The myths about Soviet pilots contain a grain of truth, but miss several key points. Some pilots, especially Soviet PVO air defense pilots and foreign pilots trained by the PVO (like the North Vietnamese), tend to place the accent on interception and ground control. This is natural, since their main role is strategic bomber interception, not tactical fighter combat. It is often forgotten that there are two Soviet Air Forces, the PVO, which controls air defense missiles and air defense interceptor fighters, and the VVS (Air Force), which controls tactical fighters (such as the MiG-29) as part of their Frontal Aviation branch.
Soviet writing in their air force magazines suggests that they have appreciated many of the shortcomings attributed to them by NATO. They mouth all the right words about requiring greater pilot initiative, and the need for more attention to "free-lance" or "free-hunt'' offensive fighter sweeps. It is not clear if Soviet tactical training is yet up to the task of preparing Soviet pilots for these roles. As in other branches of the armed forces, Soviet aviation training leans toward the staged and the stereotyped. Missions, even training missions, are meticulously planned without much accent on dynamic tactical environments and the unexpected. Soviet air combat maneuver training does not appear to be comparable to American Top Gun-style training. A study prepared by a fighter pilot at General Dynamics suggests that Soviet pilots display good basic airmanship, but are not as well trained as American pilots in adapting to the changing environment in tactical situations.
The Soviets have often tried to overcome qualitative disadvantages in men and machines with greater numbers. This is true of aircraft as well. In the NATO environment, the Soviets are likely to have some numerical superiority in fighters and tactical aircraft over NATO. But these advantages are not as great as in many areas of ground equipment. It is not as easy to translate numerical superiority in aircraft into superior combat power; the key link would be the ability to sustain air operations. Maintenance is absolutely critical. In Korea, the Chinese and Korean air forces had marked superiority in overall numbers. But American fighters displayed sustained combat power because they were well maintained and could be sent on missions more often than their adversaries.
The Soviets appear to have shortcomings in sustaining air operations. Their ground maintenance force suffers the endemic problems brought about by a reliance on a conscript force without an adequate middle level of professional, nonofficer technical personnel. Maintenance is slow because the officers must closely supervise the handling performed on the aircraft. This problem may be addressed in new reforms, but it is likely to linger well into the 1990s.
Like the Soviet Union itself, the Soviet Air Force is a curious blend. The most advanced technology coexists with outdated technology, advanced tactical thinking with outdated training. The capabilities of the Soviet Air Force can be exaggerated by concentrating on one aspect, or underestimated by concentrating on the other. Soviet pilots are well trained and courageous; their planes among the world's best. But in the arena of air combat, a little bit better training and a little bit better technology often make the critical difference between victory and defeat.
CHAPTER 8
Chemical Warfare:
Gas Attack at Geiselhoring
Senior Lieutenant Pyotr Chazov surveyed the field where his motor rifle company was bedding down for the night. His troops had done a good job concealing their armored vehicles along the edge of a neat Bavarian pine forest. The sun was setting, and you could hardly see the silhouettes of their BMP armored vehicles against the dark pines. His troops weren't as sharp as the platoon he had had under him in the Panshir Valley fighting in Afghanistan back in 1988. But they had become remarkably battle hardened in only a week of war. They had overrun a German mechanized infantry unit during the forest fighting on the third day, which had given them a lot of needed confidence. Some of them were even becoming a bit cocky. His company had been pretty lucky so far — no air attacks. Still, he hollered over to Sergeant Aksai to get his two Igla antiaircraft missile teams into position in case any NATO attack helicopters did show up.[62]
Chazov's company had seen hard fighting. They had lost a third of their vehicles during the forest fighting along the Czechoslovak border. Two BMPs were blown up near the border by mines, and a third was lost in an ambush to a German Milan antitank missile. They had crossed the Danube two days before without too much trouble, and had been assigned to the western flank of the Straubing bridgehead. The neighboring BMP company under Lieutenant Dudkov had been roughed up tar worse. Earlier in the day, they had been ambushed by a German Leopard 2 tank unit, losing most of their vehicles. The remnants of Dudkov's company were put under Chazov's command. This brought it back up to its normal full strength of ten BMP armored infantry vehicles.
His company had started the war with a full complement of the newer BMP-2 Yozh. The Yozh was well armed, but it had real limits when feced with enemy tanks. Chazov hoped that if he ever ran into Leopards he would have some T-80 tanks to help. His regiment had a single tank battalion with T-80s to support the three BMP battalions.
Chazov's 3d Platoon was equipped with older BMP-1M Korshun-Ms from Dudkov's company. [63]
The old Korshun-Ms had a low-pressure gun in the turret instead of the 30mm woodpecker autocannon on the Yozh. It was derisively called a "sparrow shooter" by the troops. It was slow to fire, maybe three rounds a minute if everything worked right. But the autoloader in the turret was finicky, and if the gunner wasn't careful, it would catch on this clothing and mash him up against the gun breech. The Korshun's gun fired a little PG-9 rocket-powered grenade, much like the RPG-7 antitank rocket launcher, which was supposed to be able to destroy a tank. But NATO tanks now had reactive armor and Chobham armor, so it didn't work worth a damn. Its warhead just wasn't big enough to get through the new armors. To give the old BMP-1 some tank-killing power, a Fagot missile launcher had been lashed on the roof.[64]
This was a smaller cousin of the Konkurs missile on the BMP-2. The Konkurs missile could be fired from within the turret, however; with the Fagot, the gunner had to open up his hatch and aim the missile from outside. Needless to say, the old Korshun-Ms weren't too handy when facing tanks.
Dudkov's company had found this out the hard way earlier in the day. His company was moving through some hilly pastures outside the village of Mitterharthausen in support of the day's regimental attack. They were separated from the regiment's T-80 tank battalion by a small woods on their right flank. Pyotr Chazov's company was to their left behind some low hills. Before Dudkov had even reached his objective, about four German Leopard 2 tanks came spewing out of the woods, going full tilt. It was a fearsome sight. The Leopards could move at nearly forty miles an hour, even on rough ground. And they could fire on the move. Dudkov's old BMP-1s had to stop to fire. It was a completely unequal contest. Dudkov's BMPs outnumbered the tanks two to one, but the tanks could open fire from 2,000 meters, far outside the range of the BMP's little "sparrow shooter." At that range, only the Fagot missile could be used. Two BMPs from the 1st Platoon stopped to fire their Fagots. They managed to launch them all right, but the Fagot missile takes nearly fifteen seconds to travel 2,000 meters. The Leopard 2 crews were well trained and they saw the white puff of smoke when the Fagots were launched. They swung their boxy turrets at the two offending Korshuns and fired. The 120mm gun projectiles took only two seconds to travel 2,000 meters, long before the Fagot missiles arrived. The high-explosive rounds hit the Korshuns squarely on the sides. The explosions blew the turrets high in the air and ignited the ammunition and fuel. The Korshuns went up in fireballs. None of the eleven crew in either vehicle survived.
62
64