1) The mistakes ascertained in the report of the Second Army about the formation of divisions with three hundred numbers also occurred in the divisions of the same type subordinated to the Sixth Army. In the case of future new formations, it is then necessary to avoid:
composition of almost only short-service, men classified as indispensable, numerous fathers with many children and last sons,
formation by cadre personnel mostly inexperienced in the East, including officers,
too brief and deficient infantry combat training.
It proved to be disadvantageous to order the few useful instructors to Döberitz and Jüterbog. Dispatching of a school’s instruction troop to the divisions would have been better.
Equipment with too little motorized transport capacity (only 1 small truck column), with horse-drawn bakery companies, with only one workshop platoon, with heavy military carriages instead of light commercial ones, with too many types (about 100) French motor vehicles and with horses that are too heavy, and thus unsuitable for the East;
Equipping [the unit] with horses and motor vehicles too late, so that it was no longer possible for the operating personnel to practice before employment.
2) In spite of these deficiencies, the 300-numbered divisions subordinated to the Sixth Army have proven themselves effective not only in attack, but also generally in defence.
3) In order to remedy the identified shortcomings during the winter:
A) Ruthless eradication of all unsuitable leaders and an increased replacement rate of men with Eastern experiences in contrast to other divisions,
B) Sustained further education during periods of relative quiet in individual and unit training up to the level of the reinforced battalion. For this, several weeks of relief for each unit. Use and training of individual battalions as instruction battalions at the company commander school of the army,
C) Remedy of the deficiencies found in the supply units by modifying the table of organization, the table of basic allowances and corresponding supply.
The divisions identified as numbering over three hundred, which primarily arrived in spring and summer 1942 to support the German summer offensive, suffered heavily from all kinds of shortages, be it men or material. While a lack of instructors with experience in the east only exacerbated the problem, the leadership of experienced divisional and, in some units, regimental commanders allowed these units to perform adequately after an initial learning curve.[15] They also profited from being transferred to the east prior to a German offensive, giving them time to settle and adapt to the conditions. Units sent eastward in the winter crisis were often hastily thrown piecemeal into battle and frequently suffered irreparable damage or were completely destroyed.
But even sending smaller units that should have been integrated into existing divisions proved very problematic, as the following report by the 5th Panzer Divisions indicates:[16]
The I./894 is subordinated to the Panzer Grenadier Regiment 13 since 22.11.1943. The experiences made with this unit appear so serious that it is considered appropriate to make higher levels aware of them.
Grenadier Regiment 894 was formed in June 1943 for security tasks on the Atlantic coast from soldiers non-suitable for the East, men who were previously rated as indispensable, in the mass soldiers classified as fit for reduced field service (Garnisonsverwendungsfähig – Feld), and deployed in the positions on the coast at the end of July 1943. On 20 October 1943, the 1st Battalion was removed from the regiment, and newly formed after the exchange of non-suitable soldiers. From the day of formation to the day of loading to the east, the battalion had 10 days available, which for the most part still had to be used for work for establishing [the unit].
The battalion was equipped in a way that has not been seen in the East either with our own or with other units. Armament: purely MG 42, namely for each company 12 light and 2 heavy machine guns. In addition, in each company two medium mortars. Combat strength of the companies average 130 men. The equipment for the winter, from the complete winter clothing, to sleds, rescue toboggans, skis up to and including coal for heating was described as perfect.
A training of the battalion with the assigned weapons has almost not taken place at all. During the time of the use on the coast, only training on the immobile defensive weapons was carried out. Only in the reserve company was some terrain training carried out. After the formation of the battalion, a special training on the heavy machine gun and mortar was begun, which however had to be interrupted after five days as a result of transport to the east. Use, handling and maintenance of all weapons, priming and use of hand grenades, and the use of the spade invariably are almost unknown to the battalion. The principles on the use of weapons and the building of positions are also unknown to most officers and NCOs.
During the formation of the battalion, it never trained as a unit at all. Therefore, none of the leaders were trained in smooth cooperation. Because of their short affiliation with the troops, most of them hardly knew each other.
The personnel situation was as follows:
NCOs and men at march out: 800
Thereof with experiences in the East: 8% 60
Thereof with otherwise war experiences (France) 90
Without any war experience 81% 650
Officer situation at march out: 11
of which with experience in the East (mainly partisan war) 5
of which otherwise war-experienced (campaign in France) 3
of which without war experience: 3
A 46-year-old Hautpmann was appointed as the leader of the battalion, who until now had been company commander of a bicycle company, and so far had occasionally led a battalion as deputy. He had experience in bandit warfare, but all that is fundamental in the entrenchment and defence of a position is completely new to him. A Leutnant was assigned to him as adjutant, who learned about and took over the affairs of the adjutant for the first time at the end of October 1943. His wartime experiences were limited to the war against France. He had not been in the East yet. The same information applies to the special mission staff officer. Of the company leaders two had experiences in the East. However, the experience of the one limited itself to the staff activity. The third company leader was 2 months [in the Soviet Union], and the fourth not yet in the East.
Immediately prior to the start of the railroad transport, the battalion was given replacements from the class of 1925, which accounted for 16% of the total strength. These young men were all grouped together in a company. As a result of imperfect training and inexperience among the leaders and NCOs, these young replacements suffered considerable casualties within a few days, so that now only 9% are still available.
The total losses of the battalion were also comparatively high as measured by combat activity. Within 9 days, there were 180 casualties. These losses are mainly attributed to the lack of combat experience, likewise the comparatively high losses of armament, devices and equipment already in the first 24 hours.
Such a wear-and-tear of people and material would not have occurred in a veteran unit. There, men as well as weapons and equipment come into expert hands. What is lacking in training will be made good in a sound form, be it during the deployment, and weapons are issued only to those people who could operate them.
It seems more appropriate to refrain from such new formations, and to correspondingly replenish the old, combat-proven companies. Only then can such losses be avoided. We cannot afford any superfluous losses in the currently strained replacement situation.
15
For a detailed study on the 385th Infantry Division and its leadership, see Marco Sigg,
16
5. Panzer-Division/Ia, Betr.: Erfahrungen mit neu aufgestellten Einheiten im Einsatz, 2.1.44, BA-MA RH 20-2/557.