Out in the Nevada desert, a MiG 21 awaited.
In 1967, the Defense Intelligence Agency secretly acquired a single MiG 21. The country the MiG 21 came from, and the means by which it came to the United States, remain secret to this day. Because U.S. possession of the MiG 21 was, itself, secret, it was tested at Groom Lake. A joint air force-navy team was assembled for a series of dogfight tests. The project was code-named "Have Doughnut."[639]
Comparisons between the F-4 and the MiG 21 indicated that, on the surface, they were evenly matched. At a speed of Mach 0.9 at 15,000 feet the instantaneous turn rates of the two planes were nearly identical, at 13.5 degrees per second. At Mach 0.5, the MiG 21 held the edge at 11.1 degrees versus 7.8 degrees for the F-4.[640] But air combat was not just about degrees per second of turn rate. In the final analysis, it was the skill of the man in the cockpit. The Have Doughnut tests showed this most strongly.
When the air force pilots flew the MiG 21, the results were a draw — the F-4 would win some fights, the MiG 21 would win others. There were no clear advantages. The problem was not with the planes, but with the pilots flying them. The air force pilots would not fly either plane to its limits. To avoid accidents, restrictions had been placed by the air force on air combat maneuvers.
One of the navy pilots was Marland W. "Doc" Townsend, then commander of VF-121, the F-4 training squadron at NAS Miramar. He was an engineer and a Korean War veteran and had flown almost every navy aircraft. When he flew against the MiG 21, he would outmaneuver it every time. The air force pilots would not go vertical in the MiG 21. Townsend would make his pass, then pull up into a vertical climb, do a roll as he came over the top, spot the MiG 21, then line up on its tail. He recalled years later, "It was a piece of cake… Easiest plane I've ever fought in my life."
The Have Doughnut project officer was Tom Cassidy, a pilot with VX-4, the navy's Air Development Squadron at Point Mugu. He had been watching as Townsend "waxed" the air force MiG 21 pilots. Cassidy climbed into the MiG 21 and went up against Townsend's F-4. This time the result was far different. Cassidy was willing to fight in the vertical, flying the plane to the point where it was buffeting, just above the stall.
Cassidy was able to get on the F-4's tail. After the flight, they realized the MiG 21 turned better than the F-4 at lower speeds. The key was for the F-4 to keep its speed up.
On the third day, Townsend and Cassidy met for a final dogfight. The fight started with the F-4 and MiG 21 coming toward each other. When Townsend spotted the MiG, he lowered the F-4's nose and pulled into a high-g turn, maintaining a speed of 450 knots. The MiG 21 could not follow and lost speed. Townsend then pulled the F-4 into the vertical. The MiG 21 lacked the energy to follow, and Cassidy dove away. Townsend rolled over the top and pulled behind the MiG 21. Nothing Cassidy did could shake the F-4. Finally, the dogfight was called off when the MiG 21 ran low on fuel.[641]
What had happened in the blue sky above Groom Lake was remarkable.
An F-4 had defeated the MiG 21; the weakness of the Soviet plane had been found. The means to reverse the 2 to 1 kill ratio was at hand. It was also clear that the MiG 21 was a formidable enemy. United States pilots would have to fly much better than they had been to beat it. This would require a special school to teach advanced air combat techniques.
And it would require more MiGs.
The Iraqi MiG 21 pilot saw the two Israeli Mirage III fighters closing in.
The MiG pilot reduced his speed, wiggled his wings, and lowered his landing gear. When one of the Israeli planes pulled alongside, the MiG pilot signaled he wanted to land. The Israeli pilot indicated the MiG was to follow him. It was August 16, 1966, and the first MiG 21F-13 fighter had reached Israeli hands.[642]
At a press conference that evening, the Iraqi pilot, Capt. Monir Radfa, explained that he had defected due to his revulsion against attacks on Kurds in northern Iraq. He was also a Roman Catholic, one of only five or six in the Iraqi air force, and he felt discriminated against in the predominately Moslem country. He had requested a transfer to MiG 21s and spent four months training in the Soviet Union. Once he decided to defect, he had sent his family out of Iraq. He also sent a letter to Israel announcing his intention to defect. Dated August 3, it said in part,
I am a MiG 21 pilot of the Iraqi air force and I have decided to come to your country. This decision I have arrived at after very hard thinking and for important reasons that I shall explain to you personally…
I plan to carry out this decision within three or four weeks from now. Please tell your pilots not to shoot me down because I come for peaceful feelings. I should come in high altitude between 0700 and 1100 hours G.M.T. flying east to west and over the Jordan River near the Dead Sea. With the help of God I hope to land at one of your bases.
It was signed, "Yours faithfully, a MiG 21 pilot."
Monir Radfa took off from Rashid Air Base outside Baghdad on a navigation flight, then headed for Israel. As he crossed Jordan, two Hawker Hunter jet fighters climbed toward his plane, but the MiG was flying too high and too fast for them to catch it. He landed at Hatzor Air Base, to the astonishment of the pilots and ground crews.[643]
In fact, the defection was not a spontaneous action. For three years, the Mossad had been attempting to acquire a MiG.[644] The actual planning had taken nearly six months. Reportedly, an Israeli air force pilot had even taken a check ride with him, to ensure he could fly and navigate well enough to make the flight.[645]
The MiG 21 was repainted with the Israeli Star of David insignia, yellow recognition stripes, and the number "007" (a subtle reflection of the secret means behind its acquisition). For the next several months, it was subjected to a series of flights to learn its strengths and weaknesses. These were made by Lt. Col. Dani Shapira, the Israeli air force's chief test pilot. He recalled later, "We found out, for example, that at high speed it had trouble maneuvering as well as the Mirage, which meant we had to try to get it into tight turns at high speeds." (This was the same conclusion drawn in the Have Doughnut tests the following year.) At low speeds, the MiG 21 would tend to spin out in tight, low-altitude turns.
The MiG 21 was then used to train Israeli Mirage pilots. Some 100 hours were spent flying in mock combat with Israeli Mirage III fighters. By the end of the year, every Mirage squadron had been familiarized with the MiG 21.[646]
It was unique information, but it does not appear it was shared. The newspaper Lamerhav said two days after the defection that "supreme political interests" and defense responsibilities required that Israel not give any information to other countries. "The Government would do well if it left no room even for unfounded suspicions," the paper said. The Ma'ariv newspaper said, "Israel should not allow foreign experts to examine the new Soviet plane. The pilot landed his plane in Israel and only Israel should be able to glean benefit from this important event." The reason given was the need to avoid worsening relations with the Soviet Union.[647]
The information gleaned from 007 proved valuable to the Israelis. On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a preemptive strike on Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. By the end of the first day, the Arab air forces had been destroyed on the ground and Israel had complete air superiority. During the Six Day War, thirty-seven MiG 21s were shot down (out of seventy-two air-to-air kills). Two Israeli aircraft (out of forty-eight lost) were shot down in air-to air-combat — a 36 to 1 kill rate.[648]
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Wilcox,
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