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A total of 578 drones were lost—251 were confirmed kills, the vast majority to North Vietnamese air defenses. Another 80 were possible losses to enemy action, 53 were lost in the recovery sequence, 30 in retrieval, and the remainder in other ways.[288] The drones survived the heaviest air defenses built up to that time. One drone had an SA-2 explode within twenty to thirty feet of it and still made it home. One of the high-altitude drones evaded eight MiG intercepts, three air-to-air missile firings, and nine SA-2 launches.[289]

Their accomplishments were many and varied. They had provided the first photographs of North Vietnamese SA-2 construction, MiG 21s, and helicopters; arming and fuze data on the SA-2; and the only low-altitude BDA coverage of Linebacker. The total number of photos they took, over areas too physically or politically dangerous for manned aircraft, is estimated to be 145 million.

The photos these Dark Eagles brought back cast a long shadow. For more than a decade after the defeat in Vietnam, the images of collapse and failure raised doubts about the ability and even competence of the U.S. military. In the years to follow, it was depicted as unable to win and equipped with weapons that did not work.

Until another Dark Eagle, and a night of thunder.

CHAPTER 5

Orphaned Eagle

The Model 154 Firefly

… of the four seasons, none lasts forever; of the days, some are long and some short, and the Moon waxes and wanes.

Sun Tzu ca. 400 B.C.

Despite the failures of the Model 136 and Lucy Lee proposals to gain approval, Ryan Aeronautical remained interested in an advanced drone. There was only so much growth in the basic Firebee airframe. Also, a greater altitude and range, as well as further reductions in radar cross section, would need a completely new design.

The target area for the advanced drone was Communist China. The nuclear test site at Lop Nor, as well as the reactors and reprocessing plants, were beyond the reach of the 147 drones. Even the U-2s were hard-pressed to cover these targets. The losses suffered by Nationalist Chinese U-2 pilots made a long-range drone program that much more attractive.

HATCHING THE FIREFLY

With most of Ryan's efforts directed toward the 147 program, work on the advanced drone remained at a low level. Understanding how shape affected radar return was one major area of study. Unlike the 147 drones, which relied on radar-absorbing blankets, the new design would use shape to make it hard to detect. From time to time, the advanced drone was proposed to the air force, but a place could not be found for it in their plans or funding.

The CIA expressed an interest to Ryan about developing a separate drone program, and a formal proposal was put together. It was given the designation Model 150 "Red Book." Ryan felt uncomfortable about going "behind the back" of the air force with the proposal, and told the CIA that if they did not respond within thirty days, Ryan would feel free to deal with the air force. Within a week the CIA rejected the Model 150 proposal, suggesting Ryan talk to the air force about the project. The CIA had its own, very different, drone project.

Ryan renamed the project "Blue Book," which sounded better and was less suggestive of a project aimed at Communist China. The Model 150 was also revised to the Model 151 through the Model 154 designs. After several years of work and proposals, Ryan felt the time was right for a major effort.

This included a formal briefing at SAC Headquarters by the company's founder, T. Claude Ryan. By this time, the 147G drones were conducting overflights of China, and the 147H was beginning development, so the presentation was successful. Because this was a whole new aircraft, rather than a simple conversion of an existing target drone, a design competition was started.

The competition pitted North American Aviation against Ryan. North American had set up a separate division to undertake drone work. Additionally, Northrop tried to enter the emerging competition, but the air force refused its proposal. The range and altitude requirements for the drone were similar to what Ryan had proposed, and the company felt confident its design would be selected. North American put up a strong challenge, and for a time it seemed likely to win. Ryan emerged victorious, however, and won the development contract in June 1966.[290]

THE MODEL 154 FIREFLY

The new drone was called the Model 154 Firefly. The fuselage resembled that of the Model 136, with the engine over the fuselage and inward-canted fins. The sloped, flat sides were designed with reduced radar return in mind.

The fins were tilted inward to both reduce radar return and shield the exhaust. Much of the airframe was made of plastic, which also absorbed radar signals. Infrared suppression was provided by placing the engine above the fuselage and mixing the hot exhaust with cool intake air. Active ECM equipment would provide further protection.

The total length was 34.2 feet, while the swept-back wings spanned 47.68 feet. The 154 had a maximum altitude between 72,000 and 78,000 feet. As with the 147 drones, it would be launched by a DC-130 and recovered in midair by a helicopter. It was equipped with a KA-80A camera able to provide coverage along a 1,720-mile strip. A highly precise doppler-inertial system handled the navigation. Due to the sensitive onboard equipment, the 154 was also to be fitted with a destruct system on operational missions. In every aspect, it pushed the state of the art in drone technology.

It was not surprising that the 154 program was soon behind schedule.

The major problem was the guidance system, which was supposed to be accurate to 5 miles per 1,000 miles flown. The system had five different operating modes. Even if it suffered a complete failure, the drone could still automatically fly to a recovery zone. It was soon clear that everyone had been overly optimistic. The project was also overmanaged. Unlike the streamlined Big Safari management, as many as two hundred people attended the monthly progress meetings.[291]

The first 154s were delivered in early 1968. A total of twenty-eight Model 154 drones was produced. This consisted of one static test vehicle (STV), two captive test vehicles (CTV), five flight test vehicles (FTV), and twenty production vehicles, numbered P-l through P-20.

The initial tests included both captive flights aboard the DC-130 launch aircraft and tests of separation characteristics and recovery parachute operations. The first powered flight was made on September 10, 1968, at Holloman Air Force Base. The early free flights were restricted to the White Sands Missile Range and tested aerodynamics, performance, and stability.

Starting in 1969, testing picked up. A total of forty-two free flights were made, including long-range flights from White Sands to Utah and back again. Between April and July, four Model 154 drones were lost due to control problems and recovery accidents.[292]

To this point, the Model 154 Firefly, like the 147 drones, was a Black project. That changed on August 4, 1969.

EXPOSED

154P-4 was on a long-range test flight when a warning light came on at the Holloman control center. A control surface actuator had failed, and the drone was seconds from going out of control. Ground control triggered the parachute recovery to save the drone, but the troubles of 154P-4 were only starting. It was descending toward the Los Alamos complex, during the lunch hour. Thousands of people saw it coming down under a 100-foot-diameter parachute. Suddenly, there were bright flashes as doors on its underside were blown off, and the bags used to cushion the landing impact inflated.

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288

Drone Operations in Vietnam," Warplane, (Vol. 4, Issue 48, 1986), 946.

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289

Wagner, Lightning Bugs and Other Reconnaissance Drones, 24, 25, 191, 192, 197, 199, 200, 209, 213. Much of the original work on the 147SD's systems was actually done for the Model 1241 reconnaissance drone built for Israel in the early 1970s. This was a ground-launched drone able to fly both high- and low-altitude missions.

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290

William Wagner and William P. Sloan, Fireflies and other UAVs (Arlington, Tex.: Aerofax, 1992), 36, 37.

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291

Ibid., 38–40.

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292

Ibid., 40, 41.