At the end of our conversation, Englund asked me how I could verify my story, and I replied that the strength of my convictions would never allow me to disclose any secrets – technical or otherwise. I recommended that he get in touch with my colleague Edward Sarkisyan, an activist in the Democratic Russia Movement. Probably he would confirm what I had told Englund. Edward and I didn’t discuss this beforehand or have any kind of understanding or preliminary agreement, but I hoped that he could meet with the American correspondent, and he did. Edward told me about it later over the phone. He also added that he had made a recording of the conversation with Englund and they agreed that Englund would show him the material before publication. A few weeks after that I asked him to call to Andrey Zheleznyakov who agreed to answer the reporter’s questions.[81]
Just before Moscow News released the article, Leonard Nikishin from that paper called to read me the text. Although Fedorov had made a few insertions that did not sit well with me, I agreed to the article’s publication, since Nikishin insisted there was little time for changes. Moscow News published “A Poisoned Policy” on September 16, 1992 with a joint Mirzayanov-Fedorov byline and dressed it up with a landmark photograph of GOSNIIOKhT’s administrative building. That was the first published image of a secret Post Office Box.[82]
From its opening lines, “A Poisoned Policy” left the readers no illusions, asserting that Russia was continuing to test and produce chemical weapons despite international pledges to the contrary. It also stated that this activity threatened the health of Muscovites, and that the generals operating the chemical weapons complex were running amok. The article warned that Russian military authorities had already approved new chemical weapons and stockpiled a large amount of them. GOSNIIOKhT, the article specified, had developed a new toxic agent that was much more powerful than VX and had also successfully developed and produced a new binary variant of that agent. The first production of the binary agent had occurred at Volgograd, and in the spring of 1991 former Soviet President Mikhael Gorbachev had rewarded those involved with the prestigious Lenin Prize. The new binary had been field tested in the first quarter of 1992 at the Nukus test site, perhaps without the knowledge of Uzbekistan’s new President, Islam Karimov. The article further pointed out that these binary tests had occurred on President Yeltsin’s watch, after his January 29, 1992 statement committing Russia to a 1990 bilateral agreement with the United States to eliminate chemical weapons and no longer produce them.[83] In other words, five years after Soviet leader Gorbachev pledged that the country had stopped making chemical weapons, Russia had just tested the most powerful chemical weapon ever.
“A Poisoned Policy” painted a very grim picture, reporting that GOSNIIOKhT had been literally poisoning Moscow’s citizens by releasing toxic agents directly into the air. Furthermore, the article stated that it was nearly impossible to prevent such dangerous pollution, and that the decontamination solutions that GOSNIIOKhT developed and employed were really not all that effective. GOSNIIOKhT was storing toxic chemicals unsafely, even in open barrels, and the barrels were transported on regular trains to the Shikhany test site, where they were dumped into open pits. GOSNIIOKhT’s leaders knew but had not informed the public that environmental analyses had proved that the facility’s grounds and the water beneath it were contaminated with toxic chemicals. For these reasons, Russians should not trust the important task of destroying chemical weapons to those who made and continued to make them, for these very people had every intention of maintaining their dangerous and deceptive practices.
Even though “A Poisoned Policy” in Moscow News did not name any of the binary agents or give any formulas, I felt that the public and the government would surely take notice this time. Serendipitously, Englund’s article in the Baltimore Sun[84] appeared on the same day, stating that Russia had developed a new chemical agent that was 10 times more toxic than the well-known nerve agent VX. The article also reported that US government officials and independent experts in chemical weapons arms control were surprised and skeptical about these new chemical weapons.[85]
I was preoccupied with trying to feed my family, unaware that GOSNIIOKhT set in motion the process which culminated in my arrest only five days after “A Poisoned Policy” appeared. The institute’s Permanent Technical Commission assembled to consider whether my article contained secret information. On September 25th, these five senior officials passed a Top Secret resolution[86] claiming I had revealed state secrets learned during the course of my career. GOSNIIOKhT’s Director Petrunin[87] sentthis resolution to the KGB with a letter asking it to decide whether or not to initiate criminal proceedings. The KGB, in turn, forwarded a letter which stated that my actions indicated a “criminal offense” along with my case materials to its Investigation Department.[88] Russia’s Deputy Attorney General, Ivan Zemlyanushin, issued a warrant for my arrest on October 19, 1992, “for prevention of further divulging of state secrets and possible intervention in an investigation”.
