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In Africa, Chinese foreign policy concentrated overwhelmingly on trying to block the interests of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the Chinese supported a range of leaders and political groups that could not, by the furthest stretch of the imagination, be considered Maoist. This policy did little to recommend Maoism in Africa.

Even in the region in which, at first, the Chinese threw strong support to Maoist parties—in South and Southeast Asia—the national interests of China turned out to be more important than the desire of the Chinese leaders to establish an international political movement. In Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India, Bangladesh, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, the Chinese leadership ended up preferring to establish tolerable state-to-state relations with local governments to continuing to encourage Maoism and, more particularly, Maoist guerrilla activities.

In Indochina, particularly after the end of the Vietnam War, the clash between Chinese and Vietnamese (and Laotian) national interests became much more important to the Chinese leaders than the cause of expanding a Maoist international movement. Only in Cambodia—where Chinese national interests were linked to the Khmer Rouge and its battle with the Vietnamese—did the Chinese continue to concern themselves with supporting a clearly Maoist party.

Finally, the internal politics of China—first Mao’s seeking a rapprochement with the United States in the early 1970s, and then the conflict between the Hua Kuo-feng/Teng Hsiao-ping group and the “Gang of Four"—undermined International Maoism in Asia as it did in other parts of the world. Perhaps most important of all, the ascension to power of Teng Hsiao-ping by 1980 assured that the Chinese leadership would lose virtually all interest in fomenting Maoism groups might continue to serve the Chinese national interest.

Maoism in Afghanistan

The Afghan Communist Party, called the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), was established in 1965. Soon after its foundation, the PDPA split into two principal factions, the Khalq (People) and the Parcham (Flag). They were reunited in a single party in 1977, although factionalism within the PDPA continued. The party seized power early in 1978, through a coup by pro-PDPA elements of the army. When the hold of the party was threatened in December 1979, the Soviet Union moved large numbers of troops into the country, beginning a struggle that lasted for a decade.[562]

Both the Parcham and Khalq factions of the PDPA were pro-Soviet. However, for a time there also existed a third element, called Shola-y-Jaweid, which was pro-Chinese.[563] With the political turbulence of 1978 and the subsequent Soviet occupation of the country, that faction appears to have disappeared and to have played no role in those events. However, it was reported that its “Organization Abroad” denounced the Three Worlds Theory as “revisionist” and supported the Albanians in their quarrel with the Chinese.[564]

Early in 1992 it was announced that a new Communist Party of Afghanistan had been founded on May 1 of the previous year. It had been established by the Organization of Revolutionary Communists of Afghanistan, which had fought against the Soviet invasion of the country. The new Communist Party affiliated with the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, the grouping of orthodox Maoist parties that proclaimed their support of the Gang of Four.[565] Little is known about the subsequent history of this group. It certainly played no significant role in the multifaceted civil war that followed the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country.

Bangladesh Maoism

Maoism in Bangladesh—formerly East Pakistan—was characterized by more than the usual amount of factionalism among parties and groups claiming adherence to Mao Tse-tung Thought. It was affected, both negatively and positively, by the positions adopted by the Chinese government, first toward the struggle for independence by East Pakistan in 1971-1972, and subsequently toward the various regimes of independent Bangladesh.

The struggle for independence of East Pakistan, leading to establishment of Bangladesh, was led by the Awami League (AL), headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. This fight, beginning as a move for autonomy of East Pakistan, became an open war for independence in 1971. Sheikh Mujibur emerged as first head of the new state.

During this struggle, the Chinese, who because of their hostility toward India had developed particularly friendly relations with Pakistan, supported the efforts of the Pakistan government of General Yahya Khan to put down the rebellion in the east. This attitude of China contributed to the splintering of Maoism in East Pakistan-Bangladesh. In contrast to the Chinese position, the Soviet Union had supported the insurrection to establish Bangladesh, as did the pro-Soviet party of East Pakistan.[566]

In January 1975, Rahman’s government proclaimed establishment of a single-party state, to be governed by a new group, the Bangladesh Khrishak Srami Awami League, and all existing parties were banned. On August 15, 1975, Rahman was killed during a revolt by junior officers. Two and a half months later a revolt by senior officers ousted the government established in August. The new regime was led by General Ziaur Rahman. It is against this turbulent background that Maoism functioned in Bangladesh.

In 1954, the Communist Party of Pakistan had been outlawed, and members had taken refuge in the “polyglot” National Awami Party (not to be confused with the Awami League of Sheikh Rahman). Three years later, the National Awami Party split into a proSoviet group, National Awami Party (M), led by Wali Khan and predominant in West Pakistan, and the pro-Chinese National Awami Party (B), led by Maulana Bhashani, centered in East Pakistan. It was mainly out of the latter that the various Maoist parties appeared. Bhashani himself could not be considered a Maoist, since although he was anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese, he professed a belief in “Islamic socialism.”[567]

In order to clarify somewhat the various contending Maoist groups of the 1970s and after, it is most convenient to analyze the various parties individually.

Bangladesh Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist)

The most important of the Maoist groups was the Bangladesh Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), or BCP-ML, formerly the Communist Party of East Pakistan (Marxist-Leninist), which had broken away from the pro-Moscow Communist Party of East Pakistan in the late 1960s.[568] From its inception the BCP-ML was headed by Mohammed Toaha, who had at one time been Secretary-General of the National Awami Party.[569]

Justus van der Kroef wrote, “During the 1971 independence struggle the BCP-ML was accused of opposing the Bangladesh freedom fight, reportedly after the Awami League, the CPR and the NAP(M) refused to collaborate with it in a proposed National Liberation Front. BCP-ML sources claim that not just independence, but social and economic revolution needed to be achieved… and that the ‘reactionary’ AL and the ‘social imperialist’ CPB and NAP(M) refused to support this desired broader objective. … CPB critics allege that Toaha and other Maoists were prevented from siding with the independence struggle by their overriding allegiance to Peking.”[570]

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562

See Ernest Harsch, “Problems of the Afghan Revolution,” Intercontinental Press (organ of Socialist Workers Party, New York), February 18, 1980; and “Afghanistan—A Revolution Misled,” Intercontinental Press, September 15, 1980.

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563

World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. State Department, Washington, D.C., 1973, page 107.

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564

SED, Dokumentation, 1980, page 230.

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565

A World to Win (London), March 1992, pages 18—19.

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566

See Conrad Wood, “Bangla Desh Background,” Marxism Today (organ of Communist Party of Great Britain, London), September 1971.

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567

Mukund G. Untawale, in Yearbook of International Communist Affairs, 1974, Hoover Institution, Stanford, Calif., 1974, pages 395—396.

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568

Justus van der Kroef, in Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1975, Hoover Institution, Stanford, Calif., 1975, page 288.

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569

Craig Baxter, in Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1973, Hoover Institution, Stanford, Calif., 1973, page 534.

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570

Van der Kroef, op. cit., page 288.