In August, most German advance axes experienced operational stops of varying lengths as a consequence of exhaustion and growing supply problems. This was expected by the military leadership, but it was presumed that the Red Army was beaten at that time. Fighting in most areas, such as the previously mentioned Dnipropetrovsk bridgehead, instead confronted the Germans with a different reality. Instead of pausing and filling up the depots for a second operational phase, German forces were involved in hard, supply-consuming combat. Only minor reserves of supply goods could be accumulated in depots near the front. Maintenance of vehicles also suffered. With the imminent worsening of road conditions due to the upcoming autumn rains, the prospects for future operations were dire. Massive breakdowns could be expected to occur, as the next section indicates:
7) Losses during the march from the Pavlovka-Snamenka area to Makejevskoj
How much the division’s motor vehicles were wasted, however, was reflected in the catastrophic impact of the march from the Pavlovsk– Snamenka area to Makejewoskj (380km). Together with a slight frost, heavy rains had softened the roads and made them so impassable, that all motor vehicle traffic had to be stopped. During this period, the division was compelled by orders of First Panzer Army to proceed with the march with foot and horse drawn troops, without regard for the motorized sections and supply units, so that the troops were increasingly distant from the division’s supply basis. Despite the strong wind, the drying out [of the roads] lasted a long time as a result of a constant alternation between frost and rain so that it was not possible to wait for the road conditions to be completely suitable for motor vehicles. As far as possible, the marches were carried out during the night and early morning hours, when the frozen ground still gave motor vehicles a hold. Since motor vehicle traffic was generally tremendously heavy due to the standstills that lasted for days, this condition constituted only a temporary improvement; the motor vehicles had to cut their way through mud and morass partly on and partly next to the roads. The motor vehicle material was no longer able to cope with such a high strain. Thus, 21 motorcycles, 10 sidecar motorcycles, 18 passenger cars, 17 trucks, 4 motor ambulances and 1 bus fell out on the 380km-long route, though these figures did not constitute a final result as the march movement had not yet been completed due to further rain. As a result, the number of missing vehicles has risen to a total of 61 motorcycles, 87 sidecar motorcycles, 24 passenger cars, 66 trucks, 10 motor ambulances, [and] 2 buses. Not included in this figure remain the numerous motor vehicles, which broke down on this route, have been sent to maintenance, and are not yet operational again. In order to collect these fallen out vehicles, two motor vehicle collection points were set up in Novo-Nikolayevka and Guljaj Pole, where the division’s workshop platoon was deployed to work. During the march of the motorized sections on this 380km-long impassable route, the tractors captured in Dnipropetrovsk rendered invaluable services in collecting the broken vehicles. Without them, the losses undoubtedly would have been much greater.
8) Losses of the fuel [supply] column
For example, the long and poor supply routes had a particularly strong effect on the fuel column’s truck inventory. It was assigned to the division in December 1940 with 7 Magrius trucks built in the years 1936/38 and 4 Chevrolet trucks manufactured in 1939. The last-named trucks were traded for 2 Ford, 1 Opel and a MAN truck in the exchange action. By 16.8.41, all the trucks swapped by the 253th Infantry Division and a Magrius truck had already broken down because of engine and differential damage and due to general wear and tear. On 30.8., 3 further Magrius trucks and 2 Ford trucks newly allocated in the meantime were lost. On 20.9., two trucks were loaded [on a train] for repair in the army motor vehicle park in Breslau. The last truck was a total write-off at the beginning of September because of a broken frame and bearing failure. In the case of the column’s Magrius trucks, these were commercial trucks formerly used as long distance lorries, which had already driven more than 100,000 kilometres when they were assigned to the column, and in this state they were involved in the campaigns in the West, in the Balkans and in the East. For instance, one of the trucks written off on the basis of general wear and tear, manufactured in 1937, had a kilometre reading of 400,000km.
This short discussion about the fuel columns not only provides a detailed view of the problem of integrating civilian vehicles into the army, but also indicates the wide variety of trucks in use, as well as the condition of many trucks on the eve of Barbarossa. The following section sums up all of the division’s problems, which were typical for the Eastern Army.
VI) In this context, the division again reported that beyond that [difficulties of supply], the same conditions apply with regard to the troops’ motor vehicle material, with the corresponding consequences for the motorized units’ operational readiness and the supply of the entire troops. In order to compensate for the shortages of the division’s equipment (only one motor vehicle workshop platoon, a horse drawn bakery company) and the lack of tonnage space in connection with the high combat equipment requirements of the troops from the beginning of the Eastern campaign with the enormously long supply routes, the division was forced from the very beginning to resort to using the total tonnage of the baggage train for supply, whether through central deployment by the division or by distributing its trucks for those lost by the second group [the food supply section of the battalions]. In order to meet the stringent demands of the almost uninterrupted marches and battles, it was to be expected that the troops had to abandon their baggage. It was later only possible for the division to supply the troops with the most essential luggage , that is to say that winter clothing left in Jassy was shipped to them.[20]
VII) The continuous change in the division’s subordination[21] may have been particularly disadvantageous in the motor vehicle supply with new allocations, spare parts and tires. In total, the division changed its subordination 25 times during the war. […]
IX) In summary, the reasons for the current extremely strained motor vehicle situation are as follows:
1) Shortcomings in the formation of the division: a horse drawn bakery company, assignment of only one motor vehicle workshop platoon, allocation [of] predominantly obsolete and exclusively commercial motor vehicle material, no towing-tractors.
2) Loss of tonnage and decline in the motor vehicles’ operational capacity due to the exchange of captured vehicles for German ones.
3) Failure of the refreshment period and in filling the vacancies before the Eastern campaign.
20
A German battalion-level supply train consisted of three subunits: The combat train (
21
The division was the highest level of a fixed unit in the German army. Corps consisted of several divisions, which changed according to tasks and situations, with divisions sometimes remaining under a certain corps’ command for only several days. Each change meant a new chain of commands and was a source of friction.