Phase III was continuation training, in which the pilot was required to demonstrate mission qualification events, approach, and a normal landing.
This phase underlined the low flight rates of the U.S.-operated MiGs. Only one flight every forty-five days was required. Clearly, the MiG program was more akin to the flight rates of the X-planes, rather than the day-in, day-out operations of a regular fighter unit. If a pilot did not make the minimum of one flight in forty-five days, he would have to be recertified. Depending on the time elapsed, this would vary from reviewing the exams and procedures, then making a flight, up to undergoing nearly the complete training cycle, A U.S. MiG 23 pilot could also be upgraded to instructor following a single flight to demonstrate mission qualifications, instructional capability, and situational awareness. All the pilots had to complete open- and closed-book exams and make an annual qualification check flight.[688]
Coinciding with the arrival of the Egyptian MiGs, there were several leaks about both the MiGs and Groom Lake. In September 1978, a man named John Lear took a panoramic photograph of the Groom Lake facility from public land at the north end of the lake bed. When enlarged, it showed a MiG 21 on the parking apron. It appears to be one of the later model MiG 21s, with a broader tail and larger dorsal hump than the MiG 21F. (The photo was not published until 1991.)[689]
The following year came the notorious Las Vegas Review-Journal article on Groom Lake activities. In addition to naming Groom Lake as the location of the test site and revealing the existence of the stealth test aircraft (while getting the details wrong), it also stated that "three unrelated sources" had said two MiG 23s had been provided by Egypt.[690] During the early 1980s, several different photos were published of U.S.-operated MiG 21Fs.[691]
At the same time, the U.S. MiG squadron grew considerably. According to one account, there were about twenty MiG 21s and four MiG 23s in service by the mid-1980s. They operated not only from Groom Lake and North Base at Edwards, but also from the Tonopah Test Range,[692] during this same time as the first F-117As were becoming operational at TTR. Over all, U.S.
Black airplane activities in the early 1980s rivaled those of the 1960s. Not only the MiGs, but also the F-117A, HALSOL, and possibly another Black airplane were undergoing flight tests. The MiGs operated by the United States during this time were "new" aircraft. The original group of MiGs had been retired. The two MiG 17s and 007 had been returned to Israel in the mid-1970s. One of the MiG 17s and 007 were placed on display at the Israeli Air Force Museum. The other U.S.-operated MiG 21s were apparently retired, stored, stripped of useful parts, or scrapped. One of the MiG 21s was later used by the navy as an RCS test article.[693]
Despite the leaks, only minimal attention had been drawn to U.S. MiG operations. Then, in the spring of 1984, a crash would make it front-page news.
At 10:18 A.M. on April 26, 1984, a plane crashed on the Nellis Air Force Base range. Witnesses at a cafe in nearby Lathrop Wells reported hearing an explosion and seeing smoke in the area of Little Skull Mountain.[694] A few hours later, the Air Force Systems Command at Andrews Air Force Base outside Washington, D.C., issued a brief statement: "Lt. Gen. Robert M. Bond, vice commander, Air Force Systems Command, was killed today in an accident while flying in an Air Force specially modified test aircraft."[695]
General Bond was a thirty-three-year veteran of the air force, had flown in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and had more than five thousand hours of flight time. He was alone in the aircraft when it crashed.
Three-star generals do not generally fly test missions, so Bond's death attracted press interest. The fact that the air force also refused to identify the type of plane also raised questions. Early reports claimed he had been flying "a super-secret Stealth fighter prototype."
Within a week, stories were published that it actually was a MiG 23. It was said that the MiG 23 was used to test the Stealth fighter in simulated combat and that Bond might have been involved in such tests at the time of the crash.[696] Still later, it would be claimed that the crash was caused by a loss of control at high speed.[697]
The flight was the second of two orientation flights for General Bond.
