Even more significant than the bombardment was the lively Soviet reconnaissance activity indicating that the attack was imminent and would be aimed at the Neustadt, possibly simultaneously also at Kietz, where a thrust from the north-west had been driven back, as reported in the daily situation report: ‘About 1300 hours enemy attacked Kietz from both sides of railway line supported by three tanks. The enemy penetrated the south-western part of Kietz and was only checked by throwing in the last of the reserves. Own counterattack from Kietz slowly gained some ground against fierce enemy resistance.’
The crews of the tracked vehicles returned to Seelow at speed that evening. Just two vehicles sufficed for the civilians who had been chased out of their cellar quarters by the smoke and heat and had been able to get through to the assembly point at the Boys’ Middle School in time.
The Wehrmacht Report the next day maintained that the Soviet activity was aimed at finding ‘launching points for further operations on the west bank [of the Oder] and to knock out the Küstrin fortress from our front’.[2] The worst damage to trenches, bunkers and barricades on the curve of the front line around the Neustadt was hastily repaired during the night, but extinguishing and supervising fires, as well as clearing rubble, took more time, even in the ‘quiet’ parts of the garrison. From dusk onwards ambulances shuttled to and fro between the casualty collecting points and the main dressing station, but only a small number of the worst cases made it to the Seelow convoys.
In the early hours of the morning of 7 March, while it was still dark, a dozen boats with 60 men of the Soviet 1042nd Rifle Regiment approached the engineers’ water training area on the Warthe, and a fierce fight broke out on the sparsely built-up area on the southeastern edge of the town near the gas works and less than 1,000 metres from the bridges. The landing party withdrew again after about an hour, having been betrayed by unexpected moonlight and suffering heavy casualties. The success of the defence was wildly and undeservedly overestimated in the report to Army, then Army Group, being finally written up in the Wehrmacht Diary: ‘A surprise night attack on Küstrin was repelled.’
The units on the far side of the Warthe–about three-fifths of the garrison were in the Neustadt–could not expect to be either replaced or reinforced. The Soviets assessed these forces as consisting of six combat teams, two sapper, two Volkssturm and two pioneer battalions supported by six artillery battalions and a mortar battalion, a total of about 7,000 officers and men with 280 machine guns, 50 mortars, 90 guns of 77mm calibre and over, 10 six-barrelled Nebelwerfer mortars, 7 rocket launchers and 25 self-propelled guns. Should the Neustadt fall, the Altstadt Warthe bank would become the main front line. Until then it had been held only by poorly armed Volkssturm and light flak units unaccustomed to ground warfare. Perhaps the troops in the Neustadt could be withdrawn at the last minute to take over this smaller position and so avoid certain destruction, but any such hopes vanished with the dawn. Again ground-attack aircraft dived down dropping bombs and firing machine guns on all worthwhile targets. The starting positions for the reconnaissance and assault teams in the forthcoming battle had hardly changed since the beginning of the siege over a month before. The tactical advantages and disadvantages governed by the terrain were varied. East of the Zorndorfer Chaussee the defence had a favourable view over open ground that extended to the Warthe on either side of the Engineer Barracks. On the left wing, however, the front line first ran through a wedge of woodland reaching to the edge of a housing estate, then over flat ground on which Soviets emerging from the cover of Drewitz could operate.
The assault on the Neustadt began at 0920 hours on 7 March with a 40-minute artillery preparation. Two regiments of the 295th Rifle Division in the first echelon headed for the railway bridges across the Warthe from Alt Drewitz, concealed from the German artillery by a massive smokescreen, while another two regiments of the 416th Rifle Division were held back in the second echelon to develop the attack in due course. By 1600 hours progress amounted to an advance of about a kilometre on the right flank and 500 metres on the left, and at this point General Sherebin decided to commit his second echelon, which went into action at 1830 hours. The fighting continued all night, but the Soviets failed to achieve any significant progress.
Towards noon an attack of estimated regimental strength led to the first breach of the town perimeter. Kietz, which had already lost its south-western part the day before, was attacked by three regiments of the 8th Guards Army and a battalion of Seydlitz-Troops with a view to cutting off the fortress, but the attack failed to reach the vital bridges across the Vorflut Canal.
Artillery fire and air attacks on the town centre intensified, the Soviets attacking with 65 PE-2, 64 IL-2 and 12 IL-3 bombers flying in groups of six to nine aircraft and supported by 85 fighters. Most of the telephone lines were cut. The regular army units were equipped with radios, but the combat teams that had been formed from various organisations such as the police and Volkssturm had none, so were left hanging in the air. Lightly wounded soldiers and troops of the rear services fleeing over the bridges under heavy fire suffered more casualties, then had to seek shelter in the next best trenches and cellars of the Altstadt. The Soviet aircraft were almost able to do what they liked. Even in the inner quarters of the Altstadt where many offices and staff quarters had begun the day behind glass windows on the ground floors, they now had to hang curtains and blackout materials over the shattered window frames.
A conference about the establishment of community kitchens was convened that morning in the town hall cellars, into which the remains of the administration had moved. The number of persons still fending for themselves was estimated at about 200. The provisions available to them in the cellars were running out, and the heavy bombardments of the last few days had rendered unusable many of their cooking facilities, electric devices having been out of action for some time through lack of power. Water was still available but flowed only thinly from low-lying taps. Those summoned to the meeting who did not live in the immediate neighbourhood of the market took hours to get through to the town hall, dodging from cover to cover. Once they were all assembled the bad news from the Neustadt and the ceaselessly detonating explosions close by made it obvious that there was nothing more for them to administer or decide upon. They broke up; the administration had ceased to exist.
Even the Feste Küstrin was finished. The 23rd issue had been printed but could not be distributed. The two Volkssturm men assigned to the Oder-Blatt printing house sabotaged the presses by scattering sand over them and then they tipped all the letters out before being reassigned to a combat team. One joined the flight to the Altstadt, the other was declared missing.[3]
Teenager Hans Dalbkermeyer remembered these difficult days:
On 7 March the Russians opened their long-awaited offensive on our position. Heavy artillery fire opened the attack. We could hardly see out of our cover. There were bangs and explosions everywhere. Along the road from the north-west came tanks and infantry towards us, almost moving into their own fire. From this point on I cannot remember what happened during the rest of that day. Apparently we quit the position in fear and fled in panic to south of the Warthe. I can still see a Russian who saw me around the corner of a building and, like me, pulled back in shock.
My memory returns that evening as we entered an industrial complex in the dark. It was the Cellulose Factory, already enclosed on three sides by the Russians that evening. Only the west side, the Warthe bank, was still clear and offered possible salvation. Nevertheless, we would have to swim across the Warthe.
3
Bokov, p. 119; Hahn, p. 8; Thrams, pp. 94–6; article in War Literature. The Seydlitz-Troops were mentioned in a telephoned report to HQ 9th Army (exhibit in Seelow Museum).
Seydlitz-Troops was the name given to the turncoat German units raised by the National Committee for a Free Germany within the Soviet Union from prisoners of war. The members were initially used for disseminating written and oral propaganda encouraging German soldiers to desert, but later went into actual combat against them; they also spread false orders among retreating troops in order to trap them. General Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, captured at Stalingrad, was the vice-president of the committee, but had disassociated himself from all but the propaganda purposes of these troops and was later officially exonerated.