The men leading the panzers into the Soviet Union were a well-trained and professional cadre, but nearly one-third had little or no direct experience with tanks. Indeed, many German senior armour leaders in 1941 were still learning their trade and not completely aware of the capabilities and limitations of tanks. Half of the top thirty-one panzer leaders came from the infantry branch and one-third from the cavalry. At the most senior level, Generaloberst Ewald von Kleist of Panzergruppe 1 had more experience with commanding large panzer formations than any other officer in any army, although he had never actually served in a panzer unit. Generaloberst Heinz Guderian, commander of Panzergruppe 2, had commanded a panzer division and led his motorized corps in Poland and France, but was the only non-combat arms officer in command of panzer units in Operation Barbarossa. As a signal corps officer turned mechanization advocate, Guderian remained something of a dilettante throughout his career and had the impulsive, undisciplined nature of a military maverick – he was not a team player, but an individualist. Six of the ten commanders of motorized corps in June 1941 had previous battle command experience with a corps, but three – including General der Infanterie Erich von Manstein – had no personal experience with panzer units. Only three panzer corps commanders: General der Panzertruppen Georg-Hans Reinhardt, General der Panzertruppen Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg and General der Panzertruppe Rudolf Schmidt had both extensive corps command experience and had previously led a panzer division in battle. Hitler’s creation of ten new panzer divisions in late 1940 diluted the division leadership pool somewhat and, by the start of Barbarossa, only eight of the seventeen panzer division commanders had previous division command experience and five of the seventeen were new to the Panzerwaffe. A number of the new panzer division commanders, such as Generalleutnant Walter Model, had primarily been staff officers with limited command experience. The German officers tended to be older than their Soviet counterparts due to Stalin’s purge of the Red Army, with the average age of the top thirty-one panzer commanders being fifty-three.
At the platoon, company, battalion and regiment level, German tankers were very well trained in operating their vehicles and there was a high proportion of combat veterans. All had been trained at either Panzertruppen Schule I in Munster or Panzertruppen Schule II in Wünsdorf, which helped to standardize skill levels across the Panzerwaffe. Most panzer divisions passed the winter of 1940–41 in France or Germany, with considerable time spent in gunnery and maneuver training. Units rotated through training areas such as Grafenwöhr or Warthe, as well as gunnery training at the Putlos range on the Baltic. The German tank crews were extremely well-trained in their basic tasks of driving, loading and gunnery and were cross-trained in order to fill gaps created by casualties. German tankers were also trained to conduct routine maintenance, but they were not so handy at mending thrown track, conducting battlefield recovery or repairing simple defects; they tended to wait for their I-Gruppe (Instandsetzungsgrupe, Repair Group) mechanics to arrive. This type of casual attitude was not an issue in the French campaign, but in Russia it often led to tanks being abandoned. At the start of Barbarossa, most panzer commanders were proven junior officers or NCOs. It is also important to note the role played by other members of the panzer company and battalion, particularly the Spieß who played the role of company first sergeant. The real strength of the German Heer (Army) lay in its carefully groomed NCO corps, consisting of men who could easily assume higher positions when necessary to fill gaps created by combat losses. German training also put great stress on individual initiative and problemsolving, which produced a very aggressive and dynamic quality in combat; soldiers were encouraged to act quickly and not wait to be told. At the beginning of Barbarossa, the German panzer soldiers in general also had very high morale: they believed that they were on a winning team and that the campaign would be over quickly, with the survivors being well-rewarded by a grateful Fatherland. The Fascist philosophy of the Third Reich, replete with parades, medals, hero-worship and neo-Gothic heraldry, helped to create a generation of over-achievers who sought to gain recognition through dedicated service and self-sacrificing behavior. As it turned out, excellent training, an aggressive spirit and high morale were major factors in explaining the Panzerwaffe’s successes in 1941–42, as well as its subsequent defeats.
The ability of the panzer divisions to achieve decisive operational-level success in the Soviet Union rested squarely on the ability of the corps- and army-level logistical echelons to sustain the panzer spearheads with fuel and ammunition, as well as replacement crews and vehicles. However, the German logistical system was not robust enough to conduct a protracted campaign in the Soviet Union, over vast distances and in all weather conditions.
A 1941 panzer division required one V.S. (Verbrauchssatz) of fuel, equivalent to 125cbm (m3)[6] or 125,000 liters or 92.3 tons, to move all of its vehicles a distance of 100km on roads. German doctrine specified that each panzer division needed four V.S. of fuel stockpiled in order to begin an offensive, which would give it a theoretical range of 400km, although the poor state of Russian roads meant that one V.S. was often only sufficient to move a division 40–50km. In order to reach distant objectives such as Moscow or the eastern Ukraine, the Germans would require dozens of V.S. for each panzer division. However, the logistical capabilities of the Wehrmacht were grossly insufficient for an operation on this scale. The Third Reich perennially suffered from inadequate fuel production and even a short duration campaign on the scale of Operation Barbarossa would severely diminish the available fuel reserves. The Panzergruppen were allocated sufficient fuel for a two-month operation, with only limited reserves available to sustain any operations beyond the summer months. Even if the fuel was available, sustaining the armoured spearheads into the depths of the Soviet Union was nearly impossible, since the Panzergruppen lacked the organic transportation resources to efficiently move fuel more than 50km beyond a railhead. Each panzer division started with three organic fuel companies with a total of thirty trucks that could carry 75cbm of fuel or 0.6 V.S. Consequently, a panzer division could exhaust its entire fuel stockpile in a two-day advance and then become immobilized until more fuel was brought forward; this happened repeatedly during Operation Barbarossa in 1941 and Operation Blau in 1942. Rapid advances left the nearest railheads far in the rear, which made resupply far more time-consuming than anticipated. Armoured operations by both sides would be constrained by the slow progress of their rail repair units.
German fuel shortages were exacerbated by the general shortage of wheeled vehicles in the Wehrmacht, which was only temporarily made good by the use of thousands of captured British, French and Russian trucks. Unfortunately, these second-hand vehicles broke down at an alarming rate during Barbarossa, due to lack of spare parts and the poor condition of Russian roads. The panzer division’s mobility was based just as much on the Opel 36S medium cargo truck as it was on its tanks, but German domestic production of this key vehicle was never enough to satisfy authorized levels, never mind combat and non-combat losses. Further adding to German logistic problems, Hitler was so confident of a Russian collapse that only three weeks after Barbarossa began he ordered German industry to curtail ammunition production for the army by autumn 1941.[7] When the campaign did not end as expected, the German army found itself running dangerously short of artillery and anti-tank ammunition in December 1941. In short, Germany’s panzer forces were powerful and well-led forces, moderately well-equipped, but fragile due to their unpreparedness for a protracted campaign.
7
Hugh Trevor-Roper (ed.),