The accident occurred on April 20, 1982. With Lockheed test pilot Robert L. "Bob" Riedenauer at the controls, 785 began its takeoff roll. The plane lifted off correctly, but moments after the main wheels left the runway, it yawed violently and went out of control. Within seconds, the plane went inverted going backward and slammed into the ground on the shore of the lake bed. It took rescue crews some twenty minutes to pull Riedenauer from the wreckage. He had suffered major injuries. He recovered, but never flew again.[422]
The cause of the crash was traced to incorrect installation of several wires to the flight-control system. The computer read the pitch-up as an uncommanded yaw movement and "corrected" for it. Riedenauer never had a chance to get the plane under control.[423]
Soon after, the 4450th Tactical Group received a new commander. Colonel Jackson was replaced on May 16, 1982, by Col. James S. Allen. Although Jackson had organized the unit and started construction of TTR, Allen would oversee flight training and the move to operational status.
In June 1982, aircraft 786 was delivered to Groom Lake, but was used for flight testing. Senior Trend 787 thus became the first plane delivered for the 4450th Tactical Group. In September, this single aircraft became the core of the Q-Unit, nicknamed the "Goatsuckers" (later renamed the 4452d Test Squadron). Major Alton Whitley was picked to make the unit's first operational flight. This was successfully completed on October 15. As with the A-12/SR-71 pilots, he was given a personal designation — "Bandit 150."
As each new pilot made his first flight, he was given his own Bandit number.
Whitley was later given a plaque marking that first flight. It would be another six years before he was allowed to tell his family what the inscription meant. All it said was: "In Recognition of a Significant Event, Oct. 15, 1982."[424]
Before Christmas 1982, Senior Trends 790, 791, and 793 had been flown to TTR and flight operations had begun in earnest.26 Unlike Groom Lake, all flight operations at TTR were conducted at night. The pilots would leave Nellis Air Force Base on Monday afternoon and fly to TTR on Key Airlines, which operated a shuttle service to the base. Before each night's flights, there would be a mass briefing of the pilots, followed by target and route study.27 The hangar doors were not opened until one hour after sunset.[425]
This meant the first takeoff would not be made until about 7:00 P.M. in winter and 9:30 P.M. in the summer.
For the first year, flights were restricted to the Nellis range. This continued until sufficient confidence had been gained in the aircraft. Even so, it took a presidential authorization to begin off-range flights. In the event of an unscheduled landing, the pilots carried a signed letter from a senior air force general ordering the base or wing commander to protect the aircraft.
Once sufficient aircraft had been delivered, two waves were flown per night. This involved eight primary aircraft and two spares, for a total of eighteen sorties. The aircraft would fly the first wave (called the "early-go"), then return to TTR and be serviced. A second group of pilots would then fly the second wave (the "late-go").
Typically, the training flights simulated actual missions. A normal mission would have two targets and several turn points. On other nights, there would be a "turkey shoot" with some fourteen targets. The pilots would get points for each one; at the end of the night, they would be added up to see who "won." The missions ranged across the southwest, and the targets were changed each time, to make it more challenging.
The targets themselves were also challenging. The infrared system made picking up buildings too easy. Rather, the targets would be such things as a fire warden's shack in a forest, or the intersection of two dirt roads. When it snowed, it was even harder to pick them up, as there was little temperature difference between the targets and the ground. The hardest target was a dock at the Lake Tahoe marina. It was not visible against the cold water of the lake, and none of the pilots found it.
The second wave was completed by about 2:30 or 3:00 A.M. in the winter, a few hours later in the summer. The planes had to be in their hangars and the doors closed one hour before sunrise. After landing, the pilots would be debriefed.
The pilots then began a race with the sun. It had been found that sleep is disrupted if a person tries to go to bed after seeing the sunrise. Like vam-pires, they had to be indoors before the sun rose.[426] They would sleep six or seven hours, then begin their twelve-hour "day" again. Each pilot would make two or three flights during each four-day period at TTR. One of these flights would involve an in-flight refueling. During a month, each pilot would make ten to twelve flights in the Senior Trend and another five or six A-7 flights.[427] This took its toll — by Thursday night they were "a wreck."
Friday afternoon, the pilots would pack up and fly back to Las Vegas to their families and a normal day-night cycle. They would spend the weekend at home, then start it all over again Monday afternoon.[428]
Security affected everything the pilots and ground crews did. The pilots could call home from TTR every day but could not say where they were.
Nor did the families know what they were doing while they were gone. One pilot's wife told her children that their father was "at work." The whole situation took its toll on the pilots and their families.[429] One consolation was a sign in the ready room—"Someday They'll Know."[430]
The area around TTR was closely monitored. If a truck was seen in the hills around the base, it would be checked out, as were airplanes flying near the base's restricted airspace. Trips into Tonopah were also discouraged — security did not want a lot of air force uniforms visible.
Internal security at the base was extremely important. The operations building had no windows; it was a giant vault. Within the building was another vault room where the aircraft flight manuals were stored. When in use, the manuals always had to be in the pilot's physical possession — if a pilot had to go to the bathroom, his manuals were given to someone or returned to the vault.[431]
Before personnel were allowed access to the flight line, they underwent an electronic palm print scan.[432] During training flights, security also had to be maintained. On off-range flights, the pilots talked to the air traffic controllers as if they were in an A-7. Each plane also carried a transponder that indicated to radar operators that it was an A-7. Even though the planes flew only at night, special care was taken to avoid sightings. The routes avoided big cities. If a plane flew under a high overcast, the reflected city lights would silhouette it against the clouds. The phase of the moon also affected flight operations. Several routes were not flown if the moon was more than 50 percent full.[433]
The Senior Trend aircraft represented a complete break with past attack aircraft and, accordingly, needed a whole new set of tactics. Conventional tactics were intended to prevent the plane from being shot down — the attack was secondary. The plane would hug the ground to escape radar detection.
When the target was reached, the plane would have to pop up to a higher altitude to release the bombs. Such low-altitude, high-speed attack profiles made LGB drops difficult.
The Senior Trend, on the other hand, could go in at high altitude. This allowed the pilot to concentrate on the attack, rather than on avoiding hitting the ground. The high-altitude flight also permitted the target to be picked up at much longer ranges. In addition, the drop was made while flying straight and level. This meant the bomb would hit the target vertically, improving accuracy and penetration.[434]
422
Jim Goodall,
424
"We Own the Night," 15, 60, 61. "Bandit" was the radio call sign for the F-117 during flight tests. All the operational air force pilots received numbers counting from 150. The Lockheed and air force test pilots had numbers in the 100 range. Hal Farley, the first man to fly the plane, was given the special number "117."
430
Interview with Capt. John Hesterman and Lt. Col. Bob Maher, Edwards AFB Air Show, October 9, 1990.
433
Goodall,
434
Michael A. Dornheim, "F-117A Provides New Freedom in Attacking Ground Tragets,"