Although the court ruled that female service members were discriminated against by the policy of differential treatment, it is far from clear that this is exclusively a case of the first sexism. One could as easily say that husbands of female service members are discriminated against because they are denied the benefits that wives of male service members automatically enjoy. Alternatively, one could say, as I think we should, that both female service members and their male spouses are discriminated against, in which case the discriminatory policy is an example of both the first and the second sexism. It is noteworthy, however, that the court noticed only the first sexism. This supports my claim that even though a second sexism exists and is often intertwined with the first sexism, the second sexism typically remains invisible.31 The aim of this book is to make it visible.
Two Kinds of Denialist
Arguments showing that there is a second sexism raise objections from two main directions.32 Most plentiful, at least within the academy, are objections from some (but not all) feminists. From the other side come objections from some conservatives. In each case, the objectors deny either there is such a thing as the second sexism or that it is as extensive as I shall argue it is.
Consider, first, those second sexism denialists from among the ranks of feminists. Feminists, of course, are not a monolithic group. There are numerous ways of categorizing varieties of feminist, but for my purposes only one distinction is crucial. It is the distinction between those feminists who are motivated by and interested in equality of the sexes and those feminists whose primary concern is the advancement of women and girls. Some feminists — those of the second kind — are likely to claim that this is a distinction without a difference. They will argue that equality of the sexes is promoted by advancing the interests of females, and vice versa. They are (only) partly right. Promoting equality of the sexes does often coincide with the promotion of women’s interests. It does so when women are unfairly discriminated against. However, because men, as I shall argue, are sometimes the victims of unfair discrimination, the promotion of gender equality will sometimes require the advancement of men’s rather than women’s interests.
We might refer to those feminists who are fundamentally concerned with equality of the sexes as egalitarian feminists,33 and those feminists who are basically concerned only with the promotion of women’s and girls’ interests as partisan feminists.34 The latter are the feminist equivalent of those men’s rights advocates who are interested only in advancing the interests and protecting the rights of males. Feminists are rightly critical of that view, but partisan feminists do not notice that the blinkered pursuit of one sex’s interests that is characteristic of such (but not other) men’s rights advocates is similarly true of their own position. This criticism does not extend to the egalitarian feminists.35 Nothing that I say should be hostile to egalitarian feminism. Indeed, I endorse that form of feminism. Advocates of this view will recognize that opposing the second sexism is one part of the overall project of opposing sexism and promoting gender equality. What I shall say will be antagonistic only to partisan feminism.
In drawing the distinction between egalitarian and partisan feminists, I have not claimed that egalitarian feminists must recognize that there is a second sexism. Obviously, a commitment to equality of the sexes does not entail the belief that men are the victims of some unfair discrimination. The aim of this book is to argue that males are indeed the victims of sexism. The only point I am making now is that there is nothing in that claim that is inconsistent with egalitarian feminism.
In distinguishing egalitarian feminism from partisan feminism I have not proved that there are any partisan feminists. The distinction also does not prove that there are any egalitarian feminists, but it is the category of partisan feminists that some feminists might claim is empty. I intend to show at various points in the course of this book that there are indeed feminists of this kind. There are some, but not many, feminists who explicitly espouse what I have called partisan feminism.36 Much more commonly, however, many of those who profess egalitarian feminism in fact slip into a partisan form of feminism. They interpret the evidence as proving that females are the victims of discrimination even when they are not — and even when it is instead males who are the victims of discrimination. They also engage in rationalizations to reach the conclusion in any given instance that it is female interests that ought to prevail.
I do not intend to identify particular feminists as egalitarian. One reason for this is that it is difficult at this stage to determine who the real egalitarian feminists are. Almost all feminists writing about sex discrimination have been concerned with discrimination against females. It is difficult to know whether any given feminist has ignored discrimination against males simply because she or he has not been aware of the problem. It remains to be seen what will happen once they are made aware of it. Once it is drawn to their attention, their (broad) options seem to be these:
(1) They could accept that there is some wrongful discrimination against males (and join me in opposing it).
(2) They could provide good arguments why, contrary to what I say, males are not the victims of any wrongful discrimination.
(3) They could reject the conclusion that males are the victims of wrongful discrimination but fail to provide good reasons for this conclusion and instead engage in the familiar rationalizations that I shall discuss later.
(4) They could declare that they are not interested in discrimination against men and boys even if it does exist.
The first two options are compatible with egalitarian feminism, while the second two either suggest (option 3) or explicitly declare (option 4) partisan feminism. Partly for this reason, those in the third category are likely to claim that they are actually in the second. I do not wish to prejudge how particular people will respond. Because many feminists who profess to be egalitarian slip into a partisan form of feminism when confronted with arguments that there is a second sexism, one often cannot easily tell (in advance) which of those who profess to be interested in equality of the sexes really are.
Nor do I need to identify particular egalitarian feminists (or discuss their work qua egalitarian feminists) in order to make my case. Egalitarian feminism is a possible view and one that many people profess. The question of who actually occupies this intellectual (and political) space is not relevant to determining whether there is a second sexism. Nor is it relevant to showing that recognition of and opposition to the second sexism is compatible with the view that I have called “egalitarian feminism.”
As is the case with feminists, conservatives are not all of one stripe. Some of those who go by the name “conservative” may have no objection to the views I shall defend. This is because somebody might be conservative in one realm but not in another. Economic conservatism, for example, does not entail religious conservatism. The conservatives who will object to my arguments will most likely be those who endorse (the enforcement of) gender roles and the consequent differential treatment of the sexes, which I oppose. They will argue that many of the disadvantages that males suffer are not instances of sexism, because males ought to bear those burdens or at least that it is not unfair for males to bear them. These conservatives — whom we might call gender-role conservatives — think the same thing about various burdens borne by women, which should make them unreliable allies for partisan feminists who also deny that there is a second sexism. Indeed, gender-role conservatives may find some of what I shall argue — especially against partisan feminists — to be quite congenial. They might, for example, agree that there are the double standards that I shall demonstrate exist in the views of partisan feminists.
31
I am grateful to Don Hubin for drawing my attention to this case and for suggesting the observations I have made in this paragraph.
32
There are some criticisms that do not presuppose either of the views I shall now outline. There are not many of these and I shall consider them too in due course.
33
Michael Levin would deny that egalitarian feminism really is feminism. This is because one of his conditions for a view to count as feminist is that it not be a “platitude which no reasonable person would dispute.” He then says that views like “opposition to sexism” fall foul of this condition. (
34
This distinction is not quite the same as Christina Hoff Sommers’ distinction between equity feminism and gender feminism, even though there are similarities. (See
35
Janet Radcliffe Richards notes that there are partisan feminists (
36
For example, the (no longer existent) “New York Radical Women” in a statement of principles said:
We take the woman’s side in everything. We ask not if something is “reformist”, “radical”, “revolutionary”, or “moral.” We ask: is it good for women or bad for women?
Robin Morgan (ed.),