These two developments – the need for additional training for newly arriving recruits and the decentralized training of low-level leaders – as well as the need for training with newly introduced weapons, made training capabilities in the field units necessary. The divisional combat school was one such step, while others were taken in the field replacement battalion. It was the field replacement battalion that finally became the training facility for divisions in the east, as the following source shows:[11]
1) Purpose of field replacement battalions:
The field replacement battalion is the ‘field training battalion’ and at the same time the personnel reserve of the Eastern army’s divisions.
With the field replacement battalion, the divisions should be given the opportunity by evaluating combat experiences to:
A) train arriving replacements to become full-fledged Eastern fighters,
B) train group and platoon leaders for their demands,
C) Further training for the front fighters – especially through attack training – and to train specialists of all kinds.
As losses are the heaviest with the infantry and the engineers, the main task of the field replacement battalion is to train infantry and engineer replacements and sub-leaders.
To A): Newly arriving replacements, such as march companies, convalescent companies, etc., are to be trained in each division for several weeks in the field replacement battalion, as long as the combat situation allows for it, before deploying in the front. The same applies to the training of NCOs, who are supplied from the Replacement Army and are not yet suitable as a group or platoon leader as a result of their previous use. It is also not possible for the Replacement Army to fully train the replacements on automatic weapons (especially the machine gun) due to the lack of such weapons. The missing training is to be supplemented in the field replacement battalion.
To B): The formation of platoon and group leaders (sub-leader training) is of decisive importance in the present state of numerous divisions and in the continuing duration of the war. In consequence, divisional combat schools have been established in infantry divisions, light infantry divisions, and mountain divisions. The divisional combat schools are to be incorporated into the field replacement battalion. They count as a company. The commander of the divisional combat school (B-position)[12] can be used as commander of the field replacement battalion depending on suitability.
To C): Due to the duration of the positional warfare, it is also necessary to develop the older front fighters for other types of combat. In this case ‘attack training’ is of particular importance. If there are personnel reserves (leader reserve[13]) in the field replacement battalion, the same applies to them. The introduction of new weapons [and] the need for specialists of all kinds requires the implementation of special courses in the field replacement battalion. Furthermore, the field replacement battalion can be utilized to train the alarm units. All kinds of combat experiences can be evaluated by further trials in the field replacement battalion.
The structure of the field replacement battalion must therefore be adapted to the respective situation.
2) Training subjects:
In the case of an overabundance of subjects, the emphasis should be placed on:
Reconnaissance patrols and assault group activity
Co-operation of all infantry weapons
Close-combat training,
Anti-tank close combat,
Sniper training,
Night fighting.
At the same time, the field replacement battalion is the winter combat school of the division.
3) Structure
The field replacement battalion is to consist of the battalion staff and 2 to 5 companies. Only the command, instruction and supply personnel are fixed in the unit, while the personnel to be trained are subject to considerable changes, depending on the deployment and situation of the division. Thus, for example, the following structure may be appropriate for a division to which a march battalion had been recently added:
Staff
2 training companies for infantry training,
1 training company for heavy infantry weapons training, 1 company [at the] disposal [of the commander] (engineer training, signal training, other specialists),
1 sub-leader company (divisional fighting school)
On the other hand, it is possible that in another division, to which no march battalion or replacements were added, the field replacement battalion consists only of
1 sub-leader company (divisional combat school), 1 company [at the] disposal [of the commander] (training of specialists of all kinds),
1 company for close combat and assault group training (men removed from the front for advanced training).
4) In particular, the following is pointed out:
The training of the sub-leaders must continue independently of all combat operations.
The most appropriate officers and NCOs are to be appointed as instructors, especially to set up and get used to each other in the first training period.
Anti-gas training belongs to the basic training of every soldier and is therefore also to be pursued in the field replacement battalion.
The field replacement battalion can only fully fulfill its task of being the field training battalion of the division when the leadership does not deploy the battalion prematurely in critical situations for combat, but pursues the training as planned independent of the situation.
In addition to further training for replacements and NCOs, the Field Replacement Battalion was also not only the unit where new weapons and tactics could be tested, but also a place for the further training of men whose long stretch in the trenches had decreased their effectiveness in offensive actions. The training for newly arrived replacements in the field replacement battalion allowed for their step by step integration into frontline units, as well as for the men to adapt to conditions in the Soviet Union. When the combat situation allowed for such a period, units that carried out these programmes clearly suffered fewer losses of new men when they were again engaged in combat. But even when armed with such knowledge, German units were often forced to deploy the field replacement battalion in crisis situations or to release the replacements prematurely to the front. The demand to train NCOs independently of combat action was often impossible due to the lack of men. Interestingly, the training issues stressed did not appreciably differ from the 1941 guidelines.
In addition to filling units with individual replacements, complete units were also sent to the east. Up to mid-1943, these were mostly full divisions. A first wave of divisions was sent to the Soviet Union in the 1941/42 winter crisis to fill gaps across the front. A second wave arrived in the east in spring and early summer 1942 for the German summer offensive. This wave included many allied units. A third and final wave was sent eastward from late November 1942 on to stem the Soviet offensive in the south. After these three waves, only a few new divisions were sent eastward, mostly rebuilt units such as numerous divisions destroyed in Stalingrad. Allied threats in the Mediterranean and on the Channel coast in 1943 drew most newly formed divisions to those regions. The introduction of new troops, however, caused many problems, in some cases due to the composition of the units, while others were due to the special conditions in the east, as the following autumn 1942 report by Sixth Army illustrates:[14]
11
OKH/Generalstab des Heeres/Ausb.-Abt./Org.-Abt., Betr.: Ausbildungsmöglichkeiten im Feld-Ersatz-Bataillon der Divisionen im Osten, 1943, BA-MA RH 24-59/80.
12
The German army’s table of organization used a letter to signify all positions, marking which rank the man in the position should normally possess. B stands for
13
When possible, German units had a small reserve of officers and NCO not posted to positions, but ready to take over any command when officers or NCOs were killed, wounded or otherwise lost, to avoid long vacancies in ongoing operations. Often, the forming of such a leader reserve was not possible due to the general shortage of officers and NCOs, and even if such a reserve existed, it was frequently depleted after a few days of operations.
14
Armee-Oberkommando 6/Ia, Betr.: Erfahrungen 300er Divisionen, 26.10.1942, BA-MA RH 20-6-227.