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The Germans enjoyed the Crimea for six months and installed a puppet government in Simferopol, which allowed a limited amount of Tatar autonomy, thereby gaining some degree of local support. The Germans stabilized the situation in the Crimea and even brought the damaged battlecruiser Yavuz to be repaired in Sevastopol’s dockyards during the summer of 1918 – one could even say that Kaiser Wilhelm II got better use out of the naval facility than Tsar Nicholas II ever had. Yet when Germany agreed to an armistice with the Western Allies in November 1918, the German occupation of the Crimea came to an abrupt end. Concerned about the Bolsheviks regaining control of Sevastopol and the remnants of the Black Sea Fleet, the British Mediterranean Fleet sent a naval expeditionary force to the Crimea less than two weeks after the armistice. Landing parties from the cruiser HMS Canterbury were the first to reach Sevastopol on November 24, where they took control over the remaining Russian warships. The next day, a larger force with two British battleships arrived, joined by French and Italian warships. Vice-Admiral Albert Hopman, in charge of the 11,000 German troops in Sevastopol, was allowed to assist with maintaining order until more Allied troops arrived.[15] Although welcomed at first, the British were ignorant of local political factions, and their efforts to encourage a new anti-Bolshevik provisional government in Simferopol were ham-fisted. The famous British spy, Sydney Reilly, was sent to Sevastopol to gather information about political conditions in the area, but much of what he reported was inaccurate or overly optimistic. A contingent of 500 Royal Marines landed on December 1, but the British decided to hand responsibility for the Crimea over to the French, who landed the 176e régiment d’infanterie at Sevastopol on December 26, 1918.[16]

The French, particularly Georges Clemenceau, had ambitious plans for the Crimea and military intervention in southern Russia against the Bolsheviks. Clemenceau regarded the Crimea as the perfect bastion from which to cooperate with local White forces, since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire enabled Allied naval forces to operate freely in the Black Sea. However, Clemenceau’s vision of rolling back Bolshevism in Ukraine was not matched by the requisite military muscle. A 2,000-man Greek regiment arrived in January 1919 to reinforce the French, and then several French colonial battalions of Senegalese and Algerians, but the Allied force in the Crimea never exceeded 7,000 men. A French fleet, including the dreadnoughts France and Jean Bart, also arrived at Sevastopol, but French control did not extend beyond the range of their fleet’s guns. Morale among the war-weary French forces was poor and their relations with the Crimean people deteriorated rapidly. Nor did White forces, who opposed the Bolsheviks, have more than a token force in the Crimea. By March 1919, the Bolsheviks began moving to eject both the French and the Whites from the Crimea.

Typically for the disorganized Whites, they left the Perekop Isthmus only lightly guarded, and the Red 14th Army easily stormed the Tatar Wall on April 3. Within five days, Red cavalry reached Simferopol, sending the Provisional Government and Whites scrambling for safety. Red troops reached the outskirts of Sevastopol on 14 April and French naval gunfire repulsed the first tentative assault. However, the French had no stomach for real fighting and a serious mutiny broke out on both French dreadnoughts. A number of rebellious French sailors expressed sympathy with the Bolshevik cause and it was soon apparent that many troops were unreliable as well. The French agreed to a temporary cease-fire with the Bolsheviks, in return for evacuating their forces from the Crimea. Even though the British battleship HMS Iron Duke was in Sevastopol, the Royal Navy decided to focus on incapacitating the remaining Russian warships in the port while negotiations dragged on. The British were particularly concerned about the Bolsheviks acquiring intact submarines. British sabotage parties used demolition charges to destroy the engines on a number of warships, including both Evstafi-class pre-dreadnoughts, four destroyers and all nine submarines. Although the French agreed to a cease-fire with the Bolsheviks, the Royal Navy did not, and HMS Iron Duke and two light cruisers shelled Red positions along the coast on April 25 and April 27.[17] On April 28, 1919, the French and Greek troops completed their evacuation from Sevastopol and the Red Army marched in the next day.

Although a large number of Russian civilians left with the French, the remaining White forces retreated to the Kerch Peninsula and entrenched themselves near Ak-Monai. The Reds quickly established the Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic in Simferopol, but due to the outbreak of anti-Bolshevik rebellion in large areas of Ukraine, much of the 14th Army was transferred before victory in the Crimea was complete. Commissar Pavel E. Dybenko, a former sailor and political agitator, was left with only 9,600 troops in the Crimea. Dybenko sent his available troops east to attack the Whites at Ak-Monai, but the Royal Navy intervened; between May 2 and June 9, the British positioned two powerful naval task groups on either side of the Kerch Peninsula, one in the Sea of Azov and the other off Feodosiya. Naval gunfire from the battleships HMS Marlborough and HMS Emperor of India, supported by two light cruisers and six destroyers, prevented Red troops from breaching the White defenses.[18] Furthermore, the Royal Navy helped the Whites to move additional forces from Novorossiysk back to the Crimea. General Yakov Slashchev landed near Feodosiya with an infantry brigade and soon joined with local White forces. Alarmed by reports of White landings in the Crimea, Dybenko opted to abandon the Crimea without a fight. Slashchev’s troops marched back into Sevastopol on June 24, 1919. Thanks to British naval gunfire support, the Whites had recovered the Crimea and Anton Deniken, the leader of the White Volunteer Army, was determined not only to hold onto it as a bastion but to use it as a springboard for one last counteroffensive that ambitiously aimed for Moscow. However, Deniken’s counteroffensive failed, and by early December 1919 the defeated Volunteer Army was retreating to the Crimea, where it would make its last stand. On April 4, 1920, Deniken was replaced by Baron Petr Nikolayevich Wrangel, who assumed command over all White forces in the Crimea.[19]

Wrangel believed that the Whites might be able to hold the Crimea indefinitely, since even his depleted Volunteer Army could defend the only two practical land routes: the Perekop and Chongar. He stationed General-Lieutenant Aleksandr P. Kutepov’s 1st Corps behind the old Tatar Wall at the Perekop Isthmus, which was heavily fortified with barbed wire, machine guns, and artillery during the fall of 1919. The 38-year-old Kutepov, last commander of the elite Preobrazhensky Regiment, was one of the best fighting generals of the Volunteer Army and a stern disciplinarian who kept his troops in good order. Kutepov’s troops dug three lines of trenches at Perekop, fronted by three to five rows of barbed wire. He had 8,900 troops holding a 5½-mile-wide front at Perekop, with another 7,500 men holding a reserve position at Ishun, 12 miles south of Perekop.[20]

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15

David Snook, British Naval Operations in the Black Sea 1918–1920, Part 1, Warship International, Volume XXVI, No. 1 (1989), p. 44.

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16

J. Kim Munholland, The French army and intervention in Southern Russia, 1918–1919, Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique, Volume 22, Issue 1, 1981, pp. 43–66.

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17

Snook, British Naval Operations in the Black Sea 1918–1920, Part 1, p. 45.

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18

Snook, British Naval Operations in the Black Sea 1918–1920, Part 1, p. 45.

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19

W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory: A History of the Russian Civil War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 423–424.

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20

Vladimir K. Triandafillov, “Perekopskaya Opyeratsiya Krasnoy armii” [Perekop Operation of the Red Army] in Boris Gulubev (ed.) Perekop and Chongar (Moscow: Military Publishing, 1933), p. 63.