From the beginning, the Thai Communists were under Chinese influence. In part, this was due to the prominent role played in the party by Thais of Chinese descent. Clark Neher noted in 1975, “The overall policies of the CPT are made at infrequent meetings of the Central Committee which still consists predominantly of the 55 Sino-Thai and other CPT members who gathered at the Marx-Lenin Institute in Peking in the early 1950s and after several years of study returned to Thailand to form the backbone of the CPT. There has been a slow but deliberate effort to increase ethnic Thai participation in the top leadership of the CPT, and the overall ethnic distribution is increasingly Thai.”[902]
During most of its history, the CPT has concentrated on military and paramilitary activities. In 1960 it “formally resolved to resort to ‘revolutionary armed struggle’ and protracted warfare” in Thailand.[903] By 1970, the Thai Prime Minister, Field Marshal Thanon Kittikachorn, estimated that the CPT had “about 5,000 fulltime guerrillas and possibly 25,000 supporters, mainly in impoverished areas.”[904]
By the middle 1970s, it was reported that “There are estimated to be 8,000—10,000 full-time communist insurgents in Thailand and 6,000—7,000 unarmed civilians in the Communist Party of Thailand. … No figures are available for the number of CPT supporters or people living under de facto CPT administration, but the total presumably runs into some tens, if not hundreds, of thousands.” Communist guerrilla activities were centered in three parts of Thailand: the Northeast, the North, and the extreme South, adjoining Malaya. The first conflicts in the Northeast took place in 1965. There the Communists operated principally among “resettled hill-tribe communities, who feel themselves to be victims of Government neglect and indifference.” In 1975 it was estimated that there were “about 3,000—4,000 full-time communist soldiers” in that area.
In the North, “the insurgents are almost entirely hill tribesmen who live in remote mountains where the Bangkok Government has never held sway; the idea that the situation in the north is more an extension of the upland versus lowland conflict than an ideological struggle is not without foundation.” The fighting in the North began in 1966, in areas “which have long open borders with Laos.” In 1975 it was estimated that there were “2,000—4,000 full-time communist soldiers… usually led by lowland Thais trained abroad.” In the South, Thai Communist insurgency was closely associated with guerrilla activities of the Communist Party of Malaya.
In 1975 it was said that “Some 1,500-2,000 members of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) maintain base areas in the jungles along the Thai-Malaysian border and there are thought to be some links with the CPT and the Muslim separatists. Intelligence reports point to one CPM regiment recruiting Thai Muslims while another recruits Thai Chinese.”[905] In 1976, the CPT moved toward more open political activity than had been its wont. It announced a new ten-point program that it said it was seeking to carry out. This program included demands for freedom of speech and political activity, racial and social equality of various ethnic groups in the country, agrarian reform, the attainment of full employment, the assurance of guaranteed education and health care, and “an independent foreign policy.’
Shortly before issuing this program, the Communist Party joined with the Socialist Party of Thailand, the Socialist United Front Party, and other groups to establish the Committee for the Coordination of Patriotic and Peace-Loving Forces. The avowed purpose of this coalition was “to mobilize students, labor leaders, intellectuals, farmer group leaders and Socialist Party members.”[906]
However, when, in keeping with its pro-Chinese orientation, the Communist Party of Thailand came out strongly in opposition to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, this severely disrupted the CPT’s guerrilla and other activities. Paul Petitjean noted, “The Thai CP had long been getting simultaneous aid from China (equipment, political training), Laos (base camps, aid routes), Vietnam (transport, military training, medical training), and the Khmer Rouge (camps in Kampuchea after 1975).”
Petitjean sketched the development of the split between the Thai party and the Vietnamese (and their allies, the Laotians). He wrote, “For a long time political differences had existed between the Thai and Vietnamese CPs. For example, the Vietnamese reproached the Thais for lining up with Peking in the Sino-Soviet dispute and criticized their weak national strategy. Despite these important earlier political differences, the real split took place only in 1979. In 1975, after the victory of the Indochinese revolutions, the Vietnamese leadership had offered the Thai CP massive aid to give the liberation struggles in Thailand a shot in the arm. The Thai CP rejected that aid.” Petitjean concluded, “The split actually took place around the Kampuchean affair. Hanoi told the CPT (probably in 1978) that it would no longer provide aid unless the Thai Communists broke with the Chinese-Kampuchean bloc against Vietnam. But the Thai CP refused to publicly break with ‘Democratic Kampuchea.’… The final break, however, was consummated in early 1979 following the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime. The Thai CP’s camps in Laos were closed several months later.”[907]
M. Ladd Thomas noted, “At the same time, a pro-Vietnamese schism developed within the Thai Communist ranks. This divergence within the CPT’s ranks was perhaps also responsible for the closing down of the party’s radio frequency.”[908] This radio, which was shut down in July 1979, had been located in China’s Yunan province.[909]
Thomas reported in 1981, “There are signs that some lowerlevel leaders and a few leftist intellectuals are pressing party leaders (for the most part, Sino-Thais) to allow the party to become oriented less toward China and more toward Thailand. … In other words, these people wish to see the CPT transformed into a truly national communist party. Their hand may be strengthened by the withdrawal of direct Chinese support for the CPT.”[910]
The 1980s were marked by a drastic decline in military activities by the Thai Communists, as well as rising dissension within the party and pronounced reduction of political influence of the party. These developments were due in large degree to withdrawal of Chinese support for the Thai party, as well to difficulties with Vietnam and Laos, and to change in the Thai government’s policy in dealing with the Communists.
M. Ladd Thomas reported in 1982, “By 1980, China was urging the CPT to negotiate a truce with the Thai government. … China went a step further in 1981 in reducing its verbal support for CPT insurgents… in February 1981, Premier Zhao Ziyang of China visited Bangkok and in effect lessened such public backing by announcing that China would not allow relations between the CCP and the CPT to harm relations between the two countries.” Thomas also noted the reports that a pro-Soviet Thai Communist Party had been established by Thai Communists in Laos.[911]
By 1985, Clark D. Neher said, “The general decline of CPT in 1983 has continued through 1984, with the collapse of the united front, the defection of cadres and leaders, the loss of guerrilla bases, and the reduction of support from the outside powers. … The loss of material support from both China and Vietnam has also contributed to the demise of the CPT.” Neher noted that the Thai government had by then proclaimed “total victory” over the Communists.[912]
903
Clark Neher, in
905
Norman Peagam, “Communist Insurgency in Thailand,”
906
Clark Neher, in
907
Paul Petitjean, “Evolution of the Thai and Philippine Communist Parties,”
908
M. Ladd Thomas, in
910
M. Ladd Thomas, in
911
M. Ladd Thomas, in
912
Clark D. Neher, in