In this way, the colonial status of my people is as obvious today as it was yesterday. There is no hope of overcoming slavery until my people come to terms with their never-ending habit of leaving the successors of Sheikh-Gali,[159] a well known traitor to Tatar interests, at the helm of power, and gain control over the situation.
The Discovery of the Chekists
Meanwhile, Shkarin toiled away preparing to bring the indictment to its logical conclusion. The expert commission was working, and they found additional material at GOSNIIOKhT that allegedly proved my involvement with the development of binary weapons.[160], [161] Shkarin hurried over to GOSNIIOKhT to conduct the so-called personal inspection and wrote up a report with great satisfaction. He was certain that this time fortune had smiled upon him. He just forgot the saying that ultimately the person who is celebrating is somebody who has last word to say.
Of course GOSNIIOKhT immediately forwarded the document to the Chekists. However, the investigator handled these papers quite irresponsibly, because attaching this document to my case materials meant its complete declassification in the future. On the other hand, even in his wildest nightmare, Shkarin couldn’t imagine that I would dare to copy this top secret material along with other documents. It leaves no doubts regarding Gorbachev’s deceitful statements that the military presumably “were cleaning up unfinished business.”[162]
Shkarin painstakingly prepared for the interrogation. He planned to produce all documents that would prove that I was informed about the development of binary weapons. This is why he summoned me on March 25, 1993, for an interrogation and produced the “Technical Order.” At that point, I was still using the tactic of not participating in the interrogations, and I didn’t read the documents, but right away I understood everything. It was all true. There was my official stamp on the document. I remembered that the senior research assistant Savkin had brought it to me and asked me to put my stamp on it. I didn’t refuse, although I wasn’t allowed to be included in that work. In spite of all his efforts, Shkarin had failed to find a list of employees allowed to work on the topic of binary weapons that included my name. The lists existed, but my name wasn’t on a single one of them. So now the captain was satisfied to some extent, although he realized that there was very little information in this paper that could be used to formulate the conclusion that I had participated in this work.
Everything in the document was so vague that only a knowledgeable insider could understand what it meant. Not even the words “binary weapon” were on the paper, not to mention the components. Evidently another attempt to interrogate my former deputy, Svyatoslav Sokolov, didn’t help to prove my direct involvement in the development of binary weapons. This is why the investigator had to compose the transcript of his interrogation as if he were interested in how informed I was on the toxic properties of the compounds. This was just funny, because the investigator had more than enough information about what I knew regarding the properties of all old and new chemical agents. However, a Chekist wouldn’t be a Chekist if he didn’t try to take anybody who read this document for a fool…
The Expert Commission: Mirzayanov Told the Truth, Therefore he is Guilty
I was summoned for the next interrogation on April 12, 1993. A surprise was waiting there for my lawyer and me – the lists of secrets[163], [164] and the results[165] of the work of the expert commission. On that day I wasn’t ready to change my tactics for my behavior at the interrogations, which is evident from the following passage from the transcript of interrogation, which I also refused to sign. However, after that I changed my mind, following the advice of my lawyer Asnis, because we had already partially reached our objective. First, the expert commission was split in its decision, and the respectable and authoritative specialists, General Vadim V. Smirnitsky and Colonel Nikolai I. Chugunov, didn’t agree with the “opinion” of other members, which completely matched the resolution of the Permanent Technical Commission at GOSNIIOKhT,[166] with the exception that from it I disclosed “…the cooperation of designers and manufacturers…” naming test sites and locations of production of chemical weapons.
What is more, Asnis and I found another of their declarations most useful for my defense: “The commission has no information (documents) at its disposal at this time about any negative consequences that Mirzayanov’s actions caused.” In other words, the KGB’s vaunted experts stated that my ostensible crime was a victimless one. Also, the investigator finally produced all the lists of secrets that we had been requesting, for such a long time. Nonetheless, at a later date, in violation of all the norms of the Criminal and Procedural Code, Investigator Shkarin did not include these materials in my case (he included only extracts of them), and this is why I couldn’t copy them and make them public. However, I managed to copy some of the necessary excerpts regarding the essence of state secrets in the area of scientific research work on weapons. This is why during the next interrogation that took place on April 14, 1993, I worked very hard, reading everything attentively, and copied the parts I found most interesting. Upon the recommendation of my lawyer, I also wrote a petition in which I asked to submit a request for clarification of the terms used on the lists for interpreting chemical weapons. I remember that on all the lists of information that constitute state secrecy, there was not a single word about chemical weapons, or their development and testing. Instead of this the experts and the investigator used general terms such as “ammunition”. The situation was exactly the same with the notion of the “special purpose program” for the development of weapons, the information from which I had allegedly disclosed. For these reasons I insisted on my arguments at the interrogation on April 15, 1993. In particular, in answering the usual question of the investigator about what “explanations I could give regarding the materials that were shown to me”, I declared:
“I read the resolutions and Lists of Information of state secrecy that were presented to me, and I am submitting a request about elaborating on the question about specifying whether all the lists shown to me – and in particular clauses which the experts refer to in their resolution – are aimed at protecting information about scientific research in the area of the development of chemical weapons in our country, because in the texts of the lists there are no terms “chemical armaments,” “chemical weapons,” or “military chemical agents.” The list of the Ministry of Chemical Industry only contains the terms “model chemical agents of the probable enemy,” “objects of chemical weapons destruction,” and “means of chemical defense.” Additionally, I request that expert Nikolai I. Chugunov be interrogated and asked what, from the point of view of the requirements produced, falls into the notion “special purpose program for scientific research” and whether it is possible to say that I disclosed the final results of some specific program for scientific research. I also request that the experts who signed the general findings be interrogated about their conclusions about the precise wording of Clause 56 of the Temporary List of Information of State Secrecy. I consider it necessary to state that the list of the Ministry of Chemical Industry dated January 1, 1993, is no longer valid because, since according to Clause 1 of this list, it is based on the List of Information of State Secrecy (compiled in 1980), which became invalidated on January 1, 1993.”
159
Boris Ischboldin,
160
“Transcript of the Inspection, Moscow”, February 24, 1993, Investigation Department of MB RF, Case 62. Top Secret. See Annex 30.
161
“TECHNICAL ORDER FOR THE COMPOUND PART OF THE EXPERMIENTAL DESIGN WORK OF “Substance-232” ON THE BASIS OF THE SYSTEM OF COMPONENTS”, Investigation Department of MB RF, Case 62. Top Secret. See Annex 31.
162
In a mid-January 1996, in an interview with BBC correspondent Mark Urban, Gorbachev insisted that Russia was doing everything according to its arms control agreements with America. He literally said: “I don’t know anything about these works. Maybe military people were cleaning their tails in some way.” Transcript of “Chemical Weapons News Night,” Correspondent Mark Urban (
163
EXTRACT from “The List of Major Information Constituting State Secrets”, confirmed by resolution N 1121-387 of USSR Counsel of Ministers on December 3, 1980. Top Secret.
164
EXTRACT from the “The List of Information to be Qualified as Secret by the USSR Ministry of Petrochemical Industry” confirmed by order N 234-19 of the USSR Ministry of Petrochemical Industry on May 27 1991. Top Secret.
165
FINDINGS OF THE EXPERT COMMISSION Moscow March 16, 1993. Top Secret.