It was even sold to an Allied country. Then, suddenly, the White GNAT-750 became Black with the start of the CIA program.
The net result was that the CIA GNAT-750 effort was a Black project that was almost open. It was a very strange picture; yet it would become stranger still.
The political infighting over the CIA GNAT-750 was aggravated by technical problems. It was reported that the GNAT-750 was suffering from computer and software problems, which resulted in cost overruns, schedule delays, and "annoyed congressional staffers." A "Pentagon official" complained that the CIA lacked experience with systems integration or developing tactical communications links. Defense officials spoke of a "hobby shop approach" to development and said that the CIA was hurrying the project too fast.[623]
By late October, the GNAT-750 was judged ready for its final systems integration test flight. On the night before the flight, the CIA contract personnel modified the software program. The new program shut down the GNAT-750's motor and data link when its speed fell below 40 mph. It was assumed that if the UAV was at this low a speed, it would be on the ground.
During the flight the next day, the GNAT-750 was hit by a gust of wind.
This produced a low-speed indication, and the software shut down the motor and data link. The GNAT-750 rolled over on its back, went into a flat spin, and crashed. The surviving GNAT-750 was grounded pending an investigation. In all, the technical difficulties and the crash caused a three-month delay, as well as a $1 million cost overrun.[624]
The program regrouped from the mishap. On December 2, 1993, a GNAT-750 flying over the El Mirage test site successfully transmitted im-agery of moving targets, such as a tank, to a relay aircraft, which then passed it on to the Pentagon. Tests also indicated the GNAT-750 was quite stealthy. The radar at Edwards Air Force Base did not pick it up. It was believed that this was due to several factors — the shaping of the fuselage, its heavy use of carbon epoxy materials, and, ironically, its slow speed of 90 knots. The radar's own software filters out such weak and slow-moving targets as returns from birds or weather.[625]
Under the revised schedule, the remaining GNAT-750 was to be operational by February 1, 1994. CIA Director Woolsey reportedly demanded that it be operational before his next appearance at congressional budget hearings. There was, however, a new political problem. The Italian government was having second thoughts about playing host to the CIA operation.[626] By late January 1994, they formally turned down the U.S. request, citing the possible danger to civil aircraft from the GNAT-750.[627]
The UAVs had lost their base of operation. But the world had changed since the U-2 had taken off on that first overflight. There were other possibilities, ones that would have been unthinkable in the mid-1950s. The CIA GNAT-750 would be based in Albania.
When the Italians refused permission, the U.S. government made a direct appeal to senior Albanian officials. They approved the operation. The CIA unit would be flown in from Germany in a C-130. The single GNAT-750 and a satellite transmission station would be set up at an Albanian military base on the Adriatic coast. The three prime candidates were Scutari, Durres, and Tirane, the capital.
Pentagon acquisition chief John Deutch endorsed the recommendation Albania's location had advantages for the GNAT-750 overflights. They would have direct access to Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia without having to overfly a third country. It was in these regions that U.S. ground troops were assigned as part of the UN peacekeeping force. Bosnia Herzegovina was also well within range of the GNAT-750, as was the Serbian capital, Belgrade.[628]
It was a stunning example of how the world had changed in just a few years. Between 1949 and 1953, the CIA and the British Secret Intelligence Service had tried to establish networks of agents within Albania in an attempt to overthrow its Communist government. The effort ended in disaster — the agents were caught and killed. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Albania remained a closed, Stalinist country. It was the last Communist country in Eastern Europe to undergo the Revolution of 1989.[629]
The CIA unit was in place by early February. Its deployment in Albania was marked by a major article in Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine. The results of the GNAT-750's Bosnian overflights were mixed.
It was reported that of the thirty attempted overflights, only twelve were successful, due to continuing bad weather, maintenance problems, and difficulties with the GNAT-750's data link.[630] One of the UAV's missions was to follow UN convoys. Other flights were targeted against entrenchments; from 6,000 feet they were able to identify decoy artillery and SAM sites.
Airfields, troop and artillery movements, supply dumps, and tank locations were also monitored. Best resolution was eighteen inches. The GNAT-750s were quite stealthy — at no time did people on the ground realize the UAVs were overhead.
The overflights did reveal several problems. The relay aircraft was a two-man Schweitzer RG-8 powered glider. Because of Albania's location, it could only spend about two hours on station. Another six hours was spent flying to and from the area. Having to coordinate the GNAT-750s with the manned RG-8 meant the UAVs could only be flown in specific areas, and at certain times and altitudes. Real-time changes in the route, to more closely examine side roads and buildings, also disrupted the GNAT-750 activities.
By the summer of 1994, the U.S. European Command requested the renewal of GNAT-750 overflights. The CIA preferred to fly from an Italian base, but this was again refused. The unit was based in Croatia. This allowed better use of the RG-8 relay plane. The GNAT-750s were also equipped with an improved IR scanner.[631]
The CIA also wanted to expand its GNAT-750 unit with three more UAVs and an additional ground station. Two of the UAVs would be used for reconnaissance, while two others would be used as relay aircraft. The reconnaissance GNAT-750s were also expected to be fitted with ELINT receivers that could pick up both radar signals and transmissions from walkie-talkies.
This would be done by buying GNAT-750s originally ordered by Turkey.
The Turkish government was in a budget crunch and lacked the money to pay for the three GNAT-750s already delivered, much less the four still at the General Atomics factory. Each GNAT-750 cost $800,000, while the ground station cost $1.2 million. The CIA asked Congress for a u t h o r i t y to reprogram funds to buy the UAVs.[632]
The HALSOL and GNAT-750 represent the future of airborne reconnaissance. The smaller post-Cold War air force is unlikely to have the billions of dollars needed to develop and fly a new manned reconnaissance aircraft.
In contrast, a unit of UAVs can be built and operated for less than one-tenth the cost of a single F-15E or F-117A. The GNAT-750's similarity to a big model airplane is an advantage, rather than a shortcoming. This allows it to combine long-duration flight times with the simplicity of the small tactical […] value […] Black projects.
Despite all the problems, it was still done faster and at a lower cost than conventional methods could have accomplished. The criticism was based as much on jealousy as on the problems. At the same time, the GNAT-750 was a very different Black than the U-2, A-12, or even the Have Blue (which also started out White and then went Black). The involvement of congressional staffers meant that the lines of authority were less clear and direct.
623
Fulghum and Morrocco, "CIA to Deploy UAVs in Albania," 20, 21; and Morrocco, "Pentagon-CIA UAV Gains New Significance," 28.
631
David A. Fulghum, "CIA to Fly Missions from Inside Croatia,"