The mission was planned to include a high-speed run, followed by a systems-radar familiarization. Bond's aircraft was accompanied by a T-38 trainer as chase plane. Engine start, taxi, and takeoff were normal. The two planes climbed to 40,000 feet while ground control reported they had about fifteen minutes of airspace time. Ground control gave them the distance to the turn point. Reaching it, they turned right. The T-38 pilot told Bond to check his fuel and calibration. They had descended slightly to about 37,000 feet, and Bond climbed back to 40,000 feet.
Bond increased the throttle and began the speed run. Bond then reported to ground control that he had reached the planned speed without problems.
The much slower T-38 was now some distance behind. Ground control radioed Bond that he was four miles from the next turn. At 10:17:50 A.M. Bond asked, "How far to the turn?" Ground control responded at 10:17:53 A.M. with "Turn now, right 020." Bond responded with two clicks of the radio.
At 10:18:02 A.M. Bond radioed, "I'm out of control. I'm out o f…"
Ground control informed the T-38 pilot that Bond was twenty-two miles away. At 10:18:23 A.M. Bond radioed, "I've got to get out, I'm out of control." Ground control warned the T-38 pilot that Bond's plane was nearly at the edge of the airspace. Soon after, radar contact was lost.
Bond had ejected, but he was killed.
An investigation was started, even as speculation about the accident grew. The plane had hit the ground in a high-speed, 60-degree dive and was destroyed. Three major sections were examined — the tail, the engine compressor and turbine blades, and the engine inlet. Examination of the debris showed that all the damage was due to ground impact. The engine was running normally, at a throttle setting of about 80 to 90 percent. There was no evidence of fire, an "overtemp," heat distress, or an engine stall. Checks of the fuel, hydraulic fluid, and lube oil showed no contamination or abnormal wear. The accident report concluded that the plane had crashed due to loss of control during high-altitude, supersonic flight.[698]
Although U.S. MiG operations continued after the death of Bond, its days were numbered. The TTR operations were closed down in the mid-1980s, apparently due to the growth of F-117A activities. It was reported that in late 1988 or early 1989, the MiGs were grounded. This was caused by the problem of getting spare parts. Most of the planes were placed in storage at North Base at Edwards Air Force Base. Others were described as being on display at Groom Lake.[699] It seemed that MiG operations had ended.
So it seemed.
Ironically, as the U.S. MiG operations were ended, MiG 15s and MiG 17s began arriving on the civilian market. Communist China and the Eastern European countries began selling the old MiGs to anyone with hard currency. By the early 1990s, supersonic MiG 19s and MiG 21s were for sale. A MiG 15 could be bought for $175,000 (a fraction the cost of a flyable P-51 Mustang) and operated for about $10,000 per year. This made it practical to fly the planes for air shows and movie work.[700] For anyone who grew up during the Cold War, it was a strange and delightful experience to see a former Communist-bloc MiG sitting on the ramp of a U.S. airport. As one aviation magazine put it, "Watching an American citizen strap into a MiG 15 is a lot like watching Captain Kirk flying a Klingon battle cruiser."[701]
688
Air Force Safety Agency, Bond accident report, "[deleted] Aircrew Training, November 1, 1979"; and "Phase I Ground Training Program" (May 17, 1984). The low utilization rate of the U.S. MiGs is shown by the history of Bond's aircraft. In the three years before the crash, it had logged only 98.2 hours of flight time. Between its filial inspection oh March 15, 1984'and the crash, the plane had flown only 7.2 hours — a little more than one hour per week.
689
James C. Goodall,
690
Research File "Groom Lake (Nevada), Area 51 and Project Red Light," (W. L. Moore Publications: Compiled 1987). If it was a later-model MiG 21, it would indicate that the Egyptian MiGs were being delivered as early as the summer of 1978.
692
Peter W. Merlin, "Dreamland — the Air Force's remote test site,"
694
Phil Pattee, "General killed in plane crash,"
698
Air Force Safety Agency, Bond accident report (May 17, 1984). The type and serial number of both the aircraft and its engine were deleted from the released text of the report. Any specific details that might identify what type of plane was involved in the accident were also deleted. This allowed the report to be released, even with the extreme secrecy surrounding the MiGs.