Polkovnik Boris S. Bakharov, an experienced tank officer, commanded the 150th Tank Brigade, which sat astride the Glukhov-Orel road with twelve T-34 and eight T-50 tanks. The 14-ton T-50 was a new light tank that had just entered production as a replacement for the T-26 and it had the sloped armour and diesel engine of the T-34, but only forty-eight were completed before the GKO terminated the program in favor of the cheaper T-60.
Ermakov’s other armoured reserve was Polkovnik Nikolai N. Radkevich’s 121st Tank Brigade, deployed near Dmitriyev with seventy tanks (six KV-1, eighteen T-34, forty-six T-26). Radkevich was also an experienced tank officer, who was a VAMM graduate and trained general staff officer. The terrain was relatively flat and open in this sector and thus did not favor the defense.
After a night of heavy rain, Guderian kicked off his part in Typhoon at 0635 hours on 30 September with a brief artillery preparation on the 283rd Rifle Division positions near Essman, followed by Stuka attacks on their artillery. Then von Schweppenburg’s XXIV Armeekorps, which was designated as the main effort, attacked the center of Ermakov’s line, while Lemelsen’s XLVII Armeekorps (mot.) mounted a supporting attack on the boundary between Group Ermakov and the Soviet 13th Army. Kampfgruppe Eberbach from 4.Panzer-Division formed the schwerpunkt and easily punched through the front-line positions of the Soviet 283rd Rifle Division, but ran into a company of tanks from Bakharov’s 150th Tank Brigade at Essman. Eberbach’s panzers from I./Pz.Regt 35 knocked out a few enemy light tanks that appeared, but were stopped for a couple of hours by two T-34 tanks in excellent hull-down positions near the town. The German tankers also encountered a substantial obstacle belt comprised of wooden TMD-40 anti-tank mines which, so far, had been rare on the Eastern Front. Eberbach sent the II/Pz.Regt 35 on a flank march to hit the T-34s from behind, but a T-34 knocked out the Pz.III belonging to Oberleutnant Arthur Wollschlaeger, commander of the 6.Kompanie. The German tankers called in air support and a flight of Bf-110 fighter-bombers strafed the Soviet positions, prompting the enemy tanks to disengage.[96]
Ermakov incorrectly reported the scale of the German attack to Yeremenko, who mistakenly assessed Guderian’s attack as a mere diversion – and then directed Ermakov to resolve it with local counterattacks. However, Ermakov’s C2 – shaky from the start – fell apart under the heat of battle and he lost control over his armour. After skirmishing with Kampfgruppe Eberbach, Bakharov’s 150th Tank Brigade retreated eastward – leaving the road to Orel open. Radkevich’s 121st Tank Brigade, which was in excellent position to conduct a flank attack against Kampfgruppe Eberbach, sat immobile for five days, doing nothing. Left unmolested by Ermakov’s armour, Kampfgruppe Eberbach routed the Soviet infantry, overran Soviet artillery positions and then captured Sevsk by noon on 1 October.
On Guderian’s left flank, Lemselsen’s corps also enjoyed success on the western flank, punching through thinly-spread infantry positions and then defeating a counterattack by the 141st Tank Brigade. The Germans had begun to adapt their tactics to counter Soviet heavy tanks and now began attaching one medium 10.5cm howitzer and one 8.8cm flak gun to each Panzer-Abteilung. When Chernov’s tanks attacked head-on into the 17 and 18.Panzer-Divisionen they managed to shoot up one German column, but ran into a deluge of fire that quickly knocked out at least one KV-I and one KV-II.[97] Lemelsen’s panzers quickly pushed in the 13th Army’s flank, widening the gap between it and Group Ermakov. Within forty-eight hours, Guderian had shattered Yeremenko’s front, routed Group Ermakov and begun enveloping the 13th Army. For the first time in two months, Guderian’s panzers had achieved a clean breakthrough and he made the most of it; Kradschützen-Abteilung 34 was sent 100km ahead up the Orel highway in the afternoon and seized the bridge over at the Oka River at Kromy by dusk. Kampfgruppe Eberbach followed, moving at maximum speed against negligible resistance.
