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In commenting on this layered and redundant air defense net, USAF chief of staff General Michael Ryan, who earlier had commanded Operation Deliberate Force over Bosnia in 1995, frankly conceded in congressional testimony before the start of the operation that “these guys are very good” and that friendly aircraft and aircrew losses were “a distinct possibility.”[5] Ryan added that Yugoslavia’s IADS made for a “very substantive air defense capability” and that the Serbs maintained a “very professional army and air defense corps.” Because of the assessed robustness of the Yugoslav IADS, Pentagon planners were said to have estimated before opening night that NATO could lose as many as 10 aircraft in the initial wave of strikes.[6]

INITIAL ATTACKS AND THEIR EFFECTS

Operation Allied Force began against Yugoslavia on the night of March 24, within minutes of President Clinton’s announcement that air attacks were under way. The initial concept of operations envisaged night raids against so-called enabling targets, such as enemy air defense assets, in order to create a more permissive operating environment for subsequent attacks against other classes of targets. In announcing the commencement of attacks, the president declared that the operation had three goals: “To demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to aggression,” to deter Milosevic from “continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians,” and, if need be, “to damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo by seriously diminishing its military capabilities.” At the same time, he pointedly stressed: “I don’t intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.”[7] To those opening words, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army General Henry H. Shelton, added that NATO would engage “the full range of his military capabilities” if Milosevic did not desist from his offensive in Kosovo.[8] As noted earlier, it was accepted as a given by the Clinton administration that Milosevic would settle quickly. As Secretary of State Albright clearly attested to this expectation in a television interview on the evening that the air attacks began: “I don’t see this as a long-term operation.”[9]

The air war commenced with 250 committed U.S. aircraft, including 120 land-based fighters, 7 B-52s, 6 B-2s, 10 reconnaissance aircraft, 10 combat search and rescue (CSAR) aircraft, 3 airborne command and control center (ABCCC) aircraft, and around 40 tankers.[10] As for NATO’s additional 18 members, 13 contributed aircraft for use in the operation, with 11 allies (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Turkey) eventually participating in offensive and defensive air combat operations of all types. The first wave of attacks on the night of March 24 consisted of cruise missile launches only, featuring TLAMs fired by four U.S. surface ships (including USS Gonzales and USS Philippine Sea), two U.S. fast-attack submarines (USS Albuquerque and USS Miami), and a British attack submarine (HMS Splendid) operating in the Adriatic Sea. This initial wave further included AGM-86C CALCMs launched against hardened enemy structures by six B-52s flying outside Yugoslav airspace. The latter were the first shots fired in the operation.[11] The initial target hits occurred shortly after 8 p.m. local time in the vicinity of Kosovo’s capital city of Pristina, shutting down the electrical power grid and plunging the city into darkness. The main commercial and military airfield at nearby Batajnica was also hit. In all, 55 U.S. cruise missiles were expended the first night.

These cruise-missile attacks were followed by fixed-wing air strikes that continued throughout the night, primarily against air defense targets such as SAM batteries and radar and military communications sites.[12] Allied aircraft operated out of Italy, Spain, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Adriatic Sea.[13] Their targets included a radar site at Podgorica, the capital city of Montenegro. In addition, NATO aircrews hit airfields in Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro, as well as electrical power generating facilities, weapons-producing factories, military and police barracks, and command and control nodes, including some aim points located north of Belgrade. Among specific targets attacked were the VJ’s Kosovoski Junaci barracks near Pristina in Kosovo, the Golobovci airport in Montenegro, munitions stores at Danilovgrad, and other military targets at Radovac, Sipcanik, and Ulcini.[14] Allied pilots were instructed to take no chances with enemy infrared SAMs and AAA and to honor an altitude floor (or “hard deck”) of 15,000 ft to remain above their killing envelopes.

Targets attacked the first night were reviewed with special care at the White House by President Clinton, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, and General Shelton. Some proposed targets were removed from the list by dissenting NATO leaders out of concern for causing collateral damage because of their close proximity to civilian buildings. In other borderline cases in which targets were reluctantly approved, the recommended bomb size was reduced to minimize or preclude collateral damage. One of every five laser-guided bombs dropped by an F-117 the first night was a 500-lb GBU-12 instead of a 2,000-lb GBU-27. That meant less likelihood of the bomb’s causing inadvertent collateral damage, but also a lower probability of destroying the intended target. The rules of engagement were uncompromisingly restrictive, with pilots instructed to return home with their weapons unless their assigned target could be positively identified.[15]

In all, some 400 sorties were flown the first night, including 120 strike missions against 40 targets consisting of five airfields, five army garrisons, communications centers, and storage depots, in addition to IADS facilities. Only a few SA-3 and SA-6 SAMs were launched against attacking NATO aircraft the first night. All the same, Pentagon officials anticipated the day after that at least a dozen NATO aircraft losses could be incurred should the operation continue beyond just a few days.[16] Contrary to early Western press reports, Serb IADS operators never intentionally husbanded their SAMs. Instead, after experiencing allied SEAD operations for the first time, they adapted their tactics to balance lethality with survivability, with the result that they were always present and aggressive—even as they showed greater firing discipline than the Iraqis did during Desert Storm.[17]

