In combat, only about one-quarter of tanks hit by enemy action actually caught fire and burned out. Both sides tended to claim every enemy tank hit as a ‘kill’, but a good percentage of hits either bounced off the armour or failed to penetrate. Based upon post-battle analysis of both sides’ records, the Germans appear to have often exaggerated their tank ‘kills’ by up to 200 per cent and the Soviets by 500 per cent. Even those tanks that were considered ‘knocked out’ could often be repaired, since the damage inflicted by armour-piercing ammunition was usually not catastrophic. Crew casualties were usually limited to 0–2 fatalities per tank knocked out, with the rest of the crew wounded, so it was not unusual for a given crew to have been knocked out several times during the course of the war. In the early years of the war, Soviet tankers often abandoned their tanks if hit, and simply walked back to their own lines. The Red Army eventually issued a directive that tank crews that returned to their lines without their tanks would be sent to penal units, which forced Soviet tankers to stick with their damaged vehicles.
Chapter 1
The Opposing Armoured Forces in 1941
The German Panzerwaffe
The Wehrmacht initially deployed seventeen panzer divisions against the Soviet Union, organized into four Panzergruppen.[1] Nine of the panzer divisions were less than a year old, having been formed from other existing infantry units between August and November 1940, when Hitler decided to double the number of panzer divisions. In practical terms, this meant that nearly half the panzer divisions involved in Barbarossa had no previous campaign experience in their current role. Nor was the internal structure of the panzer divisions uniform: eight were organized with two panzer battalions and nine divisions had three panzer battalions. The Panzergruppen were further divided into ten Armeekorps (mot.), later redesignated in early 1942 as Panzerkorps, with each controlling up to two panzer divisions and up to two motorized infantry units. The Panzergruppe (or Panzerarmee after October 1941) would be the primary German operational-level armoured formation of 1941–42, while the Panzerkorps would be the primary tactical-level formation.[2] Previous campaigns had taught the Wehrmacht the value of concentrating armour, so it was rare for individual panzer divisions, brigades or regiments to operate independently in the first year of the war in the East.
The bulk of the Panzerwaffe was massed with Heeresgruppe Mitte in the center, with Generaloberst Heinz Guderian’s Panzergruppe 2 and Generaloberst Hermann Hoth’s Panzergruppe 3. These two Panzergruppen had nine panzer divisions with a total of 1,786 tanks, or 57 per cent of the total available for Barbarossa. Guderian, who had fought so hard to promote the concept of an independent panzer branch before the war, now used the credibility that he gained as a corps commander in Poland and France to ensure that he was given the strongest panzer divisions for Operation Barbarossa. Panzergruppe Guderian would start the campaign with nearly 1,000 tanks in thirteen panzer battalions and all five of his divisions were fully equipped with Pz.III medium tanks. In contrast, Hoth’s Panzergruppe 3 had a total of twelve panzer battalions in four panzer divisions, none of which were equipped with Pz.III medium tanks. Instead, Hoth was provided with 507 Czech-made Pz.38(t) light tanks, equipped with the 3.7cm Skoda A7 cannon. The Pz.38(t) tanks were still in production by BMM in Prague and had better mobility than the Pz.III Aus F/G models, but significantly less armour and firepower. Indeed, Hoth’s Panzergruppe was primarily configured as a pursuit force and had negligible anti-armour capability.
Generaloberst Höpner’s Panzergruppe 4, which was tasked to support Heeresgruppe Nord’s advance toward Leningrad, was the smallest German armoured formation given an independent mission in Barbarossa. Höpner had three panzer divisions, comprising eight panzer battalions with 590 tanks. His panzer units were all veteran outfits, but equipped with a motley collection of German and Czech-made tanks. In particular, the 6.Panzer-Division was primarily equipped with obsolescent Czech Pz.35(t) light tanks, which had no spare parts available even at the start of the campaign. The Czech Pz.35(t) was not mechanically reliable enough for a protracted campaign and none would remain in front-line combat service after October 1941. The 1.Panzer-Division was particularly fortunate in having two out of its four Schützen Abteilung (rifle battalions) equipped with a total of nearly 200 Sd.Kfz.250 and Sd.Kfz.251 half tracks.
In southern Poland, Generaloberst von Kleist’s Panzergruppe 1 was assembled to spearhead Heeresgruppe Süd’s advance toward Kiev. Kleist was given the second-best equipped Panzergruppe after Guderian, with ten panzer battalions in five panzer divisions, with a total of 730 tanks. Kleist’s command had no Czech-built tanks and a good number of Pz.III medium tanks, but he also had significantly more ground to cover in his objectives than the other Panzergruppen. Abwehr intelligence estimates on Soviet tank strength and dispositions were poor, but sufficient to indicate that Kleist would be up against some of the strongest formations available to the Red Army. Thus, it would come as little surprise that Kleist would need help from at least one other Panzergruppe to complete his mission.
The main combat elements of the 1941 Panzer Division were a panzer regiment (some divisions still had panzer brigade headquarters) with two or three panzer battalions; two Schützen (motorized infantry regiments) with a total of four battalions; a Kradschützen battalion (motorcycle infantry); an Aufklärungs Abteilung (reconnaissance battalion); a motorized artillery regiment with a total of thirty-six towed howitzers; a Panzerjäger Abteilung with towed 3.7cm and 5cm Pak guns and a motorized pioneer battalion. Most of the infantry rode in trucks, but panzer divisions were beginning to receive the excellent Sd.Kfz.250 and Sd.Kfz.251 half tracks; about 560 were available at the outset of Barbarossa. Altogether, the panzer division was authorized a total of 5,300 infantry in the five Schützen and Kradschützen battalions. A 1941 panzer division had a total of about 4,100 vehicles. The organization of a Panzer Abteilung (battalion) was far from standardized in June 1941, but its combat elements were authorized two or three light companies (equipped with Pz.III, Pz.35(t) or Pz.38(t)) and one medium company with Pz.IVs. All told, an ideal, full-strength Panzer Abteilung would have between sixty-six and eighty-eight tanks (fifteen to twenty Pz.II, thirty-five to fifty-two Pz.III, fourteen Pz.IV, two Pz.Bef) and 625–780 men.[3] Although a number of obsolete Pz.I light tanks were still in the panzer division, they were not in the panzer regiments but in the panzer pionier-bataillon, where they served as mine-clearing vehicles.
2
Some German armoured formations were already referring to themselves as Panzerkorps in 1941, but the change from Armeekorps (mot.) was not standardized until June 1942.
3