4) The enormously long and exceedingly bad advance and supply routes with their tremendous wear.
5) The heavy losses due to enemy action.
6) No allocations of motor vehicles corresponding to losses during the Eastern campaign.
7) Constant plummeting of the spare part supply and the lack of any local workshops.
If motor transportation situation was precarious at the beginning of the war in the east, it grew desperate in the following years. Not even the Panzer divisions, the German army’s spearheads, could escape the problem, as the following report of the 8th Panzer Division from 1943 indicates:[22]
The division submits below a report on the present vehicle situation:
I) The majority of the division’s vehicles date back to the time of formation in the year 1938. Insignificant reallocations later took place merely after the Polish campaign. Approximately 80% of the present vehicle stock dates back to this time. After the deployment of the division in the French, Yugoslavian, and Russian campaigns, general signs of fatigue now emerged in all of these vehicles as a result of their age, especially as the overloading of maintenance installations and difficulties in procurement of spare parts down to insignificant exceptions doesn’t allow for careful and complete overhauls.
Even the make-shift refreshment in spring 1943 in the Nevel-Gorodok area brought as a final result no improvement in the vehicle situation, as no complete overhauls could be carried out during this time. In addition, numerous vehicles that, to be sure, were to be repaired but not completely overhauled in the course of the refreshment broke down during the division’s deployment for bandit fighting during this same period of time. New vehicles, however, were not delivered to the division. After uninterrupted large scale combat since the beginning of July 1943, those still operational but very heavily used vehicles are no longer sufficient for their tasks.
II)
A) The Current Vehicle Situation
The number of the operational vehicles is excessively low in comparison to the establishment number because the establishment number also includes the vehicles that have to be sent to the Heimat for long-term repair (27%). A repair of these vehicles at the previous base in Minsk (moved on 20.10) was not practically possible due to the low capacity of the army motor vehicle park.
The number of vehicles in short-term repair (30%) will rather increase than decrease due to the over-taxing of the antiquated vehicle material.
B) Main Damage to the Operational and Short-Term Repair Vehicles
1) Approximately 50% of these vehicles require a replacement engine because cylinders and pistons are severely turned out and crankshafts and bearings are damaged.
2) Approximately 25% of the vehicles use up to 10 litres of motor oil per 100km.
3) Approximately 15% have damage to gear boxes to change speed and differential.
4) Approximately 20% have breaches in the frame, springs, and cranks.
5) Approximately 10% have broken drive shafts and half shafts.
A number of these vehicles (some 30%) that are necessary for the movement of the men, weapons and equipment must be moved by towing, which again has the consequence of an over-taxing of the still operational vehicles. Those vehicles that will be arriving from the Minsk repair station in the coming days (some 30) will only change the above-mentioned numbers minimally.
C) Procurement of Spare Parts
The well-known difficult replacement part situation has an especially negative impact on the division because the antiquated vehicles have become worn-out and therefore require replacement parts more frequently.
III)
A) For example, the shortage of vehicles has led to one Panzer Grenadier Regiment with a combat strength of 300 men of which 90 are immobile. At this time, 150 men in total from the combat strength are immobile.
B) The lack of any supply vehicles with the transfer of an armored halftrack company and 2 self-propelled light field howitzer batteries (Wespe) has an especially negative impact.
The most necessary vehicles for this must be provided from the available troop vehicles so that the mobility of this unit was further limited (see III A).
C) Due to the limited equipping with all-terrain vehicles – some 25% of the establishment number – the mobility of the division is further limited.
D) The available tonnage receives a further reduction as a consequence of the majority of the vehicles being able to carry at most only 75% of their nominal cargo load.
IV) In conclusion, one can say that the division can again be fully ready for action after the opportunity for a sufficient complete overhaul—with a correspondingly ample delivery of spare parts – and an allocation of around 25% new vehicles – in correspondence with the number in long-term repair (at this time already for many months). A quick remedy for the raising of operational ability can however only occur with the reallocation of transport room for ____ men, to at least make the current combat strength fully mobile.
One can clearly see in this report the dilemma between troop mobility and supply demands. This was intensified by the transferring of units without any supply vehicles, which then had to be drawn from combat units. The effects of an older vehicle park, which not only led to more breakdowns, but also reduced transport capacity while simultaneously increasing consumption of fuel and lubricants, was also made clear in the document. So the longer the war in the east lasted, the more German units had to rely on horse-drawn supply. The additional requirement of manpower could be only satisfied due to massive influx of Hilfswilligen or Hiwis, Soviet soldiers who more or less voluntarily fought for the German side. This issue will be discussed in more detail in chapters 5 and 6.
Supply through the air was used in German offensive operations in 1941/42 only to a small degree. In addition to supplying armoured spearheads that pushed beyond their lines of communications, it was mostly used to transport personnel and equipment of the Luftwaffe itself. But when the tide turned and the Red Army went on the offensive in winter 1941, supplying encircled German strongholds became a major issue. Holding several key strongpoints, especially in the areas of Army Group North and Centre, such as Demiansk, Staraia Russa, Kholm or Suchinitischi, broke the back of Soviet offensive efforts, denying it essential lines of communication to supply the advancing forces. And supplying those encircled positions was only possible by air transport. What worked under severe strain in the winter of 1941/42 became somewhat of a defensive strategy with dire consequences for German troops in upcoming years. 1942 saw the most well-known German airlift, the one for the encircled Sixth Army in Stalingrad. Less well-known is the airlift for Velikye Luki in the central theatre of the Eastern front.[23] A Soviet offensive, attempting a breakthrough in the direction of the Baltic, started a few days after the Soviet counterattack at Stalingrad. The Red Army achieved an encirclement of the strategically important city of Velikye Luki after a few days and tried to push further westward, but was stopped by arriving German reinforcements and its own supply problems, due in large part to the bypassed German-controlled Velikye Luki sitting astride numerous communication and supply lines. The German counter-thrust only reached the western outskirts of the city and freed a small group of the beleaguered garrison, but it failed to retake the city. Considering the size of the Soviet and German forces in combat and the overall situation on the Eastern front, Velikye Luki was a German defensive victory, but a bloody one. The foundation of this victory was the nearly two-month stand of the almost 7,000-man garrison of Velikye Luki, which was only possible due to air supply. An idea of the problems and the size of the airlift can be seen in the final report of the commanding Luftwaffenkommando Ost (Air Force Command East, the overall command of air force units operating in the area of Army Group Centre in 1942):[24]
22
8. Panzer-Division/Ib, Entwurf, 26.10.1943 (sent with minor revisions included here on 28th October 1943 to Panzer Army 4), NARA T-315 R 503.
24
Luftwaffenkommando Ost/Ia, Gefechtsbericht über die Schlacht von Welikije Luki vom 24.11.1942-19.1.1943, 26.3.1943, BA-MA RL 7/549.