All the shells that could not be used due to either missing information or ballistic tables were a waste of transport capacity and this was even more the case at the end of a 2,000-kilometre supply line, hampered by many bottlenecks and frictions, as was the case for the Sixth Army in the battle for Stalingrad. Even though this Army was the point of the main effort from September 1942 on, ammunition remained scarce. Already after only a single week of fighting inside the city, munitions became a major concern for the Germans, as a report of the OKH Forward Officer attached to Sixth Army shows:[10]
Due to the especially heavy fighting inside Stalingrad, the troops suffer from an ammunition shortage. The 2nd Heavy Rocket Launcher Regiment that is especially useful for combat in an urban area has not been deployed due to a lack of munitions at LIst Corps, a situation that has existed for days. The supply of small quantities of munitions is not expected for 6-12 days.
Similarly a whole 10cm canon battalion (II./64) had to be withdrawn by LIst Corps due to lack of munitions. There is also no further ammunition available for the other thirteen 10cm cannon batteries of the army.[11] The entire army will have 400 rounds available again in another six days.[12] Improvement is not to be expected for three weeks.
Light and especially heavy field howitzer ammunition is continuously scarce due to its very high consumption inside the city and on the northern front.
Assault gun ammunition (long barrelled gun) is also scarce. At the moment this shortage is especially noticeable, since around 50% of the assault guns are long barrelled. Their use is therefore considerably limited.
Due to the mentioned lack of ammunition, key combat systems for urban warfare such as assault guns and rocket launchers (in German: Nebelwefer) could not be deployed. The lack of artillery shells for the 10cm cannon 18 meant that the main artillery gun for counter-battery fire was not available, while the general lack of artillery shells impeded German defences north of Stalingrad. Combined with shortages of fuel and rations from September 1942 on, Sixth Army units were logistically not in a position to assault a city. These material problems were exacerbated by the German numerical manpower inferiority against a massively reinforced Soviet 62nd Army. Despite facing such obstacles, German troops were able to take nine tenths of the city, a credit to their superior tactics and low level command.[13]
Long and intensive combat frequently exhausted German ammunition stocks in a rapid manner, since the supply system could not cope with the German war machine’s voracious ammunition consumption. The situation was somewhat different when possibilities existed to build up stocks, such as was the case with the last major German offensive in summer 1943, Operation Citadel. The Germans took advantage of a lull in the fighting to concentrate fighting power – both men and material – for nearly three months before the operation opened. This allowed the army to fire an enormous mass of ammunition, as already described in the introduction to this chapter. But such a build-up and subsequent consumption, especially in the second half of the war, when the German Reich was also under pressure from Western Allied forces on the ground and in the skies, could only be achieved by strict conservation measures in all secondary theatres, including large sectors of the Eastern Front itself such as Army Group North’s area or the northern part of Army Group Centre, an often completely forgotten section of the line. The following order from the 87th Infantry Division, deployed in the Velizh area, gives an idea of such measures designed to save ammunition:[14]
Based on particular circumstances, which are thoroughly positive with reference to the larger situation, the use of ammunition must be even more keenly limited from now on than has so far been the case.
The following is ordered for the prevailing combat situation:
Infantry munitions:
1) Infantry munitions of every kind are preferably not to be used during the day.
2) ATG 3.7cm high explosive shells are only to be used in defence against enemy attacks. The munitions quantity approved for training remains the same.
3) The use of 8cm mortar shells is as of now only approved for the battle group Velizh (1st Jäger[15] Btl.) and even here only after daily query by the divisional quartermaster section for those [fired during] night to smash enemy attacks.
4) Fire on especially worthwhile targets is to be carried out with light infantry guns. Use of heavy infantry guns only with approval of the divisional Ia.
Artillery munitions:
1) Use of light field howitzer munitions only for identified enemy attack or deployment in at least platoon strength. (Indication: 30 shells).
2) Use of heavy field howitzer (French) munitions is only approved for individual night time harassing fire and enemy attacks above platoon strength.
3) Use of 15.2cm cannon (Russian) [munitions] in the next ten days only up to 15 shells daily, especially on rear area movements.
4) Counter battery fire only with approval of the division.
The principle must always be to use the available munitions primarily during the night.
Ammunition needed to be saved whenever possible to counter Soviet attacks, making the Germans more or less passive from an artillery perspective. Especially effective heavy infantry weapons such as the 8cm mortar or the heavy infantry gun faced such a shortage of ammunition, that these battalion or regimental weapons were allowed to fire only with divisional approval, eliminating the notion of decentralized command. Not even mentioned in the order are the so-called ‘shortage munitions’; types of ammunition such as the Panzergranate 40 with its tungsten core, which was so scarce that it was perpetually in short supply. This phenomenon was not only restricted to special types of shells, but often extended to whole calibre categories, such as the 8cm mortar grenade or the 10cm K18 shells. The order further illustrates the diversity of equipment and weapons, including French and Soviet guns, in regular divisions. In many divisions, essential parts of the artillery regiments, as well as many of the army support units with heavy artillery, could not have been armed without French or Soviet guns, such as the artillery regiments of the ill-fated Luftwaffen-Feld-Divisionen (Air Force Field Divisions), many of which were deployed in late 1942 on the Eastern front. One last point of the order has to be highlighted: even under these circumstances, munitions were made available for training. This underlines the importance given to training by the German army, a point to be discussed in more detail in chapter 6.
While production of goods and the process of ascertaining needs and distributing materials were great challenges that often overwhelmed the German military apparatus and the other agencies involved, the real Achilles’ heel of the German supply system in the east laid in its means of transportation or, more precisely, in the lack of an adequate means of transportation. The campaign in France in 1940 had already demonstrated strains in the logistic system due to transportation shortages, but the Soviet Union’s vast distances and much poorer infrastructure would devastate the German system.
10
Vorgeschobener Offizier/OKH bei Armee-Oberkommando 6, An OKH/Op.Abt., 20.9.1942, BA-MA RH 20-6/212.
11
Due to its great range, the 10cm canon 18 was especially needed for counter-battery fire. This lack of ammunition meant that Soviet medium and heavy artillery could not be silenced.
12
The Sixth Army had some 60 10cm canon. As a result of this shortage, each gun had only six to seven rounds available, which in a period of normal use could be fired in two to three minutes.
13
For a detailed discussion on German urban warfare tactics, a numerical comparison and the supply situation in Stalingrad, see Wettstein,
14
87. Infanterie-Division/Kdr., Betr.: Munitionseinsparungen, 11.7.1943, BA-MA RH 26-87/163.