The proceedings were instituted without any violation of the law.”
Unfortunately nobody asked why this decree is a secret and wasn’t published.
After this letter, it finally became clear that the authorities would judge me by the rules of the totalitarian regime.
CHAPTER 19
Boycott of the Investigation
Despite all the obstructions, my lawyer Aleksander Asnis followed his clearly outlined plan. This included an attempt to have the sub-legal acts and secret lists of secrets acknowledged as null and void. We were playing to gain time, and could benefit only from dragging the investigation procedure out as long as possible. It was very tough for me, but the main point was that I was free and could endure those hardships.
Nonetheless, it soon began to get on my nerves. The investigator just ignored all of our petitions aimed at a full and objective investigation of the case.
At first, the prospects for the plan we had outlined seemed pretty good. Asnis was negotiating with the RF Supreme Soviet, with the heads of the Committee on Human Rights and the Committee on Legislative Matters. According to procedure, if two committees make a similar decision on a particular problem, it practically becomes the decision of the Supreme Soviet. The Committee for Human Rights had made the decision that the resolution passed by the U.S.S.R. Committee on Constitutional Supervision, which invalidated unpublished sub-legal acts, was lawful. My lawyer also had an agreement with the deputy head of the Committee for Legislative Matters about a similar decision; however, Professor Mintyukov, the chairman of that committee, returned from his vacation and didn’t agree to make such a decision. His primary concern was that such a decision might create problems for his career.
According to our plan for the defense, at an interrogation on December 1, 1992, which lasted for only 25 minutes, I repeated my previous position that I couldn’t name my candidates for the expert commission until I was shown the lists of secrets. I informed the investigator that I would again appeal his refusal to show me these normative acts.
Apparently, Shkarin realized that he wouldn’t receive any new information from me. So he didn’t summon me for interrogation for almost a month and a half, and refocused all his efforts on trying to get “damning evidence” from other people, and on trying to have his version confirmed by the expert commission.
On November 24, 1992 Captain Shkarin called in Dr. Natalya Godzhello for an interrogation. The results of this interrogation were disappointing for the interrogator. Natalya stated “…I think that Mirzayanov didn’t disclose any state secrets in publishing information about the creation of a new chemical agent and the development and testing of binary weapons, because he didn’t indicate either the class of the compound or its chemical formula, the method of its synthesis, or the technology and equipment used for its synthesis, or the initial precursors from which it is produced. In my opinion, specific concrete information constitutes a state secret, the disclosure of which could allow another state to create the same compound. I think that Mirzayanov published this article, guided by the best intentions, in order to rule out the possibility of an arms race in the area of chemical weapons.”[147]
The interrogation of my former deputy, Svyatoslav Sokolov, also proved to be disappointing for Investigator Shkarin. He only stated that “…We took samples of water, air, and solid waste for research both on the institute grounds and at the Volgograd PO Khimprom, where compounds developed at the institute were produced. Mirzayanov personally went to Volgograd to introduce his techniques, which was why he knew the place of the production of chemical agents very well…”[148]
Even during the investigation with the trial pending, I wasn’t going to put an end to my activities directed against chemical weapons. At my request Andrei Zheleznyakov gave an interview to the magazine Novoe Vremya.[149] I also gave an interview to this magazine about the danger of testing chemical weapons on the open test site, because the remnants of chemical agents adsorb to dust particles which travel great distances, and can damage people’s health.[150]
On January 12, 1993, Shkarin summoned me to his office once more. As I expected, he showed Asnis and me a bundle of resolutions-refusals to all our petitions. They were written pro forma and openly demonstrated arrogance and contempt for my lawyer and me. On the surface, everything was done correctly: I participated in the interrogations, wrote numerous petitions, and signed the transcripts. This created the impression that the investigation was proceeding along an entirely legal course. That was the goal of the investigator. He wanted to sculpt the indictment quietly and calmly. Of course, that didn’t suit me. I warned Asnis before the interrogation began that if the investigator once more showed me piles of refusals to our petitions, then I would stop testifying and signing the interrogation transcripts. My lawyer said that it might make our defense more difficult, but he respected any of my decisions, and therefore he didn’t object.
When we came for an interrogation on January 12, 1993, and the investigator, as expected, showed us refusals to all our petitions, I wrote an appeal in which I protested against the arbitrary investigation that systematically violated my rights to a defense. Then I refused to participate in the interrogations. I also pledged to respond appropriately to all summons by the Lefortovo Investigation Department.
The investigator tested me by asking me a question about some papers that had been confiscated during the search in my apartment. Of course, I didn’t answer and he recorded this formally in the transcript.
The same scene played out again on January 13th and 14th. In this way Shkarin probably goaded me on to use stronger forms of protest. If I refused to come to the Investigation Department for the interrogation, he would arrest me with pleasure and would continue fabricating my case, without any fear that the public might find out about his actions. I decided not to play into the hands of the sneaky captain.
Under the circumstances, the investigation worked solely with my lawyer. Shkarin showed us an enactment about the appointment of the expertise. Since the General Staff Headquarters of the Armed Forces refused to take charge of the expertise, Shkarin added new people to the expert commission and decided it would have to work at Lefortovo. The details of the problem of the investigation were well laid out in Izvestia.[151]
After a long ordeal, the investigator complied with one of our requests and seated the two people we had suggested as members of the commission. The first was Reserve Major General Vadim Smirnitsky, former Commander of Military Unit 64518. He was the head of a special subdivision at the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Defense, which dealt with questions of special weapons. Also they seated Reserve Colonel Nikolai Chugunov, who had a master’s degree in science, and was the chief specialist for special weapons at the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Defense. He had been an advisor to the Soviet delegation at the Soviet-American negotiations leading to the CWC.
147
“Transcript of the interrogation of the witness N.M. Godzhello”, November 24, 1992. Investigation Department of MB RF. Case 62, vol. 1, pp.262-266. Top Secret.
148
“Transcript of interrogation of the witness S.S. Sokolov”, January 14, 1993. Investigation Department of MB RF, Case 62, vol. 1, pp. 271-273. Top Secret.
150
Vil Mirzayanov, “Testing of Chemical Weapons: Thoughtlessness or Crime”,
151
Valeri Rudnev, “‘State Criminal’ up to now doesn’t know what his crime is”, Izvestia, January 19, 1998.