Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith said Americans "should react with a healthy skepticism to the notion that airpower will decide the outcome of a war in Kuwait and Iraq." Another voice added, "The United States relies on the Air Force and the Air Force has never been the decisive factor in the history of war". […] Saddam Hussein.
The F-117A was specifically criticized: stealth could be defeated by multiple radars, stealth required too much maintenance time, "delicate" and "complex" high-technology systems could not withstand the demands of sustained combat or the desert heat and dust.[502] (In fact, the F-117A had readiness rates in the Gulf higher than the peacetime standard.) The Iraqis tried to encourage such beliefs, with such statements by Saddam as, "[The F-117A] will be seen by a shepherd in the desert as well as by Iraqi technology, and they will see how their Stealth falls just like… any [other] aggressor aircraft."[503]
The war for Kuwait, it was argued, would not be decided by airpower, but by ground combat with the "battle-hardened" Iraqi army. The Iraqi use of poison gas in the war with Iran brought back echoes of the mass slaugh-ter of World War I. Estimates of U.S. casualties from such a ground war ran as high as forty-thousand-plus. Politicians warned such casualties would fracture the nation, just as Vietnam had.[504] An "antiwar" movement had already organized under such slogans as, "No Blood For Oil," "Protest The Oil War," "Bury Your Car," and the ever popular "Yankee Go Home."[505] In a real sense, the United States had to fight not only the Iraqis, but also the ghosts of its Vietnam experience.
On January 12, 1991, the Congress approved the use of force to back up a United Nations (UN) resolution calling on the Iraqis to withdraw from Kuwait. It was, in every sense of the term, a declaration of war. The UN deadline expired on January 15, and President Bush ordered combat operations to begin.
On January 16, 1991, the F-117 pilots were told to get a good meal. They began to suspect something was afoot. The maintenance and weapons personnel were ordered to make one simple change in the bomb loading procedures — the arming lanyards were attached to the bombs.[506]
The pilots reported for duty at 3:00 P.M. and were told they would attack Iraq that night. Each pilot was then given his target data. This war would begin over Baghdad and would strike at the heart of Iraqi air defenses and communications facilities. The F-117As would strike the National Air Defense Operations Center in Baghdad, the regional Sector Operation Centers (SOCs), and the local Intercept Operation Centers (IOCs). This air-defense network controlled some five hundred radars, the SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-8, and Roland SAMs, and some eight thousand antiaircraft guns. Baghdad alone was protected by about four thousand antiaircraft guns and SAM launchers.[507] The complete system provided a thicker air defense than any in Vietnam or Eastern Europe, while the defenses of Baghdad rivaled that of Moscow or Vladivostok.[508] And the F-117 pilots would have to face it all alone.
Ironically, the senior commanders and the F-117 pilots had very different images of the plane. The commanders had great faith in stealth, but due to the flawed Panama attack, there were questions about the plane's bombing accuracy. The F-117 pilots, on the other hand, had absolute faith in their ability to hit the targets. The plane's stealthiness was the unknown factor to them. As they suited up for the first night's attacks, several pilots were heard to say under their breath, "I sure hope this stealth shit works!"[509]
At the briefing, Colonel Whitley tried to prepare them for what was ahead. He explained what it would be like when the whole world seemed to be firing at them. He recalled, "I told them there would be hormones that would flow that they'd never tapped before. I told them they would know what I meant after they came back."
The pilots arrived at their planes about 10:30 P.M. and began the preflight inspection. When this was complete, they boarded the aircraft. The ground crews then handed them the paperwork for the mission — target photos, maps, checklists, and locations of emergency airfields. Each pilot also carried a protective suit against chemical attack, a rescue radio beacon, a "blood chit" (in English and Arabic), which promised a large reward for helping a pilot escape, and a 9mm Berreta automatic.
The first wave was made up of 415th TFS pilots; they had been at Tonopah East since August, so Colonel Whitley felt they should have the honor of being first. One pilot almost missed his chance; Capt. Marcel Kerdavid discovered he could not start his plane's port engine. He grabbed his paperwork and the tape cartridge that held the mission data and was driven to the spare F-117A. He did a fast preflight and was ready to go.
Just before midnight the F-117AS were towed out of the hangars and began moving down the taxiway. The day shift had just come off duty, and the taxiway was lined with maintenance personnel. They saluted as the planes went past. Just after midnight, the first F-117A took off; by 12:22 A.M., January 17, the last was gone.
The F-117As flew in pairs to the tankers. The first refueling occurred soon after takeoff. The second was completed thirty-five nautical miles from the Iraqi border. So far, everything was exactly the same as the training missions.
The first pair completed their refueling, left the tankers, and slipped undetected into Iraqi airspace, and the unknown.[510]
At home, the day of January 16, 1991, had passed slowly. It was clear that war was inevitable. People gathered around their televisions, waiting for news. At 6:35 P.M. EST (2:35 A.M. in Baghdad), CNN's David French was interviewing former defense secretary Casper Weinberger. He stopped and said, "We're going to Bernard Shaw in Baghdad." Shaw began his report: "This is — something is happening outside… The skies over Baghdad have been illuminated. We're seeing bright flashes going off all over the sky."[511]
The sky above Baghdad had erupted with antiaircraft fire, but, as yet, there were no U.S. aircraft over Baghdad. At 2:39 A.M., only minutes after CNN began broadcasting from Baghdad, army Apache helicopters blasted two Iraqi early warning radar sites. This opened a gap in radar coverage, and F-15Es flew through it to strike Scud missile sites in western Iraq.
Two F-117As had already crossed into Iraq. They were followed by six more. Unlike the F-15Es, they did not have support from EF-111A jamming aircraft. It was one of these follow-on F-117As that opened the Black Jet's war.
The target was the Nukhayb IOC in western Iraq. Located in a hardened bunker, it could coordinate attacks on the incoming F-15Es and the follow-on strikes. The pilot was Major Feest, the lead pilot for the Panama strike.
He located the target and released the bomb at 2:51 A. M. He saw the bomb penetrate the bunker's roof and blow off its doors. He turned toward his second target, an SOC at the H2 Air Base. When he looked back, Feest saw the night sky was filled with antiaircraft fire, triggered by the bomb's explosion. When he looked toward the second target, he saw the whole sky was alive with ground fire.
As the other F-117As closed on Baghdad, antiaircraft fire seemed suspended above the city. Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Getchell, 415th TFS commander and leader of the first wave, likened it to Washington, D.C., on the Fourth of July. The firing at the empty sky had been going on for a full twenty minutes, but at 2:56 A.M., a cease-fire order was issued. A stillness fell over the city. From their cockpits, the pilots could see the eerie glow suddenly disappear. Through the IR displays, individual buildings took shape. Baghdad was still brightly lit, and car headlights could be seen stream-ing out of the city.[512]
502
Hallion,
503
505
Joe Hughes, "500 protest war threat at Balboa Park,"
511
Thomas B. Allen, F. Clifton Berry, and Norman Polmar,