The quality of the U.S. MiG pilots was also high. During the spring of 1977, a MiG 21 reportedly suffered a landing gear problem. The air force pilot was able to keep the skid under control and fairly straight. This limited major damage to the landing gear and the engine. The MiG was restored to operational status within a few days. Such high-quality flying and maintenance were critical. The MiGs were irreplaceable assets.
As during the Have Drill period, control of the MiGs was a source of conflict. During 1977, the air force and CIA fought over the planes. It was reported that the air force was barely able to retain custody of the planes and responsibility for their operation. It may have been that the value of the MiGs for training and evaluation outweighed any use the CIA may have had for the planes. It is worth noting that the Have Blue project was nearing its first flight. The Have Blue was tested against Soviet radar; it would be probable that the MiGs would also be used.
In 1977 there was a second leak about the existence of the U.S.-operated MiGs. The September 1977 issue of Armed Forces Journal carried a two-page article titled, "Soviet Jets in USAF Use." It began, "The United States has been flying a squadron of stolen or captured Soviet-built fighters for years. Some of the planes are very recent models; others date back to the Korean War. By one informal estimate, close to 20 MiGs are now in USAF service. Another source says that the U.S. has managed to obtain more than 25 planes, but has been able to keep only about five in flying condition on a regular basis." The article reported that the MiGs were being flown from "at least one base" in the United States to perfect air-to-air tactics. (The name Groom Lake had not yet been published.)
The magazine said it had been about to publish the MiG article several months before but had held off because of an "informal" request by a "senior official." Armed Forces Journal subsequently learned that the existence of the MiGs, as well as some test data from joint air force-navy tests, had inadvertently been compromised to a potentially unfriendly nation.
The article noted that estimates varied on the total number of MiGs the United States had. One source said it was about twenty, while another said it was about half that, "say eight, ten, or maybe twelve." Still another source, who said he had checked with "someone who knows," said that twenty "is high by a factor of four or five" (i.e., there were only four or five MiGs). In retrospect, the lower end of the range was more accurate.
The article also estimated that about one hundred U.S. pilots had flown the MiGs, while three or four hundred pilots were given the opportunity to fly against them. The article noted that this included pilots from the navy and Marine Corps. Again, these numbers seem high. Assuming four to eight MiGs operational at a given time, six to ten pilots would be involved (one and a half pilots to one plane). The Have Drill flights were limited to Top Gun instructors, a few selected fleet pilots, and senior officers like Gen. Marion Carl. A more probable guess would be around seventy-five pilots involved with the MiG operations in one way or another by 1977.
On a more whimsical note, the article asked, "Does USAF's secret air force explain a lot of verified, but unexplained UFO (Unidentified Flying Object) sightings?"[682]
As the 1970s neared their tumultuous end, U.S. MiG operations were undergoing another change. In the late 1960s, the MiG 17 and MiG 21F were still frontline aircraft. A decade later, they had been superseded by later-model MiG 21s and new aircraft, such as the MiG 23. Fortunately, a new source of supply was available — Egypt.
In the mid-1970s, relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union had become strained, and Soviet advisers were ordered out. The Soviets had provided the Egyptian air force with MiGs since the mid-1950s. Now, with their traditional source out of the picture, the Egyptians began looking west.
They turned to U.S. companies for parts to support their late-model MiG 21s and MiG 23s. Very soon, a deal was made.
According to one account, two MiG 23 fighter bombers were given to the United States by Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. The planes were disassembled and shipped from Egypt to Edwards Air Force Base. They were then transferred to Groom Lake for reassembly and study.[683]
The MiG 23 Flogger had a very different design philosophy than previous Soviet jet fighters. The MiG 17 and MiG 21 were small, short-range, tight-turning, point-defense fighters. The MiG 23 was more akin to multi-role Western fighters. For one thing, it used variable sweep wings. They could be pivoted forward for takeoff and landing, then swept back for high-speed flight. The aircraft was larger and heavier than earlier MiGs. It was also faster, had a longer range (some three times the MiG 17's range and half again that of the MiG 21), and a heavier weapons load (four air-to-air missiles versus two for the MiG 21). The MiG 23 could function both as a fighter and a bomber.[684]
Unlike earlier Soviet fighters, the MiG 23 had a high-wing loading and thus poor maneuverability. In fact, the F-4 was more maneuverable than the MiG 23. The U.S. fighter closest in performance was the F-104. (Both planes went like a bullet and turned like one.) Like the F-104, the MiG 23 was a demanding aircraft; it had a high accident rate in Soviet and Warsaw Pact service. On the plus side, the MiG 23 had a radar comparable to that in the F-4E. (Radars had been a weak spot in earlier MiGs.)[685]
According to some reports, the U.S. MiGs also received special designations. There was the practical problem of what to call the aircraft. This was solved by giving them numbers in the century series. The MiG 21s were called the "YF-110" (the original designation for the air force F-4C), while the MiG 23s were called the "YF-113."[686]
With the MiG 23s, operations expanded. Up to 1978, North Base at Edwards Air Force Base was largely inactive. The hangars were used for storage by NASA. Soon after, new security arrangements were put into place. It now appears they were in support of the MiG operations. It also appears that the MiG squadron was reorganized. The 4477th TES was replaced by the 413th Test Squadron (Special Operations) at some point in the late 1970s-early 1980s. The unit patch showed a Russian bear wearing a red hat, six red stars, and the slogans "Red Hats" and "More With Less."[687]
The would-be U.S. MiG 23 pilot underwent a three-phase training program. Phase I involved both ground training and six flights. Ground training covered review of the flight manual (general aircraft information, engine fuel system, electrical system, auxiliary equipment, operating limitations, flight characteristics, stall-spin characteristics, system operations, normal and emergency procedures, and performance data). The pilot then underwent ejection seat training, three hours of cockpit training, and briefings on the local area traffic patterns, restricted areas, and navigation aids. The U.S. MiG 23 pilot would then undergo written proficiency and emergency exams and an oral emergency exam.
In preparation for flying the MiG 23, the pilot would make a supervised engine start and then a high-speed taxi. The six flights were broken down into familiarization (TR-1, 2, and 3), MiG systems (TR-4, and 5), and a qualification check (TR-6).
Phase II was mission qualification training. The pilot would have to demonstrate his knowledge of flight test techniques and effective aircraft-systems handling. This demonstration could be made during or after the TR-6 flight.
683
Research File "Groom Lake (Nevada), Area 51 and Project Red Light," (W. L. Moore Productions, Compiled 1987).
685
Michael Skinner,
686
Letters,