Early on 3 October, Kampfgruppe Eberbach advanced upon Orel, a city of 110,000 people, which was defended only by a few Soviet rear service troops. Once again, German panzers were able to ‘bounce’ a major Soviet city and capture it before the Red Army could react. A lone panzer company, Oberleutnant Wollschlaeger’s 6./Pz.Regt 35, drove into the center of Orel by 1600 hours; he lost three tanks to anti-tank fire but otherwise resistance was patchy.[98] Eberbach’s panzers also engaged TB-3 bombers that were landing elements of the 5th Airborne Corps at the Orel airfield. The loss of Orel was a catastrophic blow to the Bryansk Front, since the primary communications lines ran through the city and Yeremenko quickly lost contact with many of his own units and the Stavka in Moscow.[99]
In just four days, the 4.Panzer-Division had advanced 240km and inflicted 2,200 casualties on the enemy, while capturing sixteen tanks and twenty-four artillery pieces for the loss of only forty-one killed and 120 wounded. Overall, Guderian’s two corps had eliminated over 10,000 Soviet troops in this period, and mauled two tank brigades.[100] Yet Guderian’s euphoric advance was shortlived, because the XXIV Armeekorps (mot.) used all its fuel to get to Orel and had none left. Eberbach made it into Orel with II/Pz.Regt 35, Schützen-Regiment 12, Kradschützen-Abteilung 34 and one artillery battalion, but the rest of the 4.Panzer-Division ran out of fuel 20–40km short of the city. Contrary to myth, Guderian’s spearhead was immobilized four days prior to the first snowfall, due to lack of fuel. Ammunition stockpiles with the forward units were also very low. Guderian asked the Luftwaffe to deliver 500m3 of fuel by Ju-52 transport to the Orel airfield, but Soviet fighters were active in this area and the Luftwaffe demurred. Instead, von Schweppenburg was forced to send his supply columns back to the rear for fuel and it would take four days to restock his two panzer divisions with one V.S. each – even though this amount was still insufficient to reach Guderian’s next objective – Tula.
While von Schweppenburg’s corps was immobilized at Orel, the Stavka began reacting to Guderian’s breakthrough on the Bryansk Front. In Moscow, the Stavka ordered General-major Dmitri Lelyushenko to proceed immediately to Orel and take command of several RVGK reserve units that would be released to him. He was ordered to try and retake Orel or establish a new front north of the city. By chance, Polkovnik Mikhail E. Katukov’s 4th Tank Brigade, en route from Stalingrad to Moscow by rail, was not far away and was rerouted to the Mtensk train station north of Orel. Katukov’s brigade began unloading at Mtensk on 4 October and he had a total of sixty tanks (seven KV, twenty-two T-34, thirty-one BT-2/5/7). Polkovnik Arman P. Matisovich’s 11th Tank Brigade was en route from Moscow with about fifty more tanks, including some KV-1 and T-34s. Both Lelyushenko and Katukov were very competent and experienced tank officers and, for the first time, the Red Army would have some of its best leaders and equipment in the field. Even before his brigade was fully unloaded, Katukov dispatched two tank companies with nineteen T-34s and two KV-1s under Kapetan Vladimir Gusev and Starshiy Leytenant Aleksandr F. Burda to conduct a reconnaissance in force down the road to Orel.
Meanwhile, Yeremenko was blissfully unaware of Guderian’s breakthrough and instructed the 13th Army to refuse its flank, which merely gave Lemelsen the opportunity to approach Bryansk from behind. Insufficient radios and poor coordination between units robbed Yeremenko of situational awareness and enabled Guderian’s forces to easily outmaneuver their opponents. Yeremenko’s last mobile reserve – Chernov’s 141st Tank Brigade – attempted a brief stand at Karachev against Lemelsen’s two panzer divisions, but was brushed aside. The 17.Panzer-Division then dispatched a company-size kampfgruppe from I/Pz.Regt 39 under Major Hans Gradl due west, approaching Bryansk from behind. Gradl had just thirteen tanks (seven Pz.II, six Pz.III), four SPWs with a platoon of infantry and two self-propelled 2cm flak guns. Yeremenko was unaware of the threat until Gradl’s panzers literally showed up outside his headquarters and proceeded to shoot it up; Yeremenko was wounded and forced to flee.[101] Shortly thereafter, Gradl seized a bridge over the Desna River on the evening of 6 October and then advanced into Bryansk, a city of 87,000, and seized it by coup de main on the morning of 7 October. In addition to a city, Gradl captured over 1,000 Red Army soldiers, a battalion of artillery and fourteen tanks, including four KV-1.[102] At one stroke, a small German armoured force had decapitated the leadership of the Bryansk Front, seized a major Russian city and isolated the 3rd and 13th Armies with fourteen divisions. The German 2.Armee pressed in from the west, forming the Trubchevsk kessel. It was a remarkable success, but Guderian threw it away by refusing to allocate sufficient forces from Lemelsen’s corps to properly seal off the Trubchevsk pocket. Five days later, the trapped 3rd and 13th Armies mounted a successful breakout attack that Lemelsen was unable to block, enabling elements of seven rifle divisions to slip through the loose cordon and reach Soviet lines near Tula.
69
Hans Schäufler (ed.),
97
David Garden and Kenneth Andrew (ed.),
98
Hans Schäufler (ed.),
100
Robert Forczyk,
101
Franz Kurowski,
102
la, Kriegstagebuch mit Gefechtskalender, Teil III, 18. Panzer-Division, NAM (National Archives Microfilm), series T-315, Roll 706.