The Chekists did a lot of work before I was arrested. Later a well informed Russian newspaper reporter told me that two events preceded my arrest. First, at an executive meeting convened in the office of Barannikov, who at that time was the chief of the MB RF (the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation – the successor to the KGB), four generals out of seven spoke out in favor of my arrest. Second, President Boris Yeltsin visited the MB RF on October 18, 1992. Brief information about this appeared in the press, mentioning that the president had a talk with employees of the MB RF and this talk grew into an expanded meeting of the ministry’s board.
That is why I have reason to suppose that President Yeltsin himself gave “the green light” to the generals for my arrest.
The patience of the Chekists was completely exhausted when, at Lev Fedorov’s invitation, I went to the editorial office of a popular Russian weekly magazine to give an interview on the problems of chemical weapons.
On the morning of October 20, 1992, I met with Fedorov at the Pushkinskaya Metro Station, and we went to meet with Oleg Vishnyakov, from the paper Novoe Vremya (New Times). The handsome young correspondent met us in a cramped room, and he got right to work without wasting any time. At first, it seemed to me that he didn’t know very much about the problem of chemical weapons, but during our conversation he got to the heart of the matter quickly, and by the end of the interview we were discussing problems almost on the same level. As we were leaving the Novoe Vremya editor’s office, I noticed a blond man and a blond woman without any characteristic features, next to the bulletin board which displayed the current issue of this magazine. Both blonds were discussing something in a lively manner, and I also noticed that they attentively looked at me…
81
Before that I had a telephone conversation with Andrei. He knew about the article “A Poisoned Policy” and he approved of it. I asked him whether he could give an interview to the American journalist Will Englund. I hoped at the same time that after his history was known by some responsible agencies in the US, perhaps they could give him the chance to be cured in an American hospital. Unfortunately at that time, I didn’t know there are not any such responsible agencies, and the ones that exist are mostly busy trying to compromise people like me. Anyway Andrei agreed to give an interview, and I immediately called Will. As a result the whole world became familiar with his history and the history of the development of Russian Novichok agents and a binary weapon based on them.
82
Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov, “A Poisoned Policy”, N 39, September 16, 1992.
83
Letter Dated 30 January 1992, from the Representative of the Russian Federation Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, Transmitting the Text of the Statement Made on 29 January 1992 by B .N. Yeltsin, the President of the Russian Federation, on Russia’s Policy in the Field of Arms Limitation and Reduction,” CD/1123 (Geneva: 31 January 1992).
In an interview with the US television show “20/20,” Yeltsin was asked directly whether Russia was still producing chemical and biological weapons. He responded as follows: “It’s a very difficult question. Therefore, I want to save this for my one-on-one talk with the US President. I can give only one promise. In the next few months we’re going to take steps to discontinue this kind of activity in accordance with international agreements on chemical and biological weapons.” Transcript from “20/20,” ABC News Division, 31 January 2002.
84
Will Englund, “Ex-Soviet Scientist Says Gorbachev’s Regime Created New Nerve Gas in ’91,”
85
Most of the experts that Englund spoke to declined to comment on the record. However, Dr. Lora Lumpe from the Federation of American Scientists commented that “it is unlikely that a nerve agent could be 10 times more lethal than VX gas.”
86
Resolution of the Permanent Technical Commission at GRNIIOKhT September 25, 1992. Top Secret.
87
Letter of Director GOSNIIOKhT V.A. Petrunin to A.I. Tselikovsky, Head of the Department for Economic Security of the Security Ministry of the Russian Federation , October 1, 1992, N 1594ss. Top Secret.
88
Letter of Major General A.I. Tselikovsky to Major General S.D. Balashov, Head of the Investigation Department at the RF Ministry of Security. Top Secret.