Rather than an expensive, all-new drone, and the unknown this involved, the proven Firebee would be used. The money came from a program called "Big Safari," which had been established in the early 1950s as a means to modify existing aircraft for reconnaissance missions in a very short time. On February 2, 1962, a $1.1 million contract was issued to Ryan to modify four Firebee target drones as "special purpose aircraft." Code-named "Fire Fly," the Model 147A drones were to have a 1,200-mile range, a cruising altitude over 55,000 feet, and a photo resolution of two feet. They were to be ready by May 15.
The first 147A drone was to be a standard Firebee with a simple guidance system — a timer-programmer and an MA-1 gyro compass. (A telephone step-per switch was used which cost $17.) The other three 147As were "stretched" with a thirty-five-inch plug added to the fuselage. This carried an additional sixty-eight gallons of fuel. The nose was also modified to carry a camera.
Again to speed things up, the optics from a U-2 were borrowed, and mounted in a homebuilt frame. Due to security reasons, it was not called a camera but rather a "scorer." The test program would use two of the drones—147A-l would test the navigation systems, while the stretched 147A-2 would check out the camera and other modifications. Once the system was proven, the other two 147A drones would be placed on alert for deployment in a crisis.
The first flights of 147A-1 were made from Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, in April. In its first off-range flight, the drone flew from Holloman to the Wendover Air Force Range, Utah, and then back to the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, without any commands from the B-57 chase plane or the ground station. In all, three flights of 147A-1 were made to prove out the navigation system. This was followed by four test flights of the 147A-2 drone in late April and early May. When the film from the scorer was developed, it showed very good resolution. The Fire Fly had an adequate range, an altitude and resolution better than required, and the ability to fly the desired track.
With this, the 147A reconnaissance drones were considered operational.
Two drones and their DC-130 launch aircraft were placed on seventy-two-hour alert at Holloman. This very limited capability was operated by the Strategic Air Command (SAC).[203]
In the summer of 1962, it was decided to run a simulated deployment to test the drones under operational conditions. The operational test and evaluation would involve two reconnaissance flights over the Atlantic Missile Range at Cape Canaveral and three "live-fire" tests at MacDill Air Force Base. During the two reconnaissance flights, fighters swarmed aloft in simulated interceptions; they ended up chasing each other. The radar blankets around the drone were effective, and ground radar never picked it up.
The live-fire tests at MacDill also showed the 147A's low radar return, small size, high altitude, and subsonic speed combined to make it highly survivable. The drone's main problem was the contrail — a giant banner that gave away the drone's location. (Neither of the two successful shoot downs would have been possible without the contrail as guide.) A "no-con" (no contrail) program was quickly started to find means to suppress it. It was eventually decided that a chemical agent would be added to the exhaust.[204]
As the no-con program began at Tyndall Air Force Base, events were unfolding that would bring the world to the brink of nuclear war, and Fire Fly to within moments of making an operational mission.
THE MISSILES OF OCTOBER
For several years, CIA U-2s had been directed against Communist Cuba. The missions of August 29 and September 5, 1962, revealed a major change — the Soviets had introduced SA-2 SAMs. Eleven sites, which covered most of the island, were found. The risks of Cuban overflights had increased.[205]
The dangers were underlined four days later. Nationalist Chinese U-2 pilots had been conducting overflights of mainland China since late 1960, making as many as three overflights per month. On September 9, Radio Peking announced: "A U.S.-made U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance plane of the Chiang Kai-shek gang was shot down this morning by an Air Force unit of the Chinese People's Liberation Army when it intruded over east China."
The pilot, Col. Chen Huai Sheng, was severely injured when his U-2 was hit by an SA-2. He was captured and taken to a hospital but died that night.[206]
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and presidential adviser McGeorge Bundy were worried about the political effects of a U-2 being shot down over Cuba. Rusk seemed obsessed with the idea that continued U-2 overflights would increase tensions to the point of war.[207] At a September 20 meeting, the air force proposed that the Fire Fly drones be used over Cuba. No interest was expressed in their use. At that time, there were only two drones and they were still in the test phase.
By early October, there had been no U-2 coverage of the interior of Cuba for a month. Finally, a single U-2 overflight of western Cuba was authorized. Unlike previous U-2 missions, it would be flown by an air force pilot. Two SAC U-2 pilots, Majors Richard S. Heyser and Rudolf Anderson, were checked out in the CIA's U-2F version.
205
Dino A. Brugioni,
206
Chris Pocock,