As previously mentioned, the Eastern theatre had enormous dimensions. This therefore required an enormous apparatus to bring men and material to the front (or, in case of wounded soldiers and material in need of a general overhaul, to the rear). A comparison of German and Soviet rail networks highlights this fact: The Reichsbahn ran 42,000km of railways in the occupied Soviet territories (compared to some 62,800 km in the German Reich) and therefore needed 112,000 German railway employees and 634,000 Soviet auxiliaries. Added to this were Wehrmacht security units, the German police and regionally recruited militia units, as well as technical troops under military command (Eisenbahnpioniere, railways engineer troops).
Due to the enormous distances, there was only a thin transport network in the Soviet Union. Therefore, traffic junctions were of strategic importance, an issue underestimated in German operational planning. For the Blitzkrieg campaign to be successful, these traffic junctions needed to be conquered rapidly and mostly intact. Otherwise, the advance slowed down or came to a halt, partly as a consequence of supply problems. But most of these traffic junctions were in cities, and the German spearheads – Panzer or motorized infantry divisions – were ill suited to conquer cities, especially when defended. The same was true for major river crossings, which were especially rare across broad rivers such as the Dnieper, Dvina or Don. This dilemma was never solved and was a cause of constant command friction, delays, and heavy losses in the spearheading units. The prolonged battles for Mogilev and Dnipropetrovsk were examples of the problems caused by transportation junctions in cities.[16] Poor infrastructure also applied to the quality of the roads. Most roads in the Soviet Union consisted of dirt that turned into nearly impassable seas of mud after rain or during the melting of winter snows. They were also never intended for the large number of vehicles that passed over them during the German advance. And while many railroad lines were also of lesser quality, the primary issues here were that the Soviets used a different gauge and lighter locomotives. So, if the Germans wanted to use the railway network, they needed to convert it to the German gauge or capture enough Soviet railway material (with the delaying factor of unloading goods at the German-Soviet border). By late 1941 and early 1942, the conversion, often poorly executed under the pressure of operational demands on railways that were never intended to carry the heavy German locomotives, became a constant source of problems. At the same time, the stocks of captured Soviet railway material never reached expectations. Organizational problems further hindered the efficient use of railways. It was not until spring 1942 that many of these problems were solved in most areas under German control. At around the same time, however, a new challenge arose: partisan warfare. Until the Germans left Soviet territory, their lines of communication were frequently threatened and often temporarily broken.
The German army had four means of transportation to overcome the distances and deliver the goods from Germany to the Russo-German-frontline: railways, motor vehicles, aircraft and ships, the last being a very marginal issue not further discussed here. Much has been written about railways in the east and some of their problems have already been examined.[17] Two other issues warrant a mention. First, while railways were effective in bringing forward many goods, they were not flexible enough for the new kind of operation arising from the use of mechanized formations. Second, the constant fluctuations in demand from the frontline overtaxed the agencies in charge of loading and controlling railway traffic. Additionally, the troops were not sensitive to the needs of the railways, often cannibalizing communication equipment, snow fences, supply and maintenance installations and even railway lines. Even with all of these problems – and due in no large part to the lack of motorized transportation – the railways constituted the backbone of the German supply system in the east, thereby shaping the course of German operations more often than recognized.[18]
The railways could only operate to a certain point behind the front, and all traffic from these railheads to the frontline or supply depots could only be carried out by vehicles. While motor vehicles could load more goods, drive faster and further, and needed fewer personnel than horse-drawn transport, the scarcity of vehicles prevented the German army from exclusively using such transportation in the supply system. The general lack of motor vehicles posed several dilemmas to the German army, beginning with production capacities and ending with the balancing of supply forces. A relatively weak automobile industry hampered production. The rearmament programs of the 1930s – including the build-up of a mechanized force and the Luftwaffe – drew both technical expertise and workers away from this industry. The production of trucks was always in competition with tanks or half-tracks and received a lower priority. The trucks that were produced were then needed for a variety of combat-related tasks: to motorize combat and support elements in the mechanized forces, to tow all kind of heavy weapons, and for the supply system. Even if the build-up of mechanized forces was limited, thereby freeing up production for trucks, there never would have been enough trucks to adequately fill the supply system. Another dilemma existed within the supply services. Based on the experiences of the western campaign and in anticipation of the vast distances and the need for the Panzer Groups’ operational freedom and flexibility to perform their decisive thrusts, the German army formed special supply columns to be used by the Panzer Groups as moving depots. While this gave the Panzer Groups a higher supply capability, it drew trucks from the regular supply columns and weakened supply possibilities for the remainder of the army, thereby widening the already existing gap between a highly effective but small spearhead and the bulk of the forces. In an attempt to at least minimize these problems, the German army desperately sought any motor vehicle available. This led to an extraction of vehicles from the German domestic sphere, as well as an extensive use of captured vehicles from the short campaigns before Barbarossa, especially those of French origin. While these vehicles added depth to German transportation capabilities, they also created new problems. These, as well as some of the issues discussed above, will be seen in the next source, a report given by the 198th Infantry Division’s staff officer for motor vehicles:[19]
I) Formation
The division was formed in November 1939 in the Protectorate as a division of the 7th wave. The vehicles were predominantly drawn from units that already had the Polish campaign behind them. […] The allocation of no all-terrain vehicles at all – with the exception of a few special vehicles for the Signal Battalion 235 – during the formation and later as well had an especially detrimental impact on the division’s previous operations. Therefore the anti-tank units and the leadership only had commercially available vehicles at their disposal. All forwarded requests in this vein remained unsuccessful.
Once again before the Eastern campaign, a request for the allocation of all-terrain passenger cars for at least the infantry and artillery regimental staffs, the artillery battalion staffs, the leaders of the anti-tank units and the staff of the Engineer Battalion 235 in view of the Eastern campaign was forcefully made to the XXXth Army Corps. Subsequently, during the campaign, the division was nonetheless allocated only 1 Kübelwagen and 5 Mercedes 170 V vehicles without four-wheel drive. The fittings for the fuel and equipment trucks were not delivered during the division’s formation, but had to be procured by the division itself on the open market, which caused severe difficulties, only increased by the division’s formation in the Protectorate.
16
See the detailed account in Wettstein,
17
Eugen Kreidler,