Numerous enemy fighters, including at least a dozen MiG-29s, sought to engage attacking NATO aircraft the first night.[18] One MiG-29 was reported to have fired an R-73 (NATO code-named AA-10 Alamo) radar-guided missile toward an ingressing NATO fighter in an ineffectual attempt to get off a counteroffensive shot. Two MiG-29s were downed by USAF F-15s and one by a Dutch F-16. In addition, a MiG-21 was believed to have crashed during an attempt to land. Only rarely did Serb fighters rise to challenge NATO aircraft after that. The following day, General Clark declared that the bombardment would “systematically and progressively attack, disrupt, degrade, devastate,” and “ultimately… destroy” Milosevic’s army if he failed to accept the American-drafted peace plan. Clark further declared that the air effort would be “just as long and difficult as President Milosevic requires it to be.”[19]

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5

Paul Richter, “U.S. Pilots Face Perilous Task, Pentagon Says,” Los Angeles Times, March 20, 1999. In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on the eve of the war, Ryan added: “I ran the air campaign in Bosnia, and this defensive array is much more substantive… two or three times more so. It is deep and redundant. Those guys [in Bosnia] were good, but these guys are better. There is a very real possibility we will lose aircraft trying to take it on.” David Atkinson, “Stealth Could Play Key Role in Kosovo, Despite Bad Weather,” Defense Daily, March 23, 1999, p. 1.

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6

Bruce W. Nelan, “Into the Fire,” Time, April 5, 1999, p. 31.

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7

Francis X. Clines, “NATO Opens Broad Barrage Against Serbs as Clinton Denounces ‘Brutal Repression,’” New York Times, March 25, 1999.

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8

Paul Richter, “Time Is Not on the Side of U.S., Allies,” Los Angeles Times, March 25, 1999.

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9

John T. Correll, “Assumptions Fall in Kosovo,” Air Force Magazine, June 1999, p. 4.

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10

This study has taken special care to characterize Operation Allied Force as an “air war” or an “air effort,” rather than as a full-fledged “air campaign.” Although that effort continues to be widely portrayed as the latter, formal Air Force doctrine defines an air campaign as “a connected series of operations conducted by air forces to achieve joint force objectives within a given time and area.” Air Force Basic Doctrine, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Hq Air Force Doctrine Center, AFDD-1, September 1997, p. 78. By that standard, NATO’s air war for Kosovo did not attain to the level of a campaign, as did the earlier Operations Desert Storm and Deliberate Force. Rather, it was a continuously evolving coercive operation featuring piecemeal attacks against unsystematically approved targets, not an integrated effort aimed from the outset at achieving predetermined and identifiable operational effects.

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11

The effectiveness of these initial standoff attacks was not impressive. During the first two weeks, no B-52 succeeded in launching all eight of its CALCMs. In one instance, six out of eight were said to have failed. Also, the two times that B-52s later fired the AGM-142 Have Nap cruise missile, both launches were reportedly operational failures. See John D. Morrocco, David Fulghum, and Robert Wall, “Weather, Weapons Dearth Slow NATO Strikes,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 5, 1999, p. 26, and William M. Arkin, “Kosovo Report Short on Weapons Performance Details,” Defense Daily, February 10, 2000, p. 2.

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12

An important qualification is warranted here. Although the opening-night approved aim points largely entailed fixed IADS targets, the limited attacks conducted against them were not part of a phased campaign plan in which rolling back the enemy IADS was a priority. There was no strategic emphasis on IADS takedown in these attacks. Comments on an earlier draft by Hq USAFE/IN, May 18, 2001.

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13

Italian bases used included Aviano, Gioio del Colle, Villafranca, Amendola, Cervia, Gazzanise, Ghedi, Piacenza, Istrana, Falconara, Practica di Mare, Brindisi, and Sigonella. German bases used were Royal Air Force (RAF) Bruggen, Rhein Main Air Base (AB), Spangdahlem AB, and Ramstein AB. Bases made available by the United Kingdom were RAF Fairford, RAF Lakenheath, and RAF Mildenhall. Spain provided Moron AB, and France provided Istres. For a complete list of all participating allied air assets, their units, and their bases, as well as a tabulation of the Yugoslav IADS and air order of battle as of April 20, see Benoit Colin and Rene J. Francillon, “L’OTAN en Guerre!” Air Fan, May 1999, pp. 12–19. See also John E. Peters, Stuart Johnson, Nora Bensahel, Timothy Liston, and Traci Williams, European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation, Santa Monica, California, RAND, MR-1391-AF, 2001.

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14

Robert Hewson, “Operation Allied Force: The First 30 Days,” World Air Power Journal, Fall 1999, p. 16.

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15

Nelan, “Into the Fire,” p. 32.

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16

Steven Lee Myers, “Early Attacks Focus on Web of Air Defense,” New York Times, March 25, 1999.

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17

Comments on an earlier draft by Hq USAFE/IN, May 18, 2001.

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18

This suggested that the Serb IADS may have been unable to deconflict its SAMs and fighters operating in the same airspace because of identification and discrimination problems.

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19

Barton Gellman, “Key Sites Pounded for 2nd Day,” Washington Post, March 26, 1999. See also John D. Morrocco and Robert Wall, “NATO Vows Air Strikes Will Go the Distance,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 29, 1999, p